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Executive Summary

Nuclear disarmament, including the elimination of all
nuclear weapons and related development programmes,
has been a central goal of the international community for
decades. Under international law, only the 2017 Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) obligates all
its states parties to destroy all nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices under their jurisdiction or control
and to never develop, produce, or control any such devices,
much less test or use them. This comprehensive rejection
by law of a uniquely inhumane and indiscriminate weapon
is the embodiment of Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a legally
binding provision that has been violated by nuclear-armed
states for far too long.

prime minister, the United States president asserted that
“I have plans on Afghanistan that if I wanted to win that
war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the earth,
it would be gone, it would be over in literally 10 days.” The
comment was widely read as an allusion to plans to use
nuclear weapons. North Korea has restarted ballistic
missile testing, firing missiles into the Sea of Japan and
ratcheting up tensions in the region.
The Ban Monitor records that 135 (or more than two
thirds) of all states today support the TPNW and its
unequivocal renunciation of nuclear weapons, while 45
states are categorized as non-supporters, and 17 states
as undecided. Despite voting in favour of adopting the
TPNW in 2017, Sweden announced in July 2019 that it
would “refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the
TPNW at the present time” though it has also indicated
that it might reassess its position following the next NPT
review conference in 2020. Switzerland’s government is
defying an instruction from both houses of the Swiss
Parliament to sign and ratify the TPNW “without delay”.
The Swiss government has committed to review its
decision by the end of 2020.

Using the TPNW as a yardstick against which progress
towards a world without nuclear weapons may be
measured, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor records
progress related to signature, ratification, entry into force,
and universalization of the Treaty. It also evaluates the
compatibility of each state’s behaviour with the prohibitions
of the TPNW, regardless of whether the state in question
has adhered to the Treaty.
The TPNW is moving steadily towards early entry into
force, despite obstructionism from nuclear-armed states.
At the time of writing, the TPNW had, by a close margin,
the second fastest speed of adherence of the treaties on
weapons of mass destruction. Adopted at the United
Nations on 7 July 2017, as of 1 October 2019, 32 states
were party to the TPNW, along with a further 48 signatories.
The Treaty will formally become binding international law
90 days after a further 18 states ratify or accede to it.
Adhering states already include Kazakhstan and South
Africa, both of which once had nuclear weapons but
subsequently disarmed; two of only four states ever to do
so. The international legal landscape governing nuclear
weapons is being transformed and their fundamental
illegitimacy further underscored.

Moreover, the Ban Monitor finds that a total of 155 of the
world’s 197 states currently maintain policies and practices
that are compliant with all the Treaty’s core prohibitions.
These are states that have already signed or adhered to
the TPNW and fully comply with its provisions, or which
are in a position to adhere without making changes to
existing practices or policies.
In stark contrast, all nine nuclear-armed states are currently
investing heavily in their nuclear forces. Most are branding
their ongoing development efforts as “modernisation”, a
euphemism for what has been termed a “ritual squandering
of national resources on weapons of horror that can never
reasonably be used.” China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States also retain large stocks
of fissile material even though they stopped production
for nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Russia and the United
States, in particular, possess enormous quantities of
fissile material that could be used to produce tens of
thousands of new nuclear explosive devices.

At the same time, international tensions in recent months
have reaffirmed the critical importance of nuclear
disarmament. Nuclear-armed states India and Pakistan
engaged in a short-lived but exceptionally dangerous
armed conflict in April 2019, with India implicitly threatening
to use nuclear weapons, and the Indian prime minister
provocatively declaring that it was “now Pakistan’s turn to
weep”. On 23 July 2019, ahead of a meeting with Pakistan’s
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states are first and foremost the nine nuclear-armed
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states. A further 31 non-nuclear-armed states are “nuclearweapon complicit” because they endorse the possession
and potential use of nuclear weapons on their behalf,
through arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence.
Two states, Kazakhstan and the Marshall Islands, have
rejected any role for nuclear weapons in their security
policies, but do not comply with the TPNW’s prohibition
on assistance because they host sites where missiles
designed to deliver nuclear warheads are periodically
tested by foreign powers (Russia and the United States,
respectively). Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the
TPNW. It will need to exercise due diligence to ensure that
any unlawful testing ends. The other 40 non-compliant
states may of course also lawfully sign and ratify the
TPNW, but they too would have to make changes to their
policies and practices to become compliant.

across the region (less than 6%) are not compliant. In Asia,
where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of
the 43 states (almost 19%) are not compliant: China, India,
Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Pakistan, and
South Korea. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands
are the 2 states among the total of 16 that are not
compliant with the TPNW.
The prohibitions in Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW on assisting,
encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts are the ones that
are contravened by the greatest number of states. A total
of 11 states (Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Kazakhstan, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and United States) assist acts that
are prohibited by the TPNW. Thirty-four states currently
encourage or induce such acts: Albania, Armenia, Australia,
Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The prohibition
on allowing the “hosting” (stationing, installation,
or deployment) of nuclear weapons is contravened by
five states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Turkey).

Europe is the region with the most states whose practices
and policies contravene the TPNW. A total of 30 of the 49
states in Europe (61%) currently maintain policies and
practices that contravene one or more of the prohibitions
in Article 1 of the TPNW.
In the other regions, compliance is generally high. In Africa,
all states have been found to be compliant. In the Americas,
only 2 states – Canada and the United States – of the 35
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1 Introduction

Nuclear disarmament has been a central goal of the
international community for more than seven decades.
Through its first-ever resolution, adopted on 24 January
1946, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly called
for the establishment of a commission that would make
proposals for the “elimination from national armaments
of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction.”1

All successful treaty-based efforts on a global level to
eliminate specific weapons (including chemical weapons,
biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines, and cluster
munitions) have been based on a widespread understanding that the weapon in question is indiscriminate or
excessively harmful (or both) and should be made illegal
in international law. Until the adoption in July 2017 of the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this
international affirmation by treaty of the fundamental
unacceptability of nuclear weapons had been lacking.

A lack of political will on the part of a minority of states still
stands in the way of disarmament and elimination of
nuclear weapons. For decades, the focus of the international
community has been on non-proliferation and limited arms
control measures, where the very logic is that nuclear
weapons have value and that nuclear deterrence as a
system will continue. This approach has helped to limit and
reduce nuclear arsenals, yet the failure to consider nuclear
weapons as illegitimate has brought us to the beginning of
a new nuclear arms race focused on qualitative
“improvements” that risk destabilizing the world and
triggering the use of these weapons.

By prohibiting its states parties from developing, testing,
possessing, hosting, using, and threatening to use nuclear
weapons, as well as assisting, encouraging, or inducing
those prohibited acts, the TPNW codifies the norms and
actions that are needed to create and maintain a world
free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty institutes a
comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons on moral,
humanitarian, security, and legal grounds.
Despite the absence of nuclear-armed states from the
TPNW negotiations at the UN, the Treaty provides a
pathway to their adherence and lays down a mechanism
for the adoption of “a legally binding, time-bound plan for
the verified and irreversible elimination of [a] State Party’s
nuclear-weapon programme”. Similarly, the Treaty imposes
an obligation on states parties that host nuclear weapons
to ensure their prompt removal.

The world has on several occasions been brought to the
brink of nuclear war or nuclear accidents through
miscommunication, misunderstandings, and technical
malfunctions.2 The intellectual “straightjacket” of nuclear
deterrence has prevented states from drawing lessons
from these dangerous realities and thus from pursuing
sustainable security solutions.3

Non-nuclear-armed states (including Kazakhstan and
South Africa, both of which once had nuclear weapons but
subsequently gave them up) are now taking the lead by
becoming the first states parties to the TPNW. In doing so,
these states are creating a long-overdue international
framework for elimination of nuclear weapons. They and the
other states parties have a responsibility to go beyond mere
adherence to the TPNW to use this tool to break decades of
acquiescence to the nuclear threat and to encourage other
states to stop justifying the “benefits” of nuclear weapons.
The impact of the TPNW will be built gradually and will
depend on how it is received and used by each and every UN
member state.

If we have learned one thing from the last couple of
decades of non-compliance with the disarmament
requirements of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it is that nuclear-armed states
consider nuclear weapons to be acceptable, desirable, and
even essential for their security needs, and that they do
not intend at any point in the foreseeable future to eliminate
their arsenals. They have been unable on their own to
overcome their dependence on nuclear weapons. Action
by the entire global community, which would pay the price
of a nuclear conflagration, is a prerequisite for progress.
As long as nuclear weapons are seen as acceptable, the
vision of a world without nuclear weapons will remain an
empty, rhetorical shell.
1
2
3

In the current international environment in which nuclear
weapons are a source of continuous tension and a

UN General Assembly, Resolution 1(I), “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy”,
London (1946).
P. Lewis et al., “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy”. Chatham House (2014), at: bit.ly/2zxFAGE.
B. Pelopidas, “The Nuclear Straitjacket: American Extended Deterrence and Nonproliferation”, pp. 73–105 in S. von Hlatky and A. Wenger (eds), The Future
of Extended Deterrence. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press (2015).
NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR
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potential trigger for catastrophic war, the TPNW is the only
global initiative that provides an adequate response. The
value of the TPNW as a contribution to both disarmament
and non-proliferation goals should be explicitly recognised
even by those states not yet ready to adhere to the Treaty
themselves.

of whether the state in question has adhered to the TPNW.
A central purpose of the Ban Monitor is to highlight the
specific activities that stand between the international
community and the fulfilment of one of its most urgent
and universally accepted goals: the elimination of nuclear
weapons. This edition tracks compliance during 2018 and
the first nine months of 2019.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
(ICAN), which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017
for its advocacy for the TPNW, calls for the universalisation
and faithful implementation of the TPNW to advance
progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In
support of the Treaty and ICAN’s objectives, Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) researches and publishes the Nuclear
Weapons Ban Monitor. Data collection and analysis are
assisted by research institutes, particularly the Norwegian
Academy of International Law (NAIL).

In addition to its comprehensive prohibitions on all nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the TPNW
contains a series of positive obligations. These include
reporting; accepting international safeguards on nuclear
material; the duty to destroy any stockpiles and eliminate
nuclear-weapon prgrammes; the duty to ensure the
removal of any foreign nuclear weapons from a state
party’s territory; the duty to implement the Treaty at
domestic level, including through the adoption of national
legislation; the duty to assist victims of the use or testing
of nuclear weapons and to remediate contaminated land;
and the duty to promote adherence to the Treaty. The Ban
Monitor will also be evaluating states parties’ compliance
with these positive obligations once the Treaty has entered
into force.

Using the TPNW as a yardstick against which progress
towards a world without nuclear weapons may be
measured, the Ban Monitor records progress related to
signature, ratification, entry into force, and universalization
of the Treaty. It also evaluates the extent to which the
policies and practices of all states comply with the core
obligations in the TPNW. The term “compliance” is used in
a broad sense to refer to the compatibility of each state’s
behaviour with the prohibitions of the TPNW, regardless

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR
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2 The Nuclear Condition in 2019

Only 25 states are known (or credibly suspected) to have
pursued or seriously explored nuclear weapons,4 and only
ten states have manufactured some form of nuclear
explosive device. One of them, South Africa, subsequently
disarmed. Three states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine – inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union
but gave up those weapons in the 1990s. Disarmament is
possible.

A new study in Science Advances, published in early
October 2019, which updates those earlier reports, makes
similarly sobering reading. The study examines a specific
scenario in which India employs 100 nuclear weapons
against urban targets in Pakistan and Pakistan uses 150
warheads against urban Indian targets. The authors
considered a range of consequences depending on the
size of the weapons used. If all the weapons are relatively
small Hiroshima-sized 15 kiloton bombs, 50 million people
would be killed as a direct result of the explosions, fires,
and initial radiation effects. If 100 kiloton weapons were
used, the immediate death toll would be 125 million. The
study also shows that the global climate effects would be
even more catastrophic and the impact on food supplies
much more severe than that predicted in the earlier studies
of a more limited nuclear war.7

According to the Federation of American Scientists, the
number of nuclear weapons in the world peaked in 1986
at around 70,300 warheads (see Figure 1). That number
was subsequently hugely reduced, and in early 2019 the
global estimate was of 13,890 nuclear warheads
remaining.5 A large portion of this reduction in nuclear
weapon stockpiles took place in the 1990s, and nearly all
of the reduction occurred in the massive US and Russian
arsenals, but there were also reductions in France and the
United Kingdom, and, as noted above, South Africa
destroyed its entire (small) arsenal of nuclear explosive
devices.

The number of nuclear weapons in the world is only one
dimension of the “arms race”. Other important indicators
include the average and maximum yields of each warhead,
the extent of financial investments in nuclear weapons
technology, and the precision and nature of delivery platforms.
Measuring nuclear “lethality” as a combination of warhead
yield and the precision of the available means of delivery, Lynn
Eden, Senior Research Scholar Emeritus at the Center for
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University,
asserts that the US nuclear arsenal “peaked” not in the 1960s
or 1980s, as the conventional narrative of the history of arms
control has it, but in the 2000s.8

Studies published more than a decade ago showed that
a war between India and Pakistan involving 100 Hiroshimasized bombs could kill 22 million people directly in less
than a week, and that the fires triggered by these weapons
would cause worldwide climate disruption and a global
famine that would put two billion people at risk.6
Fig 1: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945–2019.

4
5
6
7

S. Singh and C. R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2007), Appendix.
SIPRI, “World Nuclear Forces”, SIPRI Yearbook (2010).
I. Helfand, “Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?”, PSR and IPPNW (2013), at: bit.ly/2ZyqwmX.
bit.ly/31KsUJ3 . See also J. Coupe, C. G. Bardeen, A. Robock, and O. B. Toon, (2019). “Nuclear winter responses to nuclear war between the United States
and Russia in the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model Version 4 and the Goddard Institute for Space Studies Model E”, Journal of Geophysical
Research: Atmospheres, 124, 8522–8543, at: bit.ly/2OpXILC.
8 See e.g. L. Eden, “The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal and Zero”, pp. 69–88, in C. M. Kelleher and J. Reppy (eds), Getting to Zero. Stanford: Stanford University Press
(2011).
NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR
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It should also be noted that the reduction in the number
of nuclear weapons is not, in itself, an indicator of intent
to move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The
reductions made thus far were results of arms limitations
agreements and stockpile management, and arguably did
not form part of a coherent plan to “ultimately eliminate”
such weapons. In fact, while the overall trend towards
fewer nuclear warheads in the world is positive, other
developments point in the opposite direction:

India,11 and Pakistan have become nuclear-armed
states, increasing the number of locations where nuclear
accidents or escalation to nuclear war could take place.
Brinkmanship during fighting between India and
Pakistan in early 2019 showed the potential for rapid
escalation between nuclear-armed states (despite bold
claims of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence).12 The
prospect of nuclear war between North Korea and the
United States has also loomed large.

1. Disarmament obligations and commitments are not
being implemented: Almost fifty years after the entry
into force of the NPT, a shocking image of noncompliance with the Treaty’s Article VI disarmament
obligation presents itself. Despite praising the 2010 NPT
Action Plan as a “realistic”9 and “practical step-by-step”10
approach to non-proliferation and disarmament, the five
NPT nuclear-weapon states have simply refused to
implement a large number of the disarmament
commitments contained in the Plan. Nor have the four
nuclear-armed states outside the NPT (the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), India, Israel,
and Pakistan) taken steps towards disarmament. One
important area where progress has been lacking is in
reducing the roles of nuclear weapons in military and
security concepts, doctrines, and policies. Since the
adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, the only
noteworthy advance in multilateral nuclear disarmament
and in fulfilling the collective Article VI obligation of all
states parties to the NPT was the adoption in 2017 of
the TPNW.

4. All nine nuclear-armed states are “modernising” their
nuclear arsenals: They have continued to develop new
nuclear delivery vehicles and/or warheads, spending
vast sums on upgrading and perpetuating their nuclear
capabilities. Several observers have argued that the
world has entered a “new nuclear arms race”.13 Many of
the systems currently being developed are set to remain
operational for at least another fifty years. This
demonstrates the nuclear-armed states’ intent to
possess nuclear weapons for the coming decades, if
not indefinitely.
5. There is a “trend among some leaders to glorify the
world’s most destructive weapons”:14 In recent years,
leaders of nuclear-armed states have on several occasions
engaged in aggressive rhetoric and issued threats to use
nuclear weapons, challenging the norm of non-use of
nuclear weapons, increasing the risk of nuclear accidents
and war, and worsening the environment for disarmament.
6. The existing arms control and disarmament architecture is eroding: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty has broken down and is now dead letter.
The prospects for an extension of New START, set to
expire in February 2021, look bleak. The Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains in limbo, still
not in force more than two decades after its adoption.
And after decades at the top of the disarmament community’s to-do list, negotiations on a Fissile Material
(Cut-off) Treaty have not even begun. The Conference
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has entered its third
decade of inaction.

2. The pace of nuclear reductions has slowed considerably
since the 1990s: China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan
appear to be increasing their stockpiles. And despite
their repeated claims that they are pursuing nuclear
disarmament, there have been no negotiations about
total nuclear disarmament between the United States
and the Russian Federation (Russia) since the Reagan–
Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in 1986, or even on
reductions to 1,000 nuclear weapons each . The United
States has recently stated that the security environment
is not conducive to further reductions, seemingly
abandoning even the “step-by-step” or “progressive”
approach to nuclear disarmament in favour of a new
initiative labelled “creating the environment for nuclear
disarmament” (CEND).

7.

3. Three additional states have acquired nuclear
weapons: Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea,

The risks of nuclear weapon use have increased: The
organization Global Zero documented some 650 “military incidents” over three years (2014–2017) involving
nuclear-weapon states or their allies that occurred in
Europe, East Asia, and South Asia – levels not seen since
the Cold War.15 Of these, 54 incidents were classified as
“provocative”, risking escalation and the possibility of

9
United States, Statement to the UN General Assembly First Committee, New York. UN doc: A/C.1/69/PV.11 (20 October 2014).
10 P5 announcement, available at: bit.ly/2m5J2EZ.
11 India completed a so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosion before the end of the Cold War, in 1974. In 1998, it test-detonated two nuclear explosive devices
and declared itself a nuclear-weapon state.
12 Al Jazeera, “India–Pakistan tensions: All the latest updates” (10 March 2019), at: bit.ly/2L299XG.
13 See, e.g., M. Gorbechev, “A New Nuclear Arms Race has begun”, The New York Times (25 October 2018), at: nyti.ms/2ELCaFP.
14 N. Tannenwald, “The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo”, Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (2018), p. 17.
15 Global Zero, “Global Zero Military Incidents Study” (1 May 2017), at: bit.ly/32k4p5z.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

9

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

armed conflict. Former US Defence Secretary William
Perry stated in 2016 that the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe is “greater than during the Cold War and rising”.16 And in April 2018, the UN Secretary-General informed the UN Security Council that the Cold War “is
back … but with a difference. The mechanisms and the
safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present”.17

A minority of 40 states, however, explicitly base their
security strategies on the retention and potential use of
nuclear weapons, perpetuating nuclear risks and
undermining the international community’s longstanding
goal of nuclear disarmament. Nine of these 40 are nucleararmed states: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea,
Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The remaining 31 states do not possess nuclear
weapons but have outsourced their nuclear postures to
one or more nuclear-armed allies. In this report they are
referred to as “nuclear-weapon-complicit states”.
A nuclear-weapon-complicit state is a state that assists,
encourages, or induces activities prohibited under the
TPNW.

Nuclear-Weapon Policies

The vast majority of states already reject nuclear weapons.
The Ban Monitor finds that, as of 1 October 2019, 157
states – four-fifths of the world’s 197 states18 – have
excluded any role for nuclear weapons in their military
postures. A total of 135 states have signed, ratified, acceded
to, and/or voted in favour of the TPNW and are identified by
the Ban Monitor as “TPNW supporters” (see Chapter 3).
Twenty-two further states also maintain non-nuclear
security policies but have not yet adhered to or voted in
favour of the TPNW. For the purposes of this report, they
are classified as “other non-nuclear-armed states”.

Table 1 below and Figure 2 overleaf categorize the world’s
states according to their basic nuclear-weapons policies.

States with nuclear-free security strategies (157)

Table 1: The world’s 197 states by nuclear-weapons policy
Category

States

Nuclear-armed states (9 states)

China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.

Nuclear-weapon-complicit states
(31 states)

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark,
Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea,
Spain, Turkey.

TPNW supporters (135 states)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau,
Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Other non-nuclear-armed states
(22)

Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, North Macedonia,* Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

*

As of writing, North Macedonia was in the process of joining NATO. If it does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons
on its behalf, it will be deemed to be a nuclear-weapon-complicit state.

16
17
18

Cited in J. Borger, “Nuclear weapons risk greater than in cold war, says ex-Pentagon chief”, The Guardian (7 January 2016), at: bit.ly/2UgUfQd.
UN, “UN Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council” (13 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2MJIC3i.
As of 1 October 2019, the Secretary-General of the UN considered that a total of 197 states could become party to global treaties for which he is the
depository: all 193 UN member states, the two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine), and two other states (Cook Islands and Niue).
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Fig 2: States by nuclear-weapons policies

TPNW supporters

9

Other non-nuclear-armed states

31

Nuclear-weapon-complicit states
Nuclear-armed states

22
135

Extended-Nuclear-Deterrence
Arrangements

Note, however, that not all military alliances that include a
nuclear-armed state are automatically an extendednuclear-deterrence arrangement or nuclear “umbrella”. For
example, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines,
Tajikistan, and Thailand all maintain military alliances with
either Russia or the United States but have through
national statements, or signature and ratification of
international agreements signalled that they do not
support the use of nuclear weapons under any
circumstances.

The role of the nuclear-weapon-complicit states in
assisting, encouraging, and /or inducing continued retention
of nuclear weapons had not been given much attention prior
to the humanitarian initiative and the process that led to the
negotiation and adoption of the TPNW.
The nuclear-weapon-complicit states have incorporated
extended nuclear deterrence (sometimes called a nuclear
“umbrella”) in their military doctrines. They have officially
endorsed or acquiesced in the retention and potential use
of nuclear weapons on their behalf. Even with the obvious
credibility problem inherent in the policy of extended
nuclear deterrence (a nuclear-armed state is exceedingly
unlikely to risk nuclear war for anything other than serious
or even existential threats to its own national security)
these 31 states function as enablers of nuclear armament
and share responsibility for the perpetuation of nuclear
risks. All of the nuclear-armed members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States – frequently use their
allies’ avowed demand for nuclear protection as an
argument for their own nuclear possession and
modernisation. In the case of the United States, NATO’s
institutionally enshrined plea for alliance-wide nuclear
defence functions not only as a justification for nuclear
armament in general, but also as an argument for the
retention of “numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that
it [the United States] might not deem necessary if it were
concerned only with its own defense.”19

19
20
21
22
23

The 29 (soon to be 30)20 members of NATO have accepted
potential nuclear weapon use through their endorsement
of various alliance documents. According to NATO’s 2012
“Deterrence and Defence Posture Review”, the “supreme
guarantee” of the allies’ security “is provided by the
strategic nuclear forces of the alliance”.21 While some of
the alliance’s members maintain policies not to allow the
stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, none of
them has so far rejected the use, or even the first use, of
nuclear weapons on its behalf.
US allies Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea
(South Korea) have also made explicit statements or
published strategy documents endorsing the potential use
of nuclear weapons on their behalf. The governments of
the United States and Japan expressed through a joint
statement in 2013 that they remained committed to the
security of Japan “through the full range of US military
capabilities, including nuclear and conventional.”22 South
Korea has endorsed similar statements.23 With respect to

W. Perry et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington
DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009), p. 8.
As noted above, as of writing, the Republic of North Macedonia was in the process of joining NATO.
NATO, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review” (20 May 2012), para.II(9).
“Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities”, 3 October 2013, at:
bit.ly/2MeBsVk.
See, e.g., The White House, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea”, 16 June 2009, at: on.cfr.org/2KckdS0.
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Australia, a 2016 Australian White Paper on defence
appears to directly encourage the United States to retain
nuclear weapons: “Only the nuclear and conventional
military capabilities of the United States can offer effective
deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats
against Australia.”24

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have committed
never to “assist or encourage” the development,
manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons.26
Kazakhstan has also signed and ratified the TPNW.
Belarus, however, which is allied to Russia through the
CSTO and the Union State, has previously expressed public
support for nuclear deterrence.27 Armenia, the last CSTO
member, has, to our knowledge, not explicitly endorsed
the potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, but has
also not publicly rejected this (or the statement of the
CSTO Secretary-General). Armenia is therefore in this
report included among the list of nuclear-weaponcomplicit states.

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) has also been understood by certain observers as
a nuclear alliance. In 2010, the CSTO’s Secretary-General
suggested Russia had extended a “nuclear umbrella” over
all members of the alliance.25 Yet, the CSTO’s members do
not appear to have adopted official documents stipulating
a nuclear dimension to the alliance. On the contrary, three
of the CSTO’s members have actively distanced themselves from nuclear deterrence. Through the 2006 Treaty
of Semipalatinsk – the treaty establishing Central Asia as
a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) –

An overview of the members of extended-nucleardeterrence arrangements is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements
Nuclear alliance

States

NATO

Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Bilateral

- Russia, Belarus (CSTO/Union State).
- Russia, Armenia (CSTO).
- United States, Australia (ANZUS).
- United States, Japan (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (Anpo)).
- United States, South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty).

24
25
26
27

Australian Department of Defence, “Defence White Paper”, 2016, p. 121, at: bit.ly/2HMbnJ9.
International Law and Policy Institute, “Under my Umbrella”, Report, 2016, p. 8, at: bit.ly/2mWvRHp.
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (adopted 2006, in force 2009), Art. 1(1)(c).
Ibid.
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Fig 3: Locations of foreign deployed nuclear weapons, 2019

Host States

classification of the respective hosting arrangements as
state secrets. In 2013, two former Dutch prime ministers
publicly confirmed that the Netherlands hosts nuclear
weapons. Ruud Lubbers, prime minister from 1982 to
1994, stated that he “would never have thought those silly
things [nuclear bombs] would still be there in 2013”. Dries
van Agt, prime minister from 1977 to 1982, said the bombs
“are there and it’s crazy they still are”.30 Both were
threatened with prosecution,31 but formal charges were
never laid.

Among the nuclear-weapon-complicit states, Belgium,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey have a
particular, operational role in assisting and encouraging
the retention of nuclear weapons. They host approximately
150 American B-61 nuclear gravity bombs between them
on their metropolitan territories,28 as shown in Figure 3
above. The B-61 bombs are assumed to have explosive
yields ranging from an equivalent of 0.3 to 170 kilotons of
TNT. They are believed to be located at six bases: Kleine
Brogel Air Base in Belgium; Büchel Air Base in Germany;
Aviano and Ghedi air bases in Italy; Volkel Air Base in the
Netherlands; and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The “deterrent”
value of these foreign-deployed nuclear weapons is a
subject of debate.29

The nuclear weapons stored in Belgium, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Turkey are all believed to be under
the control of the United States. Yet arrangements are
reportedly in place for the bombs to be transferred to and
used by the host state in an emergency. Belgium, Germany,
Italy, and the Netherlands all have a nuclear role and retain
nuclear-capable aircraft and pilots trained in the use of the
weapons at the bases in question. The aircraft are
sometimes referred to as “dual-key”, as their employment
of nuclear weapons would have to be approved both by

The respective hosting arrangements are thought to be
governed by classified bilateral agreements between the
United States and the host states. Representatives of the
host states have traditionally been reluctant to discuss
their governments’ hosting policies, in part due to the

28
29
30
31

T. Sauer and B. van der Zwaan, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe After NATO’s Lisbon Summit”, Harvard Kennedy School (2011), at: bit.ly/32cXbA4.
For a review of this issue see: Todd Sescher, “Sharing the Bomb” (2017), at: at.virginia.edu/2PlVDlW.
H. M. Kristensen, “Nukes in Europe: Secrecy Under Siege”, Federation of American Scientists (13 June 2013), at: bit.ly/2L68B37.
Nuclear Threat Initiative, “One-time Leaders May Face Charges for Discussing Dutch-Based Nukes” (14 June 2013), at: bit.ly/2zw6Jda.
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the US government and the government of the respective
host state. In the case of the B-61 bombs stationed at
Incirlik in Turkey, however, any use of the weapons would
reportedly be carried out by aircraft stationed at other
bases, but it is not known whether they are US or Turkish
aircraft. There are ostensibly no nuclear-capable aircraft
at Incirlik.32

There have been several attempts by European
policymakers to have the remaining weapons removed
from European soil. For example, in 2005, the Belgian
Senate unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the
removal of nuclear weapons from Belgian territory.37 In
2009, the German coalition government committed
through its governing platform to have the remaining
nuclear weapons in Germany withdrawn. The then Foreign
Minister Guido Westerwelle promoted the initiative
enthusiastically for some time, but the United States
responded negatively, and the initiative was quietly shelved
the next year.38 At the NATO summit in 2018, the allies
collectively declared that NATO’s deterrence posture
“relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forwarddeployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure
provided by Allies concerned.”39

Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands have recently,
or are still, undergoing processes to procure new fighter
aircraft. In October 2018, after years of debate, the Belgian
government announced its decision to replace Belgium’s
fleet of nuclear-capable F-16s with a fleet of nuclearcapable F-35s. Italy was involved in the development of
F-35 from the mid-2000s and decided in 2012 to purchase
90 planes.33 The F-35s will replace Italy’s nuclear-capable
Tornado fighters. The Netherlands was also heavily
involved in the development of the F-35 and decided in
2013 to buy 37 planes. However, a majority of Dutch MPs
supported a motion in the Dutch parliament stating that
the F-35s should have no nuclear role, reducing the role of
nuclear weapons in the Netherlands’ military doctrine.34
Yet the Dutch government decided to ignore the
parliamentary vote, opting for nuclear-capable F-35s after
all. In 2018, the government decided to increase the
number of planes being ordered from 37 to 67.35 The final
technical adjustments necessary to make the F-35 able to
employ nuclear weapons (“Block 4”) are expected to be
implemented across the relevant host states between
2019 and 2024. Germany is due to replace its fleet of
Tornado fighters over the next few decades. In January
2019, the German government announced that it would
pick either the Eurofighter or Boeing’s F/A-18. Sources
reportedly specified that any replacement aircraft “must
be able to carry U.S. nuclear weapons”.36

Only the United States is believed to station nuclear
weapons in other countries today, but Russia and the
United Kingdom have also done so in the past. A total of
23 states are believed to have hosted such deployments,
in some cases without their knowledge (see Table 3
overleaf).40 Most nuclear hosting arrangements were put
in place in the 1950s and 1960s, and all but the abovementioned five cases in Europe are believed to have since
been discontinued. Most deployments were ended in the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when British, Soviet, and US
nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Bulgaria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany), Hungary, Mongolia, the Philippines,
Poland, Singapore, South Korea, and Spain. Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons
they inherited upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Since the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from Greece
in 2001, however, the rate of discontinuance of nuclear
hosting arrangements has effectively ground to a halt.

32 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.
33 Reuters, “Italy cuts spending on F-35 fighter plane” (14 February 2012), at: reut.rs/2ZjrsAe.
34 DutchNews.nl, “Ministers ignore vote, JSF jet fighter could carry nuclear weapons” (14 January 2014), at: bit.ly/2Zp6NuS.
35 De Telegraaf, “Ruimer budget aanschaf F-35” (18 September 2019).
36 A. Shalal, “Germany drops F-35 from fighter tender; Boeing F/A-18 and Eurofighter to battle on”, Reuters (31 January 2019).
37 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Belgian Senate Calls for Removal of U.S. Nukes” (22 April 2005), at: bit.ly/2NH12Bl.
38 M. Skjønsberg, “Nato og amerikanske kjernevåpen i Europa”, Internasjonal Politikk 75, no. 2 (2017), pp. 187–88.
39 NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration” (11 July 2018), at: bit.ly/30HzwYc.
40 The figure does not include territories that during the relevant period were under the direct jurisdiction or administration of a nuclear-armed state (Guam,
Okinawa, and the Marshall Islands). Sources: H. M. Kristensen, “Where the Bombs Are”, FAS (9 November 2006); M. Furmann and T. S. Sechser, “Appendices for ‘Signalling Alliance Commitments’” (6 April 2014); R. S. Norris, W. M. Arkin, and W. Burr, “Where they Were”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no.
6 (1999), E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, “Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe”, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, no. 42 (2015).
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Table 3: Nuclear-weapon hosting, 1945–201941
State

Owner

Start of deployment

End of deployment

Belgium

United States

1963

Active

(West) Germany

United States; United Kingdom*

1955

Active

Italy

United States

1957

Active

Netherlands

United States

1960

Active

Turkey

United States

1959

Active

United Kingdom

United States

1954

2008

Greece

United States

1960

2001

Mongolia

Soviet Union

1967

1992

East Germany

United States

1958

1991

South Korea

United States

1958

1991

Czechoslovakia

Soviet Union

1968

1990

Poland

Soviet Union

1968

1990

Hungary

Soviet Union

1974

1988

Canada

United States

1963

1984

Philippines

United States

1957

1977

Spain

United States

1958

1976

Cyprus

United Kingdom

1961

1975

Taiwan

United States

1958

1975

Singapore**

United Kingdom

1963

1970

Morocco

United States

1954

1963

Cuba

Soviet Union

1962

1962

Iceland

United States

1956

1959

Denmark (Greenland)

United States

1958

1958

* The United Kingdom stationed nuclear weapons in (West) Germany from 1972 to 1998.
** Singapore initially formed part of the British Empire, then merged with the independent state of Malaysia in 1963, before gaining independence in 1965.

41

H. M. Kristensen, “Where the Bombs Are”, FAS (9 November 2006); M. Furmann and T. S. Sechser, “Appendices for ‘Signaling Alliance Commitments’” (6
April 2014); R. S. Norris, W.M. Arkin, and W. Burr, “Where they Were”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 6 (1999); E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, “Nuclear
Attitudes in Central Europe”, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, no. 42 (2015).
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Fig 4: The world’s nuclear arsenals.
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Nuclear Arsenals

Fig 5: Estimated total yield of active nuclear arsenals (kilotons)

As of May 2019, the nine nuclear-armed states retained
approximately 13,890 nuclear warheads between them.
Of these, 9,335 warheads were deployed or in storage,
forming the active stockpile available for use by these
states’ armed forces. The rest were retired nuclear
warheads awaiting dismantlement.42 The United States
and Russia together possess about 93 per cent of the
world’s nuclear arsenal (see Figure 4 above).
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The Ban Monitor’s estimate is that the total explosive yield
of the nine nuclear-armed states’ active stockpiles of
nuclear warheads is equivalent to almost 1.9 gigatons (1.9
million kilotons) of TNT. With a world population of 7.7
billion, this means that a minority of nine states have a
combined, active nuclear arsenal capable of unleashing
firepower equal to around 245 kilograms of TNT per
person on earth. The estimated yield of each nucleararmed state’s active arsenal is shown in Figure 5.43
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For context, Figure 6 also translates the estimated yield
of the active nuclear arsenals into Hiroshima-bomb
equivalents. Most nuclear weapons today have an
explosive yield that is many times higher than that of the
nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, whose
explosive force was the equivalent of 15 kilotons of TNT
and ultimately led to the deaths of an estimated 200,000
people.44
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A typical nuclear weapon in today’s global arsenal has a
yield of around 100 kilotons, approximately seven times
that of the Hiroshima-bomb. For further context, Figure 7
overleaf provides an overview of the immediate estimated
fatalities and injuries which a 100-kiloton nuclear weapon
would cause if it were dropped today on Pyongyang,
Tehran, New York City, Beijing, or Moscow.45
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H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists (May 2019), at: bit.ly/2Ph4KUH.
Calculations of explosive yield were largely based on data from the Nuclear Notebooks by Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2miTj16. For
warheads with a range of yields listed by the Federation of American Scientists, the average yield was used in the calculation. For warheads without
previously estimated yields or undefined numbers, a best approximation was made based on average warhead sizes and known information about the
country’s arsenal. Total arsenals and yield estimates are based on active arsenals and do not include warheads waiting to be retired.
44 M. Hall, “By the Numbers: World War II’s atomic bombs”, CNN (6 August 2013), at: cnn.it/2NOW9Xl.
45 Statistics on the number of fatalities and injured are from NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein, using population density information and nuclear effects
information, at: bit.ly/2kTpBiH. Fatalities and injuries are based on the immediate impact of the detonation and do not account for long-term radiation
deaths and injuries or the lasting environmental impact a large-scale nuclear detonation could cause. All of the detonations calculated were airbursts,
not surface detonations.
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use in response to the use of “weapons of mass destruction
against it and/or its allies, as well as aggression against
Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the
very existence of the state is in jeopardy”.48 The last
nuclear-armed state, Israel, has not formally admitted to
possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not made clear
its policy on use.

Fig 7: Immediate fatalities and injuries from one 100 kiloton nuclear
weapon
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Theorists often distinguish between strategies aimed at
destroying the adversary’s missile bases and other nuclear
assets (“counter-force”) and strategies aimed at killing
civilians and destroying the adversary’s population centres
(“counter-value”). Counter-force strategies are commonly
presumed to require larger nuclear arsenals and more
sophisticated command and control structures than do
counter-value strategies. Russia and the United States are
believed to have maintained plans for both counter-value
and counter-force strikes since the 1960s. The remaining
seven nuclear-armed states have maintained smaller
nuclear arsenals primarily structured to facilitate countervalue strikes in response to an initial attack. However, there
are now signs that certain nuclear-armed states, China
and India in particular, are expanding their arsenals in such
a way as to enable counter-force strikes against certain
potential opponents.
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Policies on Use

Facilities and Deployments

Five of the nine nuclear-armed states – France, Pakistan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States –
maintain written nuclear doctrines that allow for the “first
use” of nuclear weapons. Two of the nine, India and China,
have long had so-called no-first-use policies, declaring that
they will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to the use
of such weapons by an adversary (Indian policy allowed
for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical
or biological attack in 2003). Yet both are in the process
of expanding their arsenals, which many analysts have
interpreted to suggesting that they might be envisioning
pre-emptive use under certain circumstances.46 Kim Jongun stated in 2016 and 2018 that North Korea will not use
nuclear weapons unless “its sovereignty is encroached
upon by any hostile force with nuclear weapons”.47
However, other statements issued by the same
government, including threats of a “pre-emptive nuclear
strike of justice” against Japan and South Korea, have
negated the credibility of these comments. Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s apparent claim in October 2018
that Russia would not use nuclear weapons first is not
reflected in Russia’s official nuclear-weapons doctrine,
which explicitly stipulates that Russia would consider their
46
47
48
49
50

As of 2017, nuclear weapons were believed to be stored
or deployed at a minimum of 108 locations across the nine
nuclear-armed states and the five host states.49 Nuclear
weapons are also frequently transported between these
locations, be it for deployment, retirement, maintenance,
or modifications. A significant number of nuclear weapons
are also on active patrol, carried through the world’s
oceans on nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines
(SSBNs50) (often referred to as “continuous-at-seadeterrence”). Between them, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States are believed to have
around 15 SSBNs on active duty at any given time. Each
of these submarines carries incredible nuclear firepower.
For example, a single UK Vanguard-class submarine
carries 40 nuclear warheads with estimated explosive
yields equivalent to 100 kilotons of TNT each, meaning
that a single UK SSBN carries firepower more than 250
times greater than the yield from the Hiroshima bomb. The
United States retains 14 SSBNs, Russia 10, the UK 4, and
France 4. All are in the process of building or procuring a
new generation of submarines.

H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuC0Yx; H. M. Kristensen and
M. Korda, “Indian nuclear forces, 2018”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 6 (2018), at: bit.ly/32fNiS7.
R. Smart, “North Korea will not use nuclear weapons first, says Kim Jon-un”, The Guardian (8 May 2016), at: bit.ly/2mvie1C.
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), at: bit.ly/2neZDH8.
H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.
SSBN stands for “submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered”.
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France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
all maintain nuclear weapons on alert, that is, warheads
mated with means of delivery and ready to be launched
on short notice (within 5 minutes). Combined, these four
states are estimated to deploy about 1,800 alert nuclear
warheads between them, with Russia and the United
States accounting for more than 90 per cent of that
number. 51 As discussed above, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States all have SSBNs on duty at
all times. Russia and the United States also deploy several
hundred alert ground-launched nuclear missiles.

The remaining nuclear-armed states are thought not to
maintain nuclear weapons on alert, storing their nuclear
warheads separately from their respective delivery
vehicles. However, it has been suggested that this might
change as China, India, Israel, and Pakistan are in the
process of fielding or upgrading their submarine forces. It
is not clear whether China, which has already fielded a fleet
of such submarines, equips its SSBNs with nuclear
weapons in peacetime.52 Table 4 below summarizes best
available knowledge on the alert status of nuclear forces.

Table 4: Alert status of nuclear forces
State

China

France

India

Israel

North Korea
Pakistan

Russia

United Kingdom

United States

51
52

Capability

Alert status

Air-delivered nuclear weapons

Not on alert

Land-based nuclear missiles

Not on alert

Nuclear-armed submarines

Unknown

Air-delivered nuclear weapons

Not on alert

Nuclear-armed submarines

On alert

Air-delivered nuclear weapons

Not on alert

Land-based nuclear missiles

Not on alert

Ship-launched nuclear weapons

Not on alert

Air-delivered nuclear weapons

Unknown

Land-based nuclear missiles

Unknown

Nuclear-armed submarines

Unknown

Land-based nuclear missiles

Unknown

Air-delivered nuclear weapons

Not on alert

Land-based nuclear missiles

Not on alert

Air-delivered nuclear weapons

Not on alert

Land-based nuclear missiles

On alert

Nuclear-armed submarines

On alert

Nuclear-armed submarines

On alert

Air-delivered nuclear weapons

Not on alert

Land-based nuclear missiles

On alert

Nuclear-armed submarines

On alert

H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists (May 2019), at: bit.ly/2Ph4KUH.
T. Zhao, Tides of Change (Washington DC: Carnegie, 2018), pp. 16–17.
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War Games and Missile Tests

Tests of nuclear-capable missiles in particular may
function as sabre-rattling and escalate tensions. As
explained in Chapter 5, tests of nuclear-capable missiles
amount to development of nuclear weapons and are as
such prohibited by the TPNW. In some situations, missile
tests may also amount to threatening to use nuclear
weapons, which is also prohibited by the TPNW.

The nuclear-armed states routinely engage in military
exercises involving manoeuvres by nuclear-capable
aircraft, submarines, and surface ships. They also routinely
test their nuclear command-and-control infrastructure and
missiles.
Several non-nuclear-armed states have in recent years
taken part in such exercises, in particular through NATO’s
nuclear sharing scheme. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands are all believed to engage in exercises to use
the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory with
their own dual-capable aircraft. Czechia and Poland have
practised the support of nuclear operations with conventional aircraft (the so-called “SNOWCAT”53 mission).54

Table 5 lists tests of nuclear-capable missiles from
September 2018 to August 2019. Russia, India, Pakistan,
North Korea, and the United States stand out as the most
active testers of such missiles. Note that the list is based
on public reports and may therefore not be exhaustive.

Table 5: Nuclear-capable-missile tests, Sept. 2018–Aug. 201955
State

Date

Missile

Location

China

24 November 2018

SLBM (JL-3)

Bohai Sea.

China

January 2019

IRBM (DF-26)

Launched from Northwest China.

China

January 2019

ICBM launch reported (suspected DF-41)

Unknown.

China

2 June 2019

SLBM (JL-3)

Flight from the Bohai Sea to a desert area in western China.

France

4 February 2019

ALCM (ASMP-A)

Bordeaux.

India

20 September 2018

SRBM (Prahaar)

Flight from Chandipur, Odisha to the Bay of Bengal.

India

6 October 2018

SRBM (Prithvi II)

Flight from Chandipur, Odisha to the Bay of Bengal.

India

30 October 2018

SRBM (Agni I)

Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.

India

10 December 2018

ICBM (Agni V)

Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.

India

23 December 2018

IRBM (Agni IV)

Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.

India

15 April 2019

GLCM (Nirbhay)

Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.

India

27 June 2019

SRBM (Prithvi-II)

Flight from Chandipur, Odisha.

North Korea

3 May 2019

Multiple short-range missiles

Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.

North Korea

9 May 2019

2 short-range ballistic missile
(SRBMs)

Flight from North Pyongan, possibly Kusong.

North Korea

25 July 2019

2 SRBMs

Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.

North Korea

30 July

2 unidentified rockets

Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.

North Korea

2 August 2019

2 SRBM (likely KN-23)

Missiles landed in the Sea of Japan.

North Korea

5 August 2019

2 SRBMs (likely KN-23)

North Korea

6 August 2019

2 SRBMs (KN-23)

North Korea

10 August 2019

2 SRBMs

North Korea

16 August 2019

2 unidentified missiles

53
54
55

Flight from Kwail, South Hwanghae Province, to the Sea of
Japan.
Flight from Kwail, South Hwanghae Province, to an islet in the
Sea of Japan.
Flight from Hamhŭng, Hamgyŏng Province, to the Sea of
Japan.
Flight from Tongchon, Kangwŏn Province, to the Sea of
Japan.

Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics.
H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “United States nuclear forces, 2018”, 5 March 2018, at: bit.ly/33vDyoo.
The list summarises reporting by Ankit Panda and Franz-Stefan Gady in The Diplomat and news updates published by Missile Threat, Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS).
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State

Date

Missile

Location

Pakistan

8 October 2018

IRBM (Hatf-5)

Unknown.

Pakistan

24 January 2019

4 SRBMs (Nasr)

Unknown.

Pakistan

29 January 2019

SRBM (Nasr)

Unknown.

Pakistan

31 January 2019

SRBM (Nasr)

Unknown.

Pakistan

23 April 2019

SLCM (likely nuclear capable)

Flight from the Arabian Sea to a target on land.

Pakistan

23 May 2019

IRBM (Shaheen II)

Missile landed in the Arabian Sea.

Pakistan

29 August 2019

SRBM (Hatf 3)

Unknown.

Russia

2017–2018

SRBM (Iskander-M)

In December 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defence
confirmed that Russia had used multiple Iskander-M missiles
– with conventional warheads – in Syria.

Russia

11–17 September
2018

Several anti-ballistic/air-defence
missiles

Siberia (“Vostok” war games).

Russia

26 September 2018

Multiple ASCMs (Onyx)

Launched from Kotelny Island, Bulunsky.

Russia

6 October 2018

2 SLCMs (3M-14 Kalibr)

Caspian Sea (flight to Chechen Island).

Several ballistic and cruise
Barents and Okhotsk seas (annual nuclear war games).
missiles
Anti-ballistic missile (likely nucleSary Shagan, Kazakhstan.
ar-capable)

Russia

11 October 2018

Russia

1 December 2018

Russia

6 December 2019

SRBM (Iskander-M)

Flight from Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast.

Russia

23 December 2018

Anti-satellite missile (PL-19
Nudol)

Flight likely from Plesetsk range, Arkhangelsk Oblast.

Russia

29 January 2019

GLCM (Burevrestnik)

Flight from Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast.

ICBM (RS-24 Yars)

Flight from Plesetsk Cosmodrome, Arkhangelsk Oblast to the
Kura missile-test range, Kamchatka peninsula.

Russia

5 February 2019

Russia

5 April 2019

SLCM (Kalibr)

Launched from port in Zapadnaya Litsa, Kola Peninsula.

Russia

1 July 2019

Anti-ballistic missile (likely
53T6M)

Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan.

United States

6 November 2018

ICBM (Minuteman III)

United States

5 February 2019

ICBM (Minuteman III)

United States

25 March 2019

ICBM and ICBM interceptors

United States

1 May 2019

ICBM (Minuteman III)

United States

9 May 2019

ICBM (Minuteman III)

United States

9 May 2019

SLBM (Trident II)

United States

19 May 2019

GLCM (Tomahawk)

Dangerous Nuclear Rhetoric and Threats

security environment. While certain threats and/or
aggressive statements were made in the context of
escalating tensions, others were issued almost entirely
without preface and were ostensibly designed to achieve
political objectives. This trend of using threatening rhetoric
involving nuclear weapons against specific states for
political purposes entails a broadening of their role beyond
nuclear deterrence towards their use in nuclear “blackmail”
or “compellence”.

The last few years have seen a spike in dangerous nuclear
rhetoric and outright threats to use nuclear weapons.
During the Cold War period, it was widely understood that
a conflict involving nuclear-armed states could escalate
to the use of nuclear weapons. “Signalling” of nuclear
intentions was usually understated and often occurred in
the context of military-to-military contacts. In contrast,
today’s reality involves much more explicit threats and
aggressive rhetoric. Recent explicit and implicit threats of
nuclear-weapon use by leaders of several nuclear-armed
states have contributed to the creation of an unstable
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Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,
Marshall Islands.
Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,
Marshall Islands.
ICBM flight from Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.
Target shot down by interceptor missiles launched from
Vandenberg, California.
Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,
Marshall Islands.
Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,
Marshall Islands.
Flight from Cape Canaveral, Florida to the South Atlantic,
off the coast of Namibia.
Flight from San Nicolas Island, California. The missile was,
according to the US Department of Defense, “conventionally
configured”.

For example, in 2015, the Russian ambassador to Denmark
stated that “Danish warships will be targets for Russian
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• Visiting the Dimona facility on 29 August 2018, Israeli

nuclear missiles” should Denmark join NATO’s missile
defence system.56 In March 2016, in reaction to the
commencement of a US-South Korean military exercise,
North Korea threatened to turn Washington and Seoul into
“flames and ashes”.57 In August 2017, US President Donald
Trump asserted that North Korea “best not make any more
threats to the United States”, or “they will be met with fire
and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world
has never seen before.”58 The next month, following the
adoption by the UN Security Council of new sanctions
against North Korea, the Korea Asia-Pacific “Peace
Committee”, which oversees the country’s external
relations, stated that the United States should be “beaten
to death like a rabid dog” and Japan “sunken into the sea
by the nuclear bomb of Juche”.59 The trend has continued
in 2018 and 2019:

•

•

• In his New-Year’s-Day speech of 1 January 2018, the

•

•

•

•

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stated: “The entire
United States is within range of our nuclear weapons,
and a nuclear button is always on my desk. This is reality,
not a threat”.60
On 2 January 2018, in response to Kim Jong-un’s
“button” comment, US President Donald Trump tweeted:
“Will someone from his depleted and food starved
regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear
Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than
his, and my Button works!”61
On 1 March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin
announced the development of an “invincible” new
nuclear cruise missile. An accompanying video showed
a computer animation of missiles raining down on
Florida.62
On 12 March 2018, in the context of UK investigations into
the attempted murder of a former Russian double-agent
and his daughter in Salisbury, a spokesperson for the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned: “Who does
Britain think it is, issuing ultimatums to a nuclear power?”63
On 22 July 2018, US President Trump tweeted (in capital
letters) to Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani: “Never, ever
threaten the United States again or you will suffer
consequences the likes of which few throughout history
have ever suffered before.”64

•
•

•

•

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Israel’s
enemies that Israel has the means to destroy them.
Netanyahu stated: “Those who threaten to wipe us out
put themselves in a similar danger”.65 The Dimona
reactor is believed to have produced the fissile material
for Israel’s nuclear weapons.
On 20 February 2019, in his annual State of the Nation
speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that, if
the US stationed intermediate-range missiles on the
European continent, “Russia would aim its weapons at
those missiles and at targets in the United States.”66
On 26 February 2019, amid rising tensions between
India and Pakistan, the latter publicly announced that it
would convene a meeting of the National Command
Authority (NCA), which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal. According to one observer, the disclosure of the
NCA meeting was “clearly meant to be a threat of nuclear
retaliation. ‘I hope you know what that [convening the
meeting] means,’ the Pakistani spokesperson said. They
also declared that Pakistan would ‘dominate the
escalation ladder.’”67
On 27 March 2019, US President Donald Trump stated
that Russia had to “get out” of Venezuela, and that “all
options” were on the table if they did not.68
On 17 April 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
stated: “In the past our people would weep, go around
the world saying Pakistan did this, did that. It is now
Pakistan’s turn to weep.” He further noted that India has
“the mother of nuclear bombs”, and that he had told
Pakistan: “do whatever you want to do but we will
retaliate.”69
On 19 May 2019, US President Donald Trump declared
on Twitter that he would bring about “the official end of
Iran” should the latter want to fight.70 US nuclear-capable
bombers had been deployed to a US base in Qatar,
neighbouring Iran, the week before.
On 23 July 2019, ahead of a meeting with Pakistan’s
prime minister, US President Donald Trump asserted
that “I have plans on Afghanistan that if I wanted to win
that war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the
earth, it would be gone, it would be over in literally 10
days.” The comment was widely read as an allusion to

56 Reuters, “Russia threatens to aim nuclear missiles at Denmark ships if it joins NATO shield” (22 March 2015), at: reut.rs/348UNfr.
57 AP, “North Korea threatens to reduce US and South Korea to ‘Flames and Ash’,” The Guardian (7 March 2016), at: bit.ly/2ZvHxOt.
58 P. Baker and C. Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.”, New York Times (8 August 2017), at: nyti.ms/2HtIO2s.
59 J. McCurry, “We will sink Japan and turn US to ‘ashes and darkness’, says North Korea”, The Guardian (13 September 2017), at: bit.ly/30L7ZoI. “Juche” is
North Korea’s state ideology of self-reliance.
60 Newshub, “‘Nuclear button is always on my desk’” (1 January 2018), at: bit.ly/2MIjn1l.
61 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (2 January 2018), at: bit.ly/2UgleeP.
62 BBC, “Russia’s Putin unveils ‘invincible’ nuclear weapons” (1 March 2018), at: bbc.in/2ZvgHdn.
63 P. Gourtsoyannis, “Russia warns UK”, The Scotsman (13 March 2018), at: bit.ly/2zrSZjG.
64 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (22 July 2018), at: bit.ly/2Zvhc7f.
65 D. Williams, “At Dimona reactor, Netanyahu warns Israel’s foes they risk ruin”, Reuters (29 August 2018), at: reut.rs/2UdDNAe.
66 N. MacFarquhar, “Threatening U.S., Putin Promises Russians Both Missiles and Butter”, New York Times (20 February 2019), at: nyti.ms/2ZtakDq.
67 J. Trevitchick, “Pakistan Promises Retaliation, Makes Nuclear Threats After Indian Jets Bomb Its Territory”, The Drive (26 February 2019), at: bit.ly/2NDaxS9.
68 E. Zuesse, “Trump Threatens Nuclear War if Russia Protects Venezuela”, Modern Diplomacy (1 April 2019), at: bit.ly/32dGwws.
69 C. McGrath, “Modi Warns Pakistan Against ‘Threats’”, Express (18 April 2019), at: bit.ly/2ZrqCl2.
70 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (19 May 2019), at: bit.ly/2HyN3tB.
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plans to use nuclear weapons.71 At a news conference
with Australia’s prime minister on 20 September 2019,
Trump repeated this point, saying that “We’ve been very
effective in Afghanistan, and if we wanted to do a certain
method of war, we could win that very quickly, but many,
many, really, tens of millions of people would be killed,
and we think it’s unnecessary.”72

Russia is reportedly adding a range of new nuclear-weapon
systems, including a nuclear-powered cruise missile and
a nuclear-armed underwater drone capable of delivering
a “radioactive tsunami”.77 Russia is also building new
ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Russia is also
widely believed to have developed and deployed a new
missile system with a range exceeding 500 km, precipitating
the demise of the INF Treaty in 2018–2019.

While many of these outbursts arguably do not qualify as
“threatening” to use nuclear weapons in a legal sense, they
nevertheless challenge the norms of nuclear restraint and
tradition of non-use. They also further increase incentives
for nuclear proliferation and are incompatible with the NPT
and the 2010 NPT Action Plan commitments to adopt
policies compatible with achieving a world without nuclear
weapons and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
military and security policies. See Chapter 5 and the
section on Article 1(1)(d) for an analysis of the TPNW
prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons.

The United States is in the midst of a full overhaul of all
three legs of its nuclear triad, an effort that will, over the
next 30 years, commit expenditure on nuclear weapons
of as much as $2 trillion (accounting for inflation).78 The
United States is also developing new low-yield capabilities
as outlined in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and in 2018
the US Congress approved funds to begin developing a
ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile of INF
range (500–5,500 km).79

Development, Production, and Maintenance
of Nuclear Weapons

China is developing a new generation of ICBMs capable
of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry
vehicles (MIRVs).80 France is in the process of acquiring a
new generation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles
and air-launched cruise missiles. Development of a new
class of ballistic missile submarines is expected to begin
during the 2019–24 military planning period.81 The United
Kingdom is already in the process of building a new class
of ballistic missile submarines. India, North Korea, and
Pakistan continue to build new warheads and are
reportedly working to develop ICBMs and sea-based
nuclear forces.

All nine nuclear-armed states are currently investing
heavily in their nuclear forces. Most of the nuclear-armed
states brand their ongoing development efforts as
“modernisation”, a euphemism for what the editor in chief
of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has labelled a “ritual
squandering of national resources on weapons of horror
that can never reasonably be used.” 73
The nuclear weapon “modernisation” programmes are the
most visible sign that the commitment in Action 1 in the
NPT 2010 Action plan to adopt policies “fully compatible
with the objective of achieving a world without nuclear
weapons”74 is not being respected. Many weapon systems
currently being built are set to remain operational into the
2070s and 2080s, meaning that the states in question are
committing themselves to nuclear armament for at least
half a century into the future. In other words, ongoing
modernisation projects “indicate that genuine progress
towards nuclear disarmament will remain a distant goal”.75
They also generate a dynamic that has been described as
a “new nuclear arms race”.76

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Although some features of the modernisation projects
now underway are intended to increase safety and ensure
better command and control, they also involve an
expansion in capabilities, including making the weapons
smaller and faster. According to the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI), “[i]n some respects, TNWs [tactical nuclear
weapons] are more dangerous than strategic weapons.
Their small size, vulnerability to theft, and perceived
usability make the existence of TNWs in national arsenals
a risk to global security. And the new perception of the
usability of nuclear weapons in both Russia and the United

A. Ward, “Trump says he could wipe Afghanistan off face of the earth in 10 days”, Vox (22 July 2019), at: bit.ly/2ZCuRWp.
J. Wagner, “Trump says he could end Afghanistan war quickly but “tens of millions” of people would die, Washington Post (20 September 2019), at: wapo.
st/2m6agLK.
J. Mecklin, “The wasteful and dangerous worldwide nuclear modernization craze”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2Zm3VPf.
NPT 2010 Action Plan, at: bit.ly/2nnMJ9M.
S. Kyle, “Modernization of nuclear weapons continues”, SIPRI (18 June 2018), at: bit.ly/2MK3CHe.
B. Zala, “How the next nuclear arms race will be different from the last one”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2 January 2019), at: bit.ly/2UgyjVj.
F. S. Gady, “Russia (Once Again) Announces Start of Sea Trials of ‘Doomsday Weapon’”, The Diplomat (27 December 2018), at: bit.ly/2NFuloa.
K. Reif with A. Sanders-Zakre, “U.S. Nuclear Excess”, Arms Control Association (April 2019), at: bit.ly/2zt2yyL.
K. Reif, “Congress Funds Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead,” Arms Control Today (November 2018), at: bit.ly/327OJly.
H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuC0Yx.
H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “French nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

24

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

Fissile Material

States, albeit for different reasons, could create a dangerous
precedent for other countries.”82 Other aspects of ongoing
modernisation efforts increase the dependence of nuclear
command and control systems on digital technologies. This
may make such systems vulnerable to cyber interference
and result in human errors, false alerts, and malicious
hacking by hostile states or even non-state actors.83

Fissile Material Production

Fissile material – highly enriched uranium or reprocessed
plutonium – is the key ingredient in nuclear weapons.
Production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
continues in North Korea, India, Pakistan, and, possibly,
Israel (see Table 6). Argentina, Brazil, China, France,
Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States produce
or procure nuclear material that could potentially be used
for non-peaceful purposes (see Table 7).

All the nuclear-armed states maintain strict government
control over their nuclear-weapon programmes. However,
a number of private companies are involved in the nucleararmed states’ development, production, and maintenance
of nuclear-weapon systems in various ways. Most of these
companies are headquartered in the nuclear-armed states,
but some have headquarters or divisions in non-nucleararmed states. For example, the Belarusian company Minsk
Automotive Factory is the only manufacturer of the selfpropelled mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M
ICBM.84 The multinational company Airbus Group, legally
incorporated in the Netherlands is currently involved in the
development and production of the French Navy’s M51
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, through its Germanheadquartered division Airbus Defence and Space. The
M51 will, over time, represent the main delivery system for
France’s strategic nuclear weapons. The French Air Force’s
ASMP-A missiles – designed to deliver nuclear warheads
by air – were developed by the joint venture company
MDBA, which was made up of Dutch/Germanheadquartered Airbus, UK-headquartered BAE Systems,
and Italian-headquartered Leonardo (formerly known as
Finmeccanica).

To enrich uranium is to increase the percentage of U235 it
contains. Natural uranium contains almost all U238 and
very little U235. Conventional nuclear reactors require the
fuel to be only about 3.5-4.5% U235. Although small
amounts of uranium enriched to up to about 20% may be
used in research, highly enriched uranium beyond that
threshold is not needed for standard power generation.
Atypical modern HEU-based weapon requires the amount
of U235 to be be at least 90%.87
Enrichment of uranium may be accomplished using a
range of methods, including, gaseous or thermal diffusion,
by use of laser, or through electromagnetic isotope
separation. Today, however, this occurs most often by
means of centrifuges. Plutonium is normally generated as
a by-product of the operation of nuclear reactors by
transmutation of individual atoms of a uranium isotope.
The NPT guarantees the “inalienable right” of all its states
parties to “develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes”, and the preamble of the
TPNW confirms that nothing in the Treaty should be
interpreted as affecting that right. There is some
disagreement about whether the “right” under the NPT and
the TPNW to develop nuclear energy extends to a right to
produce fissile material. Such production is not explicitly
prohibited by either the NPT or the TPNW. Under the
TPNW, production of fissile material amounts to prohibited
development when it is done with a view to producing
nuclear weapons (see Chapter 5, in particular the section
on Article 1(1)(a)).

The development and production of nuclear weapons
constitutes a multi-billion-dollar industry, with numerous
large companies and universities profiting from, and
lending their legitimacy to, the industrial effort.85
Investment in the major nuclear-weapon developers is
continuing to increase, although the number of investors
is declining. A report published in June 2019 by PAX and
ICAN found that a total of US$748 billion has been invested
in nuclear weapon-producing companies by 325 banks
and other financial institutions in the last two years.86
Under the TPNW, a company that develops or produces
key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device would be engaging in prohibited
assistance. See Chapter 5 for the Ban Monitor’s analysis
of the prohibition on assistance and corporate and state
responsibility.

82
83
84
85
86

H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “French nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr.
For an overview see: NTI, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age” (26 September 2018), at: bit.ly/2Ug0OT7.
A. M. Dyner, “The Armed Forces of Belarus”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2017), p. 54.
See, e.g., S. Snyder, Producing Mass Destruction: Private Companies and the Nuclear Weapon Industry, PAX, Utrecht, The Netherlands, May 2019.
S. Snyder, Shorting our Security – Financing the Companies that Make Nuclear Weapons, PAX and ICAN, Utrecht, The Netherlands, June 2019, at: bit.
ly/2KwIGBH.
87 J. MacDonald, “What Is Enriched Uranium?”, JSTOR, 8 August 2019, at: bit.ly/2mA2SIW.
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Table 6: States producing fissile material for nuclear weapons88
Facilities

States

Uranium enrichment

North Korea (suspected), Pakistan.

Plutonium production

India, Israel (suspected), North Korea (suspected), Pakistan.

Table 7: States producing fissile material for civilian use89
Facilities

States

Uranium enrichment
(low-enriched)

Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom,
United States.

Plutonium production

China, France, India, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom.

Fissile Material Stocks

Fig 8: Fissile material stocks in nuclear-armed states, weapon

China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States stopped producing fissile material for nuclear
weapons in the 1990s but retain large stocks. Russia and
the United States, in particular, possess enormous
quantities of fissile material that could be used to produce
tens of thousands of new nuclear explosive devices (see
Figure 8 and Table 8).
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There is also highly enriched uranium held by non-nucleararmed states, as Table 9 summarizes. A total of 15 nonnuclear-armed states have highly enriched uranium
stockpiles and one of these – Japan – also has a very
large plutonium stockpile on its territory, sufficient for the
production of 1,800 nuclear weapons.
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IPFM, “Fissile material stocks” (February 2018), at: fissilematerials.org/.
Ibid.
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Table 8: Fissile material stocks in nuclear-armed states90
Highly enriched

Military plutonium

Civilian plutonium

uranium
Approx.

Approx.

Approx.

nuclear

nuclear

nuclear

weapons

weapons

weapon

State

Tons

potential

Tons

potential

Tons

potential

equivalents

China

14

933

2.9

967

0.04

8

1,908

France

weapons

Approx. total

30.6

2,040

6

2,000

65.4

13,080

17,120

India

4

267

7.07

2,357

0.4

80

2,704

Israel

0.3

20

0.9

300

-

-

320

0

0

0.04

13

-

-

13

3.4

227

0.28

93

-

-

320

679

45,267

128

42,667

59

11,800

99,734

North Korea
Pakistan
Russia
United Kingdom
United States

21.2

1,413

3.2

1,067

110.3

22,060

24,540

574.5

38,300

79.8

26,600

8

1,600

66,500

Table 9: Fissile material stocks in non-nuclear-armed states91

State

Highly enriched

Approx. nuclear

Civilian plutonium

Approx. nuclear

uranium stockpiles

weapons potential

stockpiles (tons)

weapons potential

(tons)

Japan

< 10

~350

9*

~1,800

Canada

< 10

~350

0

N/A

Kazakhstan

< 10

~350

0

N/A

<1

~35

0

N/A

Belgium
Belarus

<1

~35

0

N/A

Germany

<1

~35

0

N/A

Italy

<1

~35

0

N/A

Netherlands

<1

~35

0

N/A

South Africa

<1

~35

0

N/A

Australia

< 0.01

0

0

N/A

Iran*

< 0.01

0

0

N/A

Norway
Syria

< 0.01

0

0

N/A

< 0.001

0

0

N/A

Argentina

0

N/A

0

N/A

Brazil

0

N/A

0

N/A

*

“Status of plutonium management in Japan in 2018”, IPFM Blog, 30 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2n8ZkxE. Japan also holds a further 36.7 tons of civilian plutonium abroad in France and the United Kingdom.

**

In July 2019, Iran exceeded the limit on the amount of low enriched uranium in its stockpile set out in the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal according to the IAEA.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was reported by the state-run Iranian broadcaster IRIB as saying that Iran’s next step would be to
enrich uranium beyond the 3.67% cap allowed by the 2015 JCPOA. “Iran nuclear deal: Tehran exceeds enriched uranium limit”, Aljazeera, 1 July 2019, at:
bit.ly/2n4n59T.

90

Ibid. HEU conversion rate is 15kg per nuclear weapon. Military plutonium conversion rate is 3kg per nuclear weapon. Civilian plutonium conversion rate is
5kg per nuclear weapon. See: See Z. Mian and A. Glaser, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015”, International Panel on Fissile Materials (May 2015), at:
bit.ly/2Pj8NzY.
91 Sources: International Panel on Fissile Material data, at: bit.ly/2kNa83B and bit.ly/2mkjYKO. Information on HEU stockpiles as at December 2018 and
information on Pu stockpiles as at December 2016.
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3 Status of the TPNW

Moment of adoption of the TPNW, 7 July 2017. Photo, Clare Conboy.

The TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017 at a diplomatic
conference established by the UN General Assembly. A
total of 122 states, more than three-fifths of the world’s
197 states, voted in favour of the Treaty’s adoption.92 Only
one state participating in the conference, the Netherlands,
voted against, while a second, Singapore, abstained. The
Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017,
with Brazil becoming its first signatory. It can be signed by
any state, also after its entry into force. The TPNW will
enter into force 90 days after the 50th state has ratified or
acceded to it.

had acceded. Thus, 32 states have adhered to the TPNW,
and a further 48 states are signatories that have not yet
ratified the Treaty. This is illustrated in Figure 9 and Table 10
overleaf.
In addition, the Ban Monitor includes among the TPNW
supporters the category “other supporters”, which consists
of an additional 55 states that have not yet signed or
adhered to the Treaty, but which adopted the TPNW at the
UN diplomatic conference in July 2017 and/or voted yes
on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in
2018. If a state that voted in favour of the adoption of the
TPNW later votes against or abstains on the TPNW
resolution at the UN General Assembly, the Ban Monitor
will remove it from the “other supporters” category.

TPNW Support

Two years after the TPNW was opened for signature, the
Ban Monitor identifies a total of 135 states, or more than
two thirds of the world’s states, as “TPNW supporters”.
These are states that have signed, ratified, acceded to and/
or voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN.93

The 55 other supporters make up the most immediate
potential for new signatories to the TPNW. Many have
already started the process to sign. For details about the
level of backing that the TPNW has in the respective states
in the other-supporters category, see the state profiles in
Chapter 8. The Ban Monitor encourages those states that
have not yet done so to move swiftly to full adherence.

As of 1 October 2019, 80 states had adhered to or signed
the TPNW. Seventy-nine states had signed, of which 31
had also ratified. In addition, one state – Cook Islands –
92

Subsequently, the delegation of Maldives informed the Secretariat that it too had intended to vote in favour of the Treaty’s adoption. This was noted in the
report of the conference. See: undocs.org/A/72/206.
93 Thus far, there have been two opportunities for states to signal their views on the TPNW during votes at the UN: when the Treaty was adopted in July
2017, and on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. The TPNW resolution is expected to become an annual feature at the UN General
Assembly.
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Fig 9: Global status of the TPNW
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Table 10: The world’s states by their position on the TPNW
Category

States

Adhered (32 states)

Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia,
Guyana, Holy See, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Maldives, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Palau, Palestine, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam.

Signed, but not yet ratified (48
states)

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Cambodia,
Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia,
Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and
Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Zambia.

Other supporters
(55 states)

Afghanistan, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Undecided (17 states)

Argentina, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Serbia, Singapore,
Somalia, South Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

Non-supporters (45 states)

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China,
Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands,
North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
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Undecided States

strategies: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Micronesia, Monaco,
and Sweden. The first three states voted against the UN
General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017 but
then abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution in
2018, before announcing in July 2019 that it would “refrain
from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the
present time”.99 It also indicated, however, that Sweden
might reassess its position following the NPT review
conference in 2020.100

A total of 17 states (8.6% of the global total) are, for the
purposes of this report, categorised as “undecided”. This
means that they have neither signed or adhered to the
TPNW nor declared that they will not do so, and their last
vote in the UN was not in favour of or against the TPNW.
The current “undecided” states all have nuclear-weaponfree security strategies but are otherwise a mixed group.
Some have the Treaty under review domestically. Others
are in fact already making preparations to sign. Yet others
are, for various reasons, including internal challenges, at
this stage not considering whether to join the Treaty or not.

The 45 non-supporters are not a uniform group. Most of
them voted against the UN General Assembly resolution
on the TPNW in 2018, while others , like Sweden, abstained.
Interestingly, both Belarus and Armenia – the only two
states that have explicit or implicit extended-nucleardeterrence arrangements with Russia – both abstained
on this resolution. By contrast, all the NATO states and
states in bilateral extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements with the United States voted against. Armenia also
participated in the negotiations on the TPNW in 2017 but
did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty.

Argentina, the Marshall Islands, and Switzerland all voted
in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017, but the Ban
Monitor has moved them to the undecided category after
they abstained on the TPNW Resolution at the UN General
Assembly in 2018. All three states are in protracted
processes to arrive at a national position. Argentina’s
consistent line has been that they are still examining the
Treaty.94 The Marshall Islands’ Foreign Minister John Silk
has said that his government cannot back the TPNW
without US involvement, but has also communicated that
ongoing internal consultations have prompted the
government to take more time for consideration before
joining the Treaty.95 In Switzerland, the government decided
in 2018 not to join the TPNW “at the present time”.96
However, both houses of the Swiss Parliament
subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify
without delay.97 In response, the government has
committed to review its decision by the end of 2020.98

Forty-five states (22.8%) are categorised as “nonsupporters” of the TPNW, meaning that they have taken a
stance against signing or adhering to the Treaty. The nonsupporters comprise the nine nuclear-armed states and
all of the current nuclear-weapon-complicit states. The
category also includes North Macedonia, which is in the
process of acceding to NATO and joined the NATO states
in voting against the UN General Assembly resolution on
the TPNW in 2018.

Many of the non-supporters, and particularly some of the
nuclear-armed states, are outspoken opponents of the
TPNW. For example, they have fallaciously claimed that the
TPNW undermines the NPT. Other states in this category
have been more nuanced in their opposition. A 2018
government enquiry in Norway, for instance, concluded that
the TPNW reinforces the obligations contained in the NPT.
In November 2018, Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Søreide
stated in Parliament that “there is no legal obligation barring
Norway from signing or ratifying [the TPNW], but strong
political commitments amounting from the Atlantic Treaty
and the strategic documents we have adopted.”101 In
France, an information enquiry set up by the parliamentary
foreign affairs committee concluded in July 2018 that
France should “mitigate its criticism of the [TPNW] and the
countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that
we understand and take into account the concerns of States
and their desire for more balanced global governance.”102
The Swedish government on its part has already announced
that it will participate as an observer at the meetings of
states parties to the TPNW when it enters into force.103

Finally, the Ban Monitor includes among the non-supporters
the following four states with nuclear-weapon-free security

Political debate about the merits of the TPNW is ongoing
in several of the non-supporter states. In September 2018,

Non-Supporters

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Argentina, statement in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 2018, at: bit.ly/2kVHjSF.
The Marshall Islands Journal, vol. 49, no. 44 (2 November 2018).
Press release, at: bit.ly/2nGIhQr.
Motion, at: bit.ly/2kTeiqI.
Press release, at: bit.ly/2ktmTQF.
Article from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: bit.ly/2Gc1lzR.
Ibid.
Transcript from meeting in the Norwegian Parliament 14 November 2018, at: bit.ly/2m2RrZP.
Report from the French Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, at: bit.ly/2mtx3l2.
Article from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: bit.ly/2Gc1lzR.
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the left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from
the Spanish government to sign the TPNW, in exchange
for Podemos’ support for the 2019 national budget. The
government has not commented on how or when it will
implement this agreement.104 The Italian parliament in
September 2017 adopted a resolution committing the
government to “pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world” and
“in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with
the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of
becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting
nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination, as
adopted on 7 July 2017”.105 The Dutch House of
Representatives supports the Netherlands joining the
TPNW and in November 2018 adopted a series of motions
on nuclear disarmament including a call for an investigation
into the compatibility of the TPNW with existing Dutch
legislation. The Dutch foreign and defence ministers
responded that there are no fundamental obstacles within
the Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining.106
In Australia, the incumbent government has opposed the
idea of a ban on nuclear weapons since the beginning,
while the opposition Labor Party has formally
acknowledged the “value of the Treaty … and its aspiration
to rid the world of nuclear weapons for all time”. In
December 2018, the Labor Party committed to “sign and
ratify the Ban Treaty” when it next forms a government,
after taking into account the need to ensure
complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification
and enforcement architecture.107

Fig 10: TPNW support by region
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Support by Region

All regions have a small group of undecided states. There
is just 1 undecided state in the Americas (Argentina),
3 in Africa, 3 in Oceania, 5 in Europe, and 5 in Asia.

Breaking down the 135 TPNW supporters by region, Figure
10 shows that support for the TPNW is already high in all
regions apart from Europe, with more than 94% of the states
in Africa supporting it by either having adhered, signed, or
voted in favour, followed by the Americas with more than
91%, Asia with 72%, and Oceania with almost 69%.

The highest number of non-supporters is in Europe, where
34 states (69%) currently are opposed to signing the
TPNW. There are no non-supporters in Africa, 2 in the
Americas, 2 in Oceania, and 7 in Asia.

In Europe only three states (Austria, Holy See, and San
Marino) have adhered, and two (Liechtenstein and Ireland)
have signed but not yet ratified, while another five (Andorra,
Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Malta, and Republic of Moldova
(Moldova)) have voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN
and are in the category of “other supporters”.

For a clear picture of which states in the respective regions
that have adhered, signed but not yet ratified, are other
supporters, undecided, and non-supporters, see Figures
11 to 15.

ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2koiOgA.
ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2lY88FY.
PAX news article, at: bit.ly/2P730d7.
ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2mmfEdT.
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More information on the latest developments in the states
in the non-supporters category can be found in their
respective profiles in Chapter 8.
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Fig 11: TPNW support in Africa
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Fig 12: TPNW support in Americas
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Fig 13: TPNW support in Asia
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Fig 14: TPNW support in Europe
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Fig 15: TPNW support in Oceania
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Adherence Speed

although significantly slower than for the NPT. This progress
is taking place despite the fact that the TPNW is the only
treaty in this list whose negotiation and entry into force has
been actively opposed by permanent members of the UN
Security Council and some of their allies.

Just after two years since the TPNW opened for signature,
a total of 32 states had adhered to the Treaty. Thirty-one
states had signed and ratified as of 1 October 2019, and
one state – the Cook Islands – had acceded. To trigger
entry into force, the TPNW needs 18 more states to adhere
to the Treaty by means of ratification or accession.

On the other hand, Figure 17 clearly illustrates that the
number of states that have signed the TPNW is still low
compared to all of the other WMD treaties. Since the first
edition of the Ban Monitor in October 2018, though, ten
states have signed the TPNW.

Figure 16 shows the rate of adherence108 to the TPNW
compared to the other treaties on weapons of mass
destruction (WMD): the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the NPT.
While the TPNW almost 25 months after opening for
signature had 32 adherents, the NPT had 52 adherents after
25 months, the BWC 30, the CWC 20, and the CTBT 21. As
Figure 16 demonstrates, the TPNW’s adherence rate is on
average the same as for other WMD treaties. In fact, at the
time of writing, the TPNW had, by a close margin, the second
fastest speed of adherence of all the WMD treaties –

108
109

Universalization Efforts

Article 12 of the TPNW obliges all states parties to
encourage states not yet party to adhere to the Treaty, with
the goal of universal adherence of all states.
To promote adherence to the TPNW, a number of regional
events took place in 2018 and 2019. South Africa and ICAN
co-hosted a regional workshop in Pretoria, on 16–17 August
2018.109 Thailand, together with New Zealand and the

Rate of adherence means rate of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.
Chair’s summary, at: bit.ly/2kHK228.
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United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),
hosted a regional workshop in Bangkok, on 31 August 2018.110
New Zealand hosted a regional workshop in Auckland, on
5–7 December 2018.111 Guyana and ICAN co-hosted a
regional forum for CARICOM states in Georgetown,
Guyana, on 19–20 June 2019.112 And finally, ICAN hosted
a regional forum for ECOWAS members in Abuja, Nigeria,
on 15–16 August 2019.113

Fig 17: Status of WMD treaties 25 months after opening for signature
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On the International Day for the Total Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons (26 September), Austria, Brazil, Costa
Rica, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria,
South Africa and Thailand as long-time champions of the
TPNW hosted a special High-Level Ceremony on the
TPNW at the UN Headquarters in New York, enabling
presidents and foreign ministers from 12 states to sign
and/or ratify the Treaty while at the UN General Assembly.114
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Fig 16: Adherence speed – WMD treaties
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Press release, at: bit.ly/2m2Sucd.
Auckland statement, at: bit.ly/2mnZJfd.
Georgetown Statement, at: bit.ly/2kRrE6R.
ECOWAS members statement, at: bit.ly/2m3doYI.
ICAN news article, at: https://bit.ly/2mQmJUI.
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4 Compliance with the TPNW

The heart of the TPNW is its Article 1, which contains the
Treaty’s core prohibitions. The Ban Monitor evaluates the
degree to which the world’s 197 states – adherents and
non-adherents alike – act in accordance with these core
prohibitions. The term “compliance” is used in a broad
sense to refer to the compatibility of each state’s behaviour
with the Treaty. In this edition of the Ban Monitor,
compliance is assessed on the basis of active policies and
acts carried out in 2018 and 2019, while reference is also
made to certain significant earlier events. Interpretations
of each of the prohibitions in Article 1 are set out in Chapter
5 of this report.

Fig 18: Overall compliance with the TPNW prohibitions

42 (21.3%)

155 (78.7%)

Overall, compliance with the core prohibitions in Article 1
of the TPNW across all states continues to be very high.
As illustrated in Figure 18 and summarised in Table 11, the
Ban Monitor finds that a total of 155 states currently
maintain policies and practices that are compliant with all
the Article 1 prohibitions. These are states that have
already signed or adhered to the TPNW and fully comply
with its provisions, or which are in a position to adhere
without making changes to existing practices or policies.

Compliant states
Non-compliant states

Box 1: Article 1 of the TPNW

A minority of 42 states were found to currently engage in
behaviour that contravenes one or more of the Article 1
prohibitions. The non-compliant states are first and
foremost the 9 nuclear-armed states and the 31 states
which for the purposes of this report are categorised as
“nuclear-weapon-complicit states” (see Chapter 2), but
also include 2 states that have rejected any role for nuclear
weapons in their security policies: Kazakhstan and the
Marshall Islands. Kazakhstan has also signed and ratified
the TPNW. The two states are, however, not fully compliant
with the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance because they
host sites where missiles designed to deliver nuclear
warheads are periodically tested by foreign powers (Russia
and the United States, respectively).115 Both Kazakhstan
and the Marshall Islands can lawfully be states parties to
the TPNW, but to become fully compliant they will need to
exercise due diligence to ensure that any unlawful testing
ends. This is discussed further in the section concerning
Article 1(1)(e) in Chapter 5. The other 40 non-compliant
states may of course also lawfully sign and ratify the
TPNW, but they too would have to make varying degrees
of changes to their policies and practices to become
compliant.

Article 1. Prohibitions
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire,
possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage
in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone
to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its
territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

115

For the same reason, Kazakhstan is also contravening the provisions of existing obligations under the regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty to which
it is party.
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Table 11: Overall compliance with Article 1 of the TPNW
Compliance status

Total

List of states

Not compliant

42

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States.

Compliant

155

Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba,
Cyprus, DR Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru,
Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia,* Oman, Palau, Palestine,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South
Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.

* As of writing, North Macedonia was considered to be in full compliance with Art 1 of the TPNW. It was, however, in the process of joining NATO, and if it
does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, it will be deemed to be encouraging assistance with acts
prohibited by the TPNW and not in compliance with Art 1(1)(e).

As set out in Figure 19, Europe is the region with the most
states whose practices and policies contravene the TPNW.
A total of 30 of the 49 states in Europe (61%) currently
maintain policies and practices that contravene one or
more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. In the
other regions, compliance is generally high. In Africa, all
states have been found to be compliant. In the Americas,
only 2 states – Canada and the United States – of the 35
across the region (less than 6%) are not compliant. In Asia,
where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of
the 43 states (almost 19%) are not compliant: China, India,
Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Pakistan, and
South Korea. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands
are the 2 states that are not compliant with the TPNW
among the total of 16 states in the region.

Fig 19: Compliance by region
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Europe

Oceania

Compliance by Prohibition

Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and United States) currently encourage
or induce such acts.

Figure 20 disaggregates compliance for each of the Article
1 prohibitions. Most importantly, the nine nuclear-armed
states are not in compliance with either the prohibitions
on developing, producing, manufacturing, or acquiring
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or the
prohibitions on possessing or stockpiling them.

The specific prohibition on allowing the “hosting”
(stationing, installation, or deployment) of nuclear
weapons is contravened by five states (Belgium, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Turkey).

The prohibitions in Article 1(1)(e) on assisting, encouraging,
or inducing prohibited acts, however, stand out as the ones
that are contravened by the greatest number of states.
The nuclear-armed states’ retention of nuclear weapons
is abetted in many ways. We find that a total of 11 states
(Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, the
Marshall Islands, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom,
and United States) assist acts that are prohibited by the
TPNW. Thirty-four states (Albania, Armenia, Australia,
Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,

An overview of which states have been found to be noncompliant with each of the prohibitions is contained in
Tables 12 to 16, broken down by region.
For further background on the non-compliant states’
policies and practices in relation to each of the prohibitions,
see the analysis in Chapter 5.

Fig 20: Compliance by prohibition
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Table 12: TPNW Compliance in Africa

1(1)(a)

TPNW Article
Prohibition

Develop,
produce,
manufacture, or
otherwise
acquire

Test

1(1)(b)

1(1)(c)

Possess or Transfer
stockpile

Receive
transfer
or control

1(1)(d)
Use

1(1)(e)

Threaten to Assist
use
prohibited
activity

Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d’Ivoire
DR Congo
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Eswatini
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Sudan
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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1(1)(g)
Allow
stationing,
installation
or deployment

Table 13: TPNW Compliance in the Americas

1(1)(a)

TPNW Article
Prohibition

Develop,
produce,
manufacture, or
otherwise
acquire

Test

1(1)(b)

1(1)(c)

Possess or Transfer
stockpile

Receive
transfer
or control

1(1)(d)
Use

1(1)(e)

Threaten to Assist
use
prohibited
activity

Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
St Vincent & Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
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1(1)(g)
Allow
stationing,
installation
or deployment

Table 14: TPNW Compliance in Asia

1(1)(a)

TPNW Article
Prohibition

Develop,
produce,
manufacture, or
otherwise
acquire

Test

1(1)(b)

1(1)(c)

Possess or Transfer
stockpile

Receive
transfer
or control

1(1)(d)
Use

1(1)(e)

Threaten to Assist
use
prohibited
activity

Afghanistan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Brunei
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Malaysia
Maldives
Mongolia
Myanmar
Nepal
North Korea
Oman
Pakistan
Philippines
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Palestine
Syria
Tajikistan
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam
Yemen
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1(1)(g)
Allow
stationing,
installation
or deployment

Table 15: TPNW Compliance in Europe

1(1)(a)

TPNW Article
Prohibition

Develop,
produce,
manufacture, or
otherwise
acquire

Test

1(1)(b)

1(1)(c)

Possess or Transfer
stockpile

Receive
transfer
or control

1(1)(d)
Use

1(1)(e)

Threaten to Assist
use
prohibited
activity

Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Holy See
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Netherlands
North Macedonia
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
San Marino
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
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1(1)(g)
Allow
stationing,
installation
or deployment

Table 16: TPNW Compliance in Oceania

1(1)(a)

TPNW Article
Prohibition

Develop,
produce,
manufacture, or
otherwise
acquire

Test

1(1)(b)

1(1)(c)

Possess or Transfer
stockpile

Receive
transfer
or control

1(1)(d)
Use

1(1)(e)

Threaten to Assist
use
prohibited
activity

Australia
Cook Islands
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia
Nauru
New Zealand
Niue
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
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1(1)(g)
Allow
stationing,
installation
or deployment

5 Interpretations and Analysis

The core prohibitions of the TPNW are all contained in
Article 1. States parties undertake never under any
circumstances to develop, test, produce, manufacture,
otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, receive the
control over, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. It is further prohibited to
any state party to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity outlawed by the TPNW,
or to seek or receive such assistance. Finally, it is prohibited
to allow any stationing, installation, or deployment of any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Box 2: The Definition of Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices
Explosive Devices
As is the case with the NPT, the TPNW does not define “nuclear
weapons” or “other nuclear explosive devices”. There is, though,
a settled understanding among states of what these terms mean.
A nuclear explosive device is an explosive device whose effects
are derived primarily from nuclear chain reactions. A nuclear
weapon is a nuclear explosive device that has been weaponised,
meaning that it is contained in and delivered by, for example, a
missile, rocket, or bomb. Thus, all nuclear weapons are a form of

These prohibitions apply at all places and in all
circumstances, including when an armed conflict is
ongoing, and even if a state party is the victim of aggression.
In addition, reservations to any of the Treaty’s substantive
provisions, including those set out in Article 1, are unlawful.
That means that the scope and content of the prohibitions
and obligations may not be limited by any state party to
the TPNW.

nuclear explosive device but not all nuclear explosive devices are
nuclear weapons.
The key components of a nuclear explosive device are fissile
material (typically highly enriched uranium or reprocessed
plutonium) and the means of triggering the nuclear chain reaction.
Also key components are the precursors to fissile material, which
are termed source material (e.g. naturally occurring uranium). As
set out in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

This Chapter provides interpretations of each of the
prohibitions in Article 1(1) of the TPNW. It also summarises
the states that are not in compliance and explains what
conduct amounts to the violation of the respective
provisions.

(IAEA), fissile material (termed special fissionable material in the
Statute) “means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched
in the isotopes 235 or 233….” Source material “means uranium
containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium
depleted in the isotope 235….” (Article XX, 1956 Statute of the IAEA
(as amended))

For an overview of the core prohibitions and obligations in
the TPNW, and a comparison with the core provisions in
the NPT, see Table 17 on page 55.

In a nuclear weapon, additional key components are widely
accepted to be the missile, rocket, or other munition, including
both the container and any means of propulsion. Delivery
platforms such as bombers and submarines are not key
components of nuclear weapons as such, but they may be integral
to a nuclear-weapon system and, in certain circumstances,
investment in such a system, or the transfer of nuclear-capable
bombers or submarines, could amount to prohibited assistance.
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Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on
Developing, Producing, Manufacturing, and
Otherwise Acquiring Nuclear Weapons or
Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
Compliance status

Total

List of states

Not compliant

9

China, France, India, Israel, North
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United
Kingdom, United States.

Under Article II of the NPT, a similar obligation is imposed
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, but this applies only to
non-nuclear-weapon states. That provision — and indeed
the NPT as a whole — does not generally prohibit the
development of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
All the nine nuclear-armed states have been actively
engaged in development and production of new nuclear
weapons in 2018–2019. Although explosive testing has
been curtailed, North Korea has conducted ballistic missile
tests and is believed to be continuing to produce fissile
material for military purposes.

Development, production, manufacture, and other forms
of acquisition of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive devices are prohibited under Article 1(1)(a) of
the TPNW.

For more information on the ongoing development and
production of nuclear weapons, see the section on
Development, Production, and Maintenance in Chapter 2.

The prohibited development of a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device means any of the actions and
activities intended to prepare for its production. This covers
relevant research, computer modelling of weapons, and the
testing of key components, as well as sub-critical testing
(i.e. experiments simulating aspects of nuclear explosions
using conventional explosives and without achieving
uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions). Explosive testing
constitutes unlawful development, but as discussed below
this is also explicitly prohibited in Article 1(1)(a).

There are also potential compliance concerns on the
horizon with respect to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran has
recently restarted uranium enrichment (albeit not to a level
sufficient for use in a nuclear explosive device) and has
threatened to no longer comply with its obligations under
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The United States
had previously withdrawn its support for the agreement
and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran.

Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes
prohibited development when this is done with the intent
to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. This is the case even though the production or
procurement of fissile material is not explicitly mentioned
in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW.

Saudi Arabia has explicitly threatened to swiftly acquire
nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Saudi Arabia has also
refused to accept adequate safeguards on nuclear
material under its jurisdiction or control. It maintains in
force a Small Quantities Protocol with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) even though the fissile
material it possesses exceeds the maximum allowed
under that protocol. In September 2019, Saudi Arabia’s
new energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman,
announced at a conference in Abu Dhabi that the country
wants to extract and enrich uranium for its new nuclear
energy programme, including construction of two nuclear
reactors. Saudi Arabia is already in talks with companies
from the United States, Russia, South Korea, China, and
France for the project. However, Saudi Arabia is unwilling
to sign a contract that forbids them from enriching
uranium or from reusing used raw materials. These are
techniques that can also be used to make weapons.116

The concepts of production and manufacture overlap
significantly, covering the processes that are intended to
lead to a completed, useable weapon or device. In general
parlance, “production” is a broader term than “manufacture”:
manufacture describes the use of machinery to transform
inputs into outputs. Taken together, these concepts
encompass not only any factory processes, but also any
improvisation or adaptation of a nuclear explosive device.
The prohibition on “otherwise acquiring” a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device is a catch-all provision
that encompasses any means of obtaining nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices other than
through production. This could be through import, lease,
or borrowing from another source or, in theory, by
recovering a lost nuclear weapon or capturing or stealing
one. This prohibition overlaps with the one in Article 1(1)
(c) not to receive the control over nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, which is discussed below.

116

”Saudi Arabia plans uranium enrichment for nuclear reactors”, Teller Report, 9 September 2019, at: bit.ly/2kscKnq.
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Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on Testing
of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices
Compliance status

Total

Not compliant

0

Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on
Possession and Stockpiling of Nuclear
Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive
Devices

List of states

The prohibition on testing in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW
bans the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device. It is therefore limited to explosive testing.
All non-explosive forms of testing are covered by the
prohibition on development in the TPNW. All explosive
testing is similarly prohibited under the CTBT, but that
treaty is, as is the case with the TPNW, not yet in force.
(Because of the relative simplicity of the entry-into-force
provision of the TPNW, it can be expected that it will enter
into force before the CTBT.)

List of states

Not compliant

9

China, France, India, Israel, North
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United
Kingdom, United States.

As of October 2019, nine states possessed and stockpiled
nuclear weapons. Through the Manhattan Project in the
first half of the 1940s, the United States became the first
state to develop and possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China followed in
1949, 1952, 1960, and 1964, respectively. India conducted
a “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974 but did not at that
time advance to weaponisation of a nuclear explosive
device. In 1998, however, India and Pakistan both
conducted nuclear explosive tests and proceeded to build
up their nuclear arsenals. North Korea announced its
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and accelerated its
nuclear-weapons programme. A first nuclear explosive
device was completed and tested in 2006. Israel has never
openly admitted to possessing nuclear weapons but is
widely believed to have acquired nuclear weapons in the
late 1960s.

North Korea is the only state that is known to have engaged
in explosive nuclear testing since 1998, with its last test
occurring in 2017. India and Pakistan both exploded
nuclear devices in 1998. France completed its last nuclear
explosive test in 1996. The United States conducted its
last explosive tests in 1992. In November 2017, however,
the United States decided to shorten its testing readiness
timeline from between 24 and 36 months to only 10
months.118 The United Kingdom undertook its last
explosive test in 1991. China’s last explosive nuclear test
was in July 1996, only a few months prior to the adoption
of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly.
The Soviet Union/Russia ostensibly undertook its last
explosive test in 1990.119 In late May 2019, a senior United
States official accused Russia of potentially having
conducted low-yield explosive testing of nuclear weapons
but did not adduce any evidence in support of this
assertion.120 Other authorities within the US Government,
however, contested the official’s allegations, which were
also angrily rebutted by Russia.121

121

Total

The prohibition on possession of any nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device under Article 1(1)(a) makes
it illegal to have a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device. Possession does not necessarily entail
ownership. In contrast, the notion of stockpiling implies
(but does not require) that the possessor also has
ownership of that weapon or device. One nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device is sufficient to constitute
a stockpile.

Since the first nuclear test explosion on 16 July 1945, at
least eight states have between them conducted an
estimated 2,056 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test
sites around the world.117 No explosive testing is known
to have occurred in the period covered by this edition of
the Ban Monitor.

117
118
		
119
120

Compliance status

South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s
but decided in 1989 to give up its nuclear-weapon capability
and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state
in 1991. In 1994, the IAEA confirmed that South Africa had
converted its nuclear programme to exclusively peaceful
applications. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acquired
nuclear weapons following the collapse of the Soviet
Union but voluntarily handed them over to Russia and
joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the
1990s.

Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Testing Tally”, Last updated February 2019, at: bit.ly/2Z2t0dz.
See, e.g., A. Sanders-Zakre and D. Kimball, “NPR Rejects CTBT Ratification; NNSA Shortens Testing Readiness Timeline”, Project for the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (2 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2K8mIVs.
Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Testing Tally”, Last updated February 2019.
M. Eckel, “US: Russia May Be Testing Low-Yield Nukes, in Violation of Treaty”, Radio Free Europe, 29 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2WyD9ky; see also J. E. Barnes
and W. J. Broad, “Russia Has Restarted Low-Yield Nuclear Tests, U.S. Believes”, The New York Times, 29 May 2019, at: nyti.ms/2XF24Qy.
Reuters, “Russia says U.S. nuclear accusation is an attack on global arms control”, 30 May 2019, at: reut.rs/2WyCzTK.
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Article 1(1)(b): The Prohibition on Transfer
of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices
Compliance status

Total

List of states

Not compliant

1

United States.

cooperation and trade. The United Kingdom’s nuclearweapon system is in large measure imported from the
United States: the UK Trident warhead design is based on
the US W-76 warhead; the Trident SLBM guidance system
and a number of Trident warhead components are
imported directly from the United States; the Trident
detonator is designed and built in the United States; and
the United Kingdom’s Trident II SLBMs are on lease from
the United States.122 This does not comply with the
prohibition on indirect transfer of nuclear weapons in the
TPNW (and its compliance with the corresponding
obligation under the NPT is highly questionable).

The transfer of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device or control over them “to any recipient
whatsoever” is prohibited under Article 1(1)(b) of the
TPNW. This is so whether this occurs “directly or indirectly”.
This makes it illegal to transmit possession or ownership
to any other state or to any natural or legal person (e.g. a
company or organisation). Unlawful transfer does not
necessarily involve payment or other form of consideration.
The prohibition on indirect transfer means it is unlawful to
transmit the key components of any nuclear explosive
device in separate instalments or via intermediaries or
third parties where there is knowledge that they will be
used to produce a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device.

Under NATO’s nuclear-sharing scheme, nuclear weapons
stationed in Europe by the United States may be transferred
to and used by host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and
the Netherlands prior to their use as part of a “dual key”
arrangement. Such transfers, were they to ever occur,
would violate both the NPT and the TPNW.

Article 1(1)(c): The Prohibition on
Receiving Transfer or Control of Nuclear
Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive
Devices

Nuclear sharing was one of the key issues in the NPT
negotiations. Several of the 18 participating states
disagreed strongly about the degree to which allies should
be allowed to share hardware and decision-making
powers. In the end, a tacit agreement was made between
key states that foreign deployment would be acceptable
as long as the weapons were kept under the control of the
owner/possessor state. However, any transfer of weapons
to the control of the host state was deemed unacceptable.

Total

List of states

Not compliant

1

United Kingdom.

Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW prohibits receiving the transfer
of or control over any nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices directly or indirectly. To “receive” a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to take
possession or control over it. This broad notion does not
require that ownership also passes to the recipient. The
prohibition on indirect receipt covers accepting the key
components of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device as well as an assembled version. This
extends to transfers made through intermediaries.

Under Article I of the NPT, the five “nuclear-weapon states”
parties have committed never to transfer nuclear weapons
“to any recipient whatsoever”. The NPT does not include
a corresponding prohibition on non-nuclear-weapon states
to transfer nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly. This
means that non-nuclear-weapon states are not explicitly
prohibited under the NPT from providing others with the
key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device. This important lacuna is addressed by
Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of the TPNW. If a single state
provides another state with all the key components of a
nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, the former
state violates subparagraph (b) on transfer. If a single state
provides another state with only one of the key components,
the former state would normally violate subparagraph (e)
on assistance.

Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW follows a similarly worded
provision in Article II of the NPT, but the corresponding
prohibition in that treaty applies only to those states that
are designated as non-nuclear-weapon states.
As discussed above, the United Kingdom leases Trident
missiles and imports other nuclear components from the
United States, which does not comply with the prohibition
on receiving the transfer or control of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.

The United States violates this provision by virtue of its
export of key components of nuclear weapons to the
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and the United
States have long been engaged in close nuclear
122

Compliance status

If the United States ever handed over control over the
nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, or
the Netherlands to the host states for use in their aircraft

D. Pleasch and J. Ainslie, “Trident: Strategic Dependence & Sovereignty”, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 2006, p. 10, at: bit.ly/30QaA1j; S.
Jones, “A wonk’s guide to the Trident nuclear deterrent”, Financial Times, 18 July 2016, at: on.ft.com/30ShqDo.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

46

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

this would amount to a violation of Article 1(1)(c) of the
TPNW by those four states (as well as of the NPT).

threat of force within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
To violate the TPNW, a threat of use must be credible in
the circumstances. This means that the threat must
emanate from a person in a position to either effect or
direct the use of a nuclear explosive device. Typically,
therefore, such a threat would be made by a senior
government official in a nuclear-armed state.

Article 1(1)(d): The Prohibition on Using
Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices
Compliance status

Total

Not compliant

0

List of states

While some take the view that a policy of nuclear
“deterrence” in and of itself constitutes an unlawful threat
to use nuclear weapons, the Ban Monitor is more
conservative. It believes that in addition to being credible
in the circumstances, a prohibited threat must also be
specific as to the target of threatened use. Prohibited
threats may, however, be implicit as well as explicit. A
stated threat does not, therefore, have to refer to use of
nuclear weapons, though it is more likely to violate the
TPNW should it do so. But merely enunciating the
circumstances under which nuclear weapons will be used,
such as through a policy of “deterrence”, is not sufficient.

Under Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW, states parties undertake
never under any circumstances to use nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. Preventing use of is a
central aim of the Treaty.
To use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
is to launch, release, deliver, or detonate it with hostile
intent or for so-called “peaceful” use.123 Intent can be
discerned from the circumstances and does not have to
be publicly declared. Possession or deployment of nuclear
weapons for the purpose of “deterrence” does not amount
to their use for the purpose of the TPNW but is caught by
the prohibition on possession in Article 1(1)(a).

In certain circumstances of tension — for example where
a nuclear-armed adversary is on the brink of war — a show
of force by means of ICBM testing or an explosive test of
a nuclear weapon could amount to an unlawful threat to
use nuclear weapons (along with other violations of the
TPNW).

Nuclear weapons have not been used since August 1945
when the United States dropped a nuclear weapon first on
Hiroshima and then, three days later, on Nagasaki.
Other nuclear explosive devices have not been used in
armed conflict, though so-called “peaceful” nuclear
explosions were conducted for civil engineering purposes
between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the
1980s by the Soviet Union and the United States. The aims
of the detonations were to achieve large-scale excavation
for canals, ports, and reservoirs; facilitate oil and gas
recovery; create underground cavities for gas, oil, or waste
storage; and extinguishing fires in gas fields.124

In mid-April 2019, as India and Pakistan came close to the
point of major conflict and the risk of actual use of nuclear
weapons loomed large, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi said publicly: “We have the mother of nuclear bombs.
I decided to tell [Pakistan], do whatever you want to do but
we will retaliate.”125 In the view of the Ban Monitor, this is
the most overt instance of a state threatening to use
nuclear weapons in recent times.

Article 1(1)(d): The Prohibition on
Threatening to Use Nuclear Weapons or
Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
Compliance status

Total

List of states

Not compliant

2

India, United States.

In July 2018, US President Donald Trump tweeted the
following message (all in capitals in the original text) to
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani: “Never, ever threaten the
United States again or you will suffer consequences the
likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered
before.”126 This can be considered an implicit threat to use
nuclear weapons against Iran. In May 2019, President
Trump also declared on Twitter that he would bring about
“the official end of Iran” should the latter want to fight.127
While ambiguous, some consider this also to constitute
threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Threatening to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device is also a violation of Article 1(1)(d) of the
TPNW. This is the case whether such use would itself be
a violation of international law or whether the device is
used in legitimate self-defence against foreign aggression.
It is therefore broader in scope than the prohibition on
123
124
125
126
127

World Nuclear Association, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions”, Updated December 2018, at: bit.ly/2wGTC7z.
Ibid.
B. Brown, “India Threatens Pakistan With ‘Mother of Nuclear Bombs’; Where’s Trump?”, CNN, 18 April 2019, at: bit.ly/2Qz7J85.
Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 22 July 2018, at: bit.ly/2wIkWm6.
Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 19 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2EXlVmI.
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Article 1(1)(e): The Prohibition on Assisting
Prohibited Activities
Compliance status

Total

List of states

Not compliant

11

Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Kazakhstan, Marshall Islands,
Netherlands, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States.

other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
weapons or explosive devices. There is, however, no
similar prohibition on any of the five nuclear-weapon
states parties of assisting, encouraging, or inducing
another nuclear-weapon state to engage in those activities.

Trade in Nuclear Material

The transfer of nuclear technology or material is not
prohibited by the TPNW unless the state party responsible
for the transfer knows that the nuclear technology or
material in question is likely to be used in a way that
contravenes the prohibitions of the TPNW. Such transfers
by nuclear-weapon states to any recipient are also
prohibited under Article I of the NPT. Otherwise, states
parties to the TPNW – just like parties to the NPT and the
CTBT – are implicitly permitted to trade in nuclear raw
materials, fuel, and equipment for purely peaceful
purposes, including with nuclear-armed states and states
not party to the TPNW.

Under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, states parties undertake
never under any circumstances to assist anyone to engage
in any activity prohibited to a state party under the Treaty.
This paragraph is one of the most discussed and debated
of all the provisions in the TPNW. The Ban Monitor has
concluded that a total of 11 states currently do not comply
with this obligation. Their practices contravene the
prohibition on assistance in different ways, discussed
under the headings below.
The prohibition on assistance in the TPNW means a state
party is precluded from knowingly128 assisting any other
state or natural or legal person to develop, test, produce,
manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile,
transfer, receive, threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. Also outlawed is
assistance for the deployment by any other state of any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
anywhere under a state party’s jurisdiction or control. The
assistance must make a substantive contribution to a
prohibited activity:129 insignificant contributions (for
example, a screw or bolt that is used in a nuclear missile)
would not violate the prohibition.

If, for instance, a TPNW state party exports uranium to a
nuclear-armed state on the understanding that the
uranium would be used for nuclear energy production or
research, the exporting state could not be held responsible
if the nuclear-armed state unexpectedly decided to use
the uranium for weapons development instead. This
would, though, be likely to affect the legality of future
exports of nuclear material to that state.

Corporate and State Responsibility

A company that develops or produces key components
for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
would be engaging in prohibited assistance under the
TPNW. The provision of ballistic missile technology, for
example, would amount to unlawful assistance where it
was known that the missile programme of the recipient of
the assistance was intended to deliver nuclear warheads.

The forms of assistance that are unlawful can be, among
others, financial (such as through economic assistance
for nuclear-weapon production); technological (for
example, by the export of equipment/components for
such production); operational (for instance, by conventional
military support for nuclear bombing); technical (through
the provision of expert information); or human (such as
by seconding nuclear scientists to assist in another state’s
nuclear-weapon programme).

Depending on the circumstances, a parent company can
also be legally responsible for the acts of its subsidiary.
The general position in domestic law is that a parent
company is not liable where its subsidiary acts unlawfully.
However, jurisprudence has established a number of
exceptions to this general principle, allowing the “veil of
separate legal status … to be pierced”.130 One is where there
is wrongdoing by the parent company; another concerns
activity that gives the impression that the parent company
has made a commitment on behalf of its subsidiary; and
a third is where there is interference by the parent company
in the management of its subsidiary.131 Under international

Under the NPT, there is no general obligation imposed on
all states parties not to assist the development or
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. Under NPT Article I, each nuclearweapon state party undertakes not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
128

See Article 16 of the International Law Commission (ILC)’s 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; and its
interpretation in: International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 420.
129 See the commentary by the Rapporteur on Article 16 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001).
130 C. Murray et al., The Law and Practice of International Trade, 12th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, §28-009.
131 See, e.g., Hughes Hubbard & Reed, “Supreme Court ruling clarifies parent company liability”, International Law Office, 6 July 2015, at: bit.ly/2YIrQDL.
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law, violation of a disarmament treaty or customary
disarmament law would suffice to render the state on
whose territory the parent company is incorporated and/
or where it has its headquarters responsible.

Under Article 5 of the TPNW, states parties are obligated
to adopt measures to implement their obligations under
the Treaty and to suppress violations by persons, or on
territory, under their jurisdiction or control. Allowing private
companies to produce or assist in the production of
nuclear weapons would clearly constitute a violation of
Article 5 of the Treaty as well as Article 1(1)(e).

In addition, any company that is engaged in a joint venture
that develops or produces key components for a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device could thereby
be engaging in prohibited assistance even if it does not
itself contribute materially to the nuclear-weapon
development or production. This is so wherever a joint
venture is akin to a partnership with unlimited liability. It
may also occur when the participating companies
establish the joint venture as a new body corporate,
holding shares in that company. Under international law,
the states on the territory of which the participating and
shareholding companies are incorporated and/or have
their headquarters would be responsible for the acts of
the joint venture where those do not comply with an
international treaty or customary law on disarmament.

Financing

The TPNW does not explicitly prohibit financing of nuclearweapon programmes. However, the prohibition on
assistance renders unlawful direct funding of any of the
prohibited activities listed in the other subparagraphs of
Article 1(1). This prohibition encompasses not only
sovereign funds but also private banks and individuals, as
discussed above in the section on corporate and state
responsibility.
While the mere purchase of shares in a company that is
engaged in nuclear-weapon activities is not per se a
wrongful act under the TPNW, divestment from such
companies is a growing trend. When screening criteria are
applied that exclude companies engaged in nuclearweapons activities from investment, these companies
could in the future be influenced to alter their practices.

Belarus, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands are not in
compliance with the prohibition on assisting development
and manufacturing because they allow companies that
are incorporated or have headquarters or production
facilities on their territory to be involved in activities that
constitute assistance for development and/or production
of nuclear weapons.

Assistance with the Possession and Stockpiling of
Nuclear Weapons

As discussed above, continuing non-compliance with the
prohibition on assistance concerns the extensive nuclear
cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United
States with respect to the Trident SLBM. The 1958 Mutual
Defense Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons
cooperation.133 It has been renewed several times, most
recently in 2014 covering the period through to 2024.134 In
2017, it was reported that the United Kingdom’s Trident
missiles are in a “common pool” shared with the US and
maintained at Kings Bay, in the US state of Georgia.135

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Belarusian company, Minsk
Automotive Factory, is the manufacturer of the selfpropelled mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M ICBM.
Leonardo (Italy) (formerly Finmeccanica) is involved in the
design, development, and delivery of Transporter Erector
Replacement Vehicles for the US Minuteman III ICBM
arsenal.132
The multinational company Airbus Group is legally
incorporated in the Netherlands and falls under Dutch law
and jurisdiction. It is currently involved in the development
and production of the French Navy’s M51 nuclear-tipped
SLBM (but not the warhead) through its Germanheadquartered subdivision Airbus Defence and Space.
Since Airbus Group considers that the actions of its
subsidiaries form part of the work of Airbus as a group
entity, should either Germany or the Netherlands sign and
ratify or accede to the TPNW, they would not be in compliance
with Article 1(1)(e) if Airbus and its subsidiaries were to
engage in any further assistance of the development and
production of nuclear-capable weapons.
132
133
134
135
136
137

The cooperation between the United Kingdom and France
for the maintenance of nuclear weapon stockpiles also
amounts to prohibited assistance under the TPNW.136 In
June 2018, the Swedish Defence Research Agency
reported that the United Kingdom and France were “closer
to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation”.137
The two states’ cooperation on nuclear weapons’ issues
is supported by the 2010 Teutates Treaty to develop
technologies for safe and effective maintenance of both
states’ nuclear stockpiles. The Teutates Treaty concerns

Don’t bank on the Bomb, “Leonardo”, Last updated January 2018, at: bit.ly/2WEsaqD.
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.
See the UK Explanatory Memorandum of 2014, at: bit.ly/2Z0Qqj2.
B. Spence, “The UK now relies on Trump for our nuclear weapons – we need to spend more than ever to free ourselves”, The Independent, 23 January
2017, at: bit.ly/301Huv2.
See, e.g., P. Ricketts, “National Security Relations with France after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, RUSI, January 2018, at: bit.ly/2HLfyot.
FOI, “The United Kingdom and France closer to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation”, Press release, 19 June 2018, at: bit.ly/2Z2b2v5.
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two main areas: simulation of nuclear detonations and
simulation of nuclear warhead function.138

that position to Russia. Under international law, a state is
required to act in good faith. The Kazakhstani government
should remind Russia of Kazakhstan’s obligations under
the TPNW and formally request that as soon as the TPNW
enters into force Russia must cease testing of missiles
intended to deliver nuclear warheads.

The hosting of US nuclear warheads by five non-nuclear
NATO allies (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Turkey) is explicitly prohibited by Article 1(1)(g), but also
constitutes prohibited assistance with possession and
stockpiling. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands
also assist possession and stockpiling when they
participate with nuclear-capable aircraft in NATO’s annual
nuclear drill, Steadfast Noon.

If this does not occur, there will be a question of compliance
to discuss among the states parties to the TPNW.
Compliance issues arise in the implementation of almost
every disarmament treaty. The TPNW has what has
become a standard dispute settlement clause. Thus,
Article 11(1) stipulates that when a dispute arises between
two or more states parties relating to the interpretation or
application of the treaty, the parties concerned must
consult together with a view to the settlement of the
dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the
parties’ choice. Under Article 11(2), the Meeting of States
Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute.
This gives the opportunity to resolve the issue peacefully
and to every state party’s satisfaction.

Allowing the Testing of Nuclear-Capable Missiles

When a state allows the testing of nuclear-capable
missiles by foreign nuclear-armed states on a test site on
its territory, this contravenes the prohibition on assistance
(with respect to the development of nuclear weapons).
Two non-nuclear-armed states host such sites: Kazakhstan
hosts Russian missile tests at Sary Shagan test site, while
the Marshall Islands hosts US missile tests at Kwajalein
Atoll. In both cases, the tests are carried out on land that
is leased to the respective nuclear-armed state through
long-term contracts. The test site at Kwajalein Atoll is
periodically used for testing of the intercontinental-range
Minuteman and Trident (nuclear) missiles. Russian missile
tests at Sary Shagan amount to prohibited assistance in
contravention of Article 1(1)(e) where the missiles used
are designed to carry nuclear warheads. In late July 2019,
Russia’s official news agency, TASS, reported that Russian
strategic missile forces conducted a test launch of a Topol
ICBL from the Kapustin Yar practice range in Astrakhan in
Russia. The missile targeted and reportedly successfully
hit the target at the Sary-Shagan range in Kazakhstan.139

More problematic are treaties such as the NPT, which has
no dispute settlement clause or mechanism, and where
there are serious compliance and interpretation concerns.
(These include transfer of nuclear weapons between the
United Kingdom and the United States and the US policy
to transfer nuclear weapons on bases in Europe to use by
non-nuclear weapon states in the event of major armed
conflict.) In the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which does have dispute settlement provisions,140
states parties have had to address use of chemical
weapons in Syria since it became a state party, as well as
use by Russian agents of a toxic chemical in the United
Kingdom.

Kazakhstan is already obligated not to “assist” the
development or manufacture of nuclear weapons through
its adherence to the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-freezone treaty. Kazakhstan ratified the TPNW in August 2019.
When the Treaty enters into force and Kazakhstan is fully
bound by the obligations set out in the Treaty, the hosting
of tests of nuclear-capable missiles would amount to
assistance with development of nuclear weapons. It is not,
however, the existence of the testing site itself that is the
cause of the violation, but Russia’s use of it to develop
nuclear-weapon missile technology.
Now that Kazakhstan has ratified the TPNW it should
submit a statement making it clear that it does not
authorise the testing of nuclear-capable missiles on its
territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate
138
139
140

N. Granholm and J. Rydqvist, Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces, FOI doc. FOI-R--4587—SE, Stockholm, April 2018, p. 19, at:
bit.ly/2KIFYHM, citing B. Tertrais: Entente Nucléaire: Options for UK-French Nuclear Cooperation, Discussion Paper 3 of the BASIC Trident Commission,
London, BASIC (2012); and J. Lewis and B. Tertrais: “Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation”, Survival, Vol. 57, No. 4 (2015).
TASS, “Russia test launches Topol intercontinental missile from Kapustin Yar range”, 26 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2MZgvMZ.
See, e.g., Article XIV, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction;
adopted at Geneva, 3 September 1992; entered into force, 29 April 1997.
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Article 1(1)(e): The Prohibition on
Encouraging or Inducing Prohibited
Activities
Compliance

Total

List of states

34

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States.

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 1971 Biological
Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons
Convention, and various protocols to the 1980 Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons similarly do not contain
any such express formulations and have not been
interpreted by their parties as proscribing participation in
alliances with states that do not observe those agreements.

status
Not compliant

The main reason for concluding that the 34 states
encourage activities prohibited by the TPNW is that they
all subscribe to doctrines, policies, and/or statements that
endorse one or more allies’ retention and potential use of
nuclear weapons. The largest group of encouraging states
are the 29 member states of NATO. NATO’s foundational
document, the North Atlantic Treaty, does not mention
nuclear weapons, but a number of the Alliance’s strategy
documents do.

Under Article 1(1(e) of the TPNW, states party also
undertake never under any circumstances to encourage
or induce, “in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a state party” under the Treaty. Encouragement
in the context of the TPNW means persuading or seeking
to persuade any other state or any legal or natural person
to carry out a violation or continue an ongoing violation of
any of the Article 1 prohibitions. Encouragement could
take the form of verbal, written, material, or institutional
support , both from governments as a whole (such as by
adoption of a particular policy) and from senior government
or military officials. Where such support has been given,
the encouragement is understood to be ongoing until the
point at which it is clearly withdrawn.

Combining alliance membership and adherence to the
TPNW is entirely feasible. For example, NATO member
states may adhere to the TPNW and remain within the
Alliance as long as they explicitly distance themselves
from specific statements or formulations in Alliance
documents, particularly the Strategic Concept,142 which
can be understood as an encouragement of the retention
of nuclear weapons and their possible use.
It could be argued that a NATO member may, without
having to explicitly “override” previous endorsement of
extended nuclear deterrence, become compliant with the
TPNW through the very acts of signing and ratifying the
Treaty. However, having adhered to the TPNW, such a state
would certainly be obliged to refrain from endorsing future
Alliance language supporting the retention and potential
use of nuclear weapons. This could be done either by
adjusting the current language or by the state clearly
rejecting possession or use of nuclear weapons on its
behalf, for instance through “footnotes”, an interpretive or
declaratory statement, or other unequivocal means of
signalling disagreement.143 NATO members are not obliged
to endorse every line of Alliance language. Indeed, there
is a tradition of member states “footnoting” or otherwise
distancing themselves from specific statements in
Alliance documents.

Inducing a prohibited activity means offering someone
something in exchange for the performance of that
activity. Thus, inducing will always involve encouragement.
The prohibition on encouraging illegal activities is the
provision of the TPNW which is most frequently
contravened. Thirty-four states were found to currently
encourage the continued possession and potential use of
nuclear weapons.

Endorsement of Nuclear-Weapons Doctrines,
Policies and Statements

The TPNW does not preclude participation in security
alliances or joint military operations with nuclear-armed
states as long as this does not involve assistance,
encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities.141
While the TPNW does not contain an express licence to
engage in cooperation with states not party to the Treaty,
along the lines of the 2008 Convention on Cluster
Munitions, there is nothing in the TPNW that suggests that
such cooperation would be unlawful per se. The 1997

Beyond NATO, three states engaged in bilateral defence
arrangements with the United States have expressed
public support for extended nuclear deterrence: Australia,
Japan, and South Korea. Finally, Belarus, which is allied to
Russia through the CSTO and the Union State, has
expressed public support for nuclear deterrence and is

141
142

See, e.g., S. Casey-Maslen, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019), paras. 1.112, 1.113.
NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Brussels, 2010.
143 Such footnotes or statements could be simple and for instance phrased as follows: “State X does not support the possession or use of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices on its behalf and will not assist the development, possession, acquisition, or use of such weapons or devices in any way.”
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therefore not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition
on encouragement and inducement.144 Armenia, the last
CSTO member, has not explicitly endorsed the potential
use of nuclear weapons on its behalf. Armenia would,
though, need to actively distance itself from nuclear
deterrence in order to be considered compliant with Article
1(1)(e). See Chapter 2 and the section on extendednuclear-deterrence arrangements for more information.

stockpile, test, produce, use, transfer, or receive nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
In contrast to Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, which prohibits
states from assisting prohibited acts by others, Article 1(1)
(f) prohibits states from seeking or receiving assistance
to violate the Treaty themselves. A similar prohibition,
imposed only on non-nuclear-weapon states, is contained
in Article II of the NPT, though it only applies to manufacture:
the undertaking is “not to seek or receive any assistance
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices”.

Conventional Participation in Nuclear Strike
Exercises

Although military preparations to use nuclear weapons are
not explicitly outlawed by the TPNW, participating in
exercises that involve the simulated use of nuclear
weapons is a violation of Article 1(1)(e) of the Treaty. This
is the position, for example, of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC affirms that where
conduct contributes significantly to a prohibited activity
(or renders it more attractive), and where there is
knowledge that the conduct would, in the ordinary course
of events, result in assisting, encouraging, or inducing a
prohibited activity, training with others specifically for the
use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful for any state
party to the TPNW.145

Most of the nuclear-armed states in the past received
some form of assistance to develop their nuclear weapons.
More recently, North Korea’s advances in ICBM technology
also appear to have been fuelled by outside sources. Some
have suggested that North Korea either stole information
or received assistance to copy Ukrainian (ex-Soviet)
missiles, but the reports have not been confirmed.147
France and the United States continue to receive
assistance to develop their nuclear arsenals from
multinational companies. In the case of France, this
concerns the Airbus Group (legally incorporated in the
Netherlands) and specifically its subsidiary Airbus Defence
and Space (headquartered in Germany).

Participation by non-nuclear-armed states in nuclear strike
exercises amounts to encouragement to possess nuclear
weapons. In October 2017, for instance, conventional
aircraft from Czechia and Poland participated in the
nuclear exercise known as Steadfast Noon as part of their
SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations with
Conventional Air Tactics) role in NATO.146 Of course, during
a conflict, assisting nuclear bombing raids, such as
through the provision of conventional air support, would
clearly constitute unlawful assistance to use nuclear
weapons.

The United Kingdom appears to be seeking more or less
continuous assistance from the United States to maintain
its nuclear capability. The United Kingdom also receives
continuous assistance with stockpile stewardship from
France and vice versa. The United States, for its part,
receives assistance from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Turkey to stockpile and deploy nuclear
weapons in Europe. The United States also receives
support for the development of nuclear weapons by the
Italian company Leonardo. Further, the US missile-testing
programme is indirectly assisted by the Marshall Islands.
Russia, for its part, receives indirect assistance to test and
develop nuclear ICBMs and anti-ballistic missiles from
Kazakhstan. Russia also receives assistance to develop
nuclear weapons by the Belarusian company Minsk
Automotive Factory.

Article 1(1)(f): The Prohibition on Seeking
or Receiving Assistance to Engage in
Prohibited Activities
Compliance status

Total

List of states

Not compliant

4

France, Russia, United Kingdom,
United States.

Under Article 1(1)(f) of the TPNW, states parties undertake
never under any circumstances to “[s]eek or receive
assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any
activity prohibited to a state party” under the Treaty. This
precludes any state party from asking any other state or
any legal or natural person to help it to develop, possess,
144
145
146
147

Ibid.
ICRC, “The prohibition to assist, encourage or induce prohibited activities under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, ICRC Briefing Note,
Geneva, undated but 2019, p. 8..
H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “United States nuclear forces, 2018”, 5 March 2018, at: bit.ly/33vDyoo.
S. Shuster, “How North Korea Built a Nuclear Arsenal on the Ashes of the Soviet Union”, Time, 1 February 2018, at: bit.ly/2JLVzs7.
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Article 1(1)(g): The Prohibition on Allowing
Stationing, Installation, or Deployment of
Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices
Compliance status

Total

List of states

Not compliant

5

Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Turkey.

All parties to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties have
committed not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons
on their territories. Certain states that are not members of
such zones have made similar commitments not to host
nuclear weapons, with some limiting their commitment
only to times of peace.
The United States is the only state currently known to
station nuclear weapons on the territory of another state.
As of 1 October 2019, five states were hosting US nuclear
bombs (type B-61): Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Turkey.

Article 1(1)(g) of the TPNW outlaws a particular form of
assistance or encouragement of prohibited action:
allowing any stationing, installation, or deployment of any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in a
state party’s territory or at any other place under its
jurisdiction or control. The TPNW’s prohibition against
such hosting of nuclear weapons applies at all times,
including during escalating tension or armed conflict.
There is no corresponding prohibition in the NPT.

Comparison of the Key Provisions in the TPNW and
the NPT

Table 17 summarises the key provisions in the TPNW and
the NPT, highlighting in particular areas where the TPNW
prohibits activities that the NPT does not.

The concept of jurisdiction refers primarily to a state’s
sovereign territory, while control extends to areas that the
state party occupies or otherwise controls extraterritorially.
This is irrespective of the legality of this control under
international law.
Deployment is the broadest of the three types of prohibited
conduct. A violation would not require any prolonged
duration, agreement, or infrastructure. Thus, although
transit of nuclear weapons is not explicitly prohibited by
the TPNW, if movement into the sovereign territory of a
state party is not swiftly followed by exit, this might
amount to prohibited deployment.
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Table 17: Comparison of the key provisions of the TPNW and NPT.
Activity

TPNW
All states parties

Research, produce and use
nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes
Develop nuclear weapons
Manufacture nuclear weapons
Test nuclear weapons

NPT
“Nuclear-weapon states”

Permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Prohibited

Permitted (implicitly)

Not addressed

Prohibited

Permitted (implicitly)

Prohibited

Prohibited

Possess and stockpile nuclear
weapons

“Non-nuclear-weapon states”

Not addressed

Prohibited

Permitted (implicitly)

Prohibited (implicitly)

Prohibited

Prohibited

Not addressed

Prohibited

Not addressed

Prohibited

Prohibited

Not addressed

Prohibited (implicitly)

Threaten to use nuclear
weapons

Prohibited

Not addressed

Prohibited (implicitly)

Assist, encourage, or induce
“nuclear-weapon states” to
engage in activities prohibited
under the respective Treaty.

Prohibited

Permitted (implicitly)

Permitted (implicitly)

Transfer nuclear weapons
Receiving the transfer of nuclear
weapons
Use nuclear weapons

Assist, encourage, or induce
“non-nuclear-weapon states” to
carry out acts prohibited under
the respective Treaty.

Prohibited

Prohibited for “nuclearweapon states” to assist,
encourage, or induce “nonnuclear weapon states” to
manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or
control over these devices.

Transfer of nuclear
material is prohibited unless
safeguarded. Otherwise not
addressed.

Seek or receive assistance from
another state in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons

Prohibited

Seek or receive assistance from
another state in the
development, possession,
stockpiling or use of nuclear
weapons

Prohibited

Not addressed

Allow stationing, installation or
deployment of nuclear weapons
on its territory or at any place
under its control

Prohibited

Not addressed

Assist victims of nuclear use
and testing
Remediate environmental
damage caused by nuclear use
and testing
Provide technical, material and
financial assistance to states
affected by nuclear weapons
use or testing and victim
assistance

Permitted (implicitly)

Prohibited

Obligation for all states
parties in a position to do so.

Not addressed

Obligation for all states
parties in a position to do so.

Not addressed

Obligation for all states
parties in a position to do so.
States that have used or tested
nuclear weapons have a
responsibility to provide
assistance to affected states.
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6 Safeguards and Verification under the TPNW

Articles 3 and 4 of the TPNW concern safeguards agreements to be concluded with the IAEA. The objective of
IAEA safeguards is to “deter the spread of nuclear weapons
by the early detection of the misuse of nuclear material or
technology”.148 Verification measures include on-site
inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and
evaluation.149

each of the five nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT
recognised under that Treaty; and item-specific safeguards
agreements with states not party to the NPT.154
The IAEA carries out different types of on-site inspections
and visits under the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements. Routine inspections are the type most
frequently used. These may be carried out according to a
set schedule or may be “of an unannounced or shortnotice character”. Ad hoc inspections are typically
conducted to verify a state’s reports of its nuclear material
or of nuclear material being transferred by one state to
another. The Agency’s right to carry out routine inspections
under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements is limited
to those locations within a nuclear facility, or other
locations containing nuclear material, through which
nuclear material is expected to flow. These are known as
strategic points.155

A number of states and commentators have claimed that
the verification provisions in the TPNW are weaker than
those in the NPT. In fact, the reverse is true, as Figure 21
illustrates.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

Every state party to the TNPW must either conclude and
enter into force or maintain in force a specific IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: (INFCIRC/153
(Corrected)). This is the most recent version of the IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The IAEA may carry out special inspections if it considers
that information from a particular state is not adequate.
Finally, safeguards visits may be made to declared facilities
to verify design information pertaining to safeguards.
For example, such visits may be carried out during
construction to determine the completeness of the
declared design information or during a facility
decommissioning, to confirm that sensitive equipment
was rendered unusable.156 Activities that IAEA inspectors
perform during and in connection with on-site inspections
of, or visits to, facilities may include auditing the facility’s
accounting and operating records and comparing these
records with the state’s reports to the Agency; verifying the
inventory of nuclear material and any changes to it; taking
environmental samples; and applying “containment and
surveillance” measures, such as seal application or the
installation of surveillance equipment.157

Under the NPT, all non-nuclear-weapon states parties are
obligated to conclude safeguards agreements with the
IAEA (although the precise agreement to be concluded is
not specified). This is required in order to verify the respect
of that state’s NPT duties “with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.150 Such a
safeguards agreement must concern “source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced,
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is
outside any such facility”.151 Further, the requisite
safeguards must be applied on all such material that is
being used in peaceful nuclear activities on any territory
under the state’s jurisdiction or control.152
As of March 2019, the IAEA had safeguards agreements
in force with 183 states. The IAEA concludes three types
of safeguards agreements:153 Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states parties to
the NPT; “voluntary offer” safeguards agreements with
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

IAEA, “Basics of IAEA Safeguards”, 2018, at: bit.ly/2WJPdvC.
IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2q2kJGL.
Art. III(1), NPT.
Ibid.
Ibid.
IAEA, “Safeguards legal framework”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2KmJ9bl.
Safeguards are implemented in three states not party to the NPT — India, Israel, and Pakistan — on the basis of item-specific agreements they have
concluded with the IAEA. IAEA, “Safeguards agreements”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2UvGxeL.
155 IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview”, 2019.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
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relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future”.
During the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017, a Swedish
proposal sought to make it an obligation for all states
parties to conclude and enter into force not only a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but also an
Additional Protocol. Regrettably, the negotiating states did
not reach agreement to do so. It is, though, hoped that the
First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW will strongly
encourage all states parties which have not yet done so
to adopt and bring into force an Additional Protocol.

Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement

The Additional Protocol158 is a legally binding agreement
with the IAEA that grants the Agency additional inspection
authority to that provided in Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA
inspectorate to provide assurance about the accuracy and
completeness of declared activities and the absence of
undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is
granted expanded rights of access to both information
and sites.159

The NPT does not require that its states parties conclude
and bring into force an IAEA Additional Protocol. The 2010
NPT Review Conference Action Plan contains a nonbinding call to all states parties which have not yet done
so to adopt and bring into force an Additional Protocol.166
This means that, under the NPT, an Additional Protocol is
voluntary for all states parties.

The Additional Protocol requires adhering states to provide
information about, and grant the IAEA inspector access
to, all parts of their nuclear fuel cycle — including uranium
mines, fuel fabrication, enrichment plants, and nuclear
waste sites — as well as to “any other location where
nuclear material is or may be present”.160 Activities carried
out during complementary access may include
examination of records, visual observation, environmental
sampling, use of radiation detection and measurement
devices, and the application of seals and other identifying
and tamper-indicating devices.161 Under the Additional
Protocol, each state is required to provide information on
the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related
technologies.162
The text of the TPNW does not make explicit reference to
the IAEA Additional Protocol. Article 4 of the Treaty,
however, requires that all current and former163 nucleararmed states that join the Treaty conclude and bring into
force a safeguards agreement with the IAEA sufficient to
provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared
nuclear materials and activities. In practice, this means at
least an IAEA Additional Protocol as well as the IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, Article
3(1) of the TPNW provides that if a state party already has
an Additional Protocol in force when the TPNW enters into
force, it must maintain it in force.164 As of September 2019,
Additional Protocols were in force with 134 states while a
further 14 states had signed an Additional Protocol but
had yet to bring it into force.165 Article 3(1) also stipulates
that the obligations to maintain existing safeguards
agreements are “without prejudice to any additional
158
159
160
161
162
163
		
164

165
166

Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA
doc. INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).
IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview”, 2019.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
This does not apply to states that disarmed before the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, notably South Africa which disarmed at the end of the
1980s. However, South Africa already has an IAEA Additional Protocol in force.
By the terms of Article 3(1), any state party that has an Additional Protocol in force at the time of entry into force of the Treaty is obliged to maintain it
along with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The obligation in paragraph 1 upon each state party is to “maintain its International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards obligations”. See also E. Giorgou, “Safeguards Provisions in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Blog entry, Arms
Control Law, posted 11 April 2018, at: bit.ly/2R3bwK4.
IAEA, “Additional Protocol”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2Ieeg5W.
Action 28.
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Fig 21: Verification in the NPT and the TPNW

VERIFICATION IN THE NPT AND THE TPNW
NPT

TPNW

VERIFICATION OF ELIMINATION
Not regulated by the NPT.

All states that join the TPNW while still
in possession of nuclear weapons must
accept a time-bound plan providing for
the verifiable elimination of their nuclear
weapons and nuclear-weapon
programmes. (Art. 4(2))

Verification of the elimination
of nuclear weapons and nuclear
weapon programmes mandatory?

All states that have disarmed before
joining the TPNW must demonstrate to
the international authority designated by
the States Parties to the Treaty that the
weapons and programmes have been
eliminated.1 (Art. 4(1))

VERIFICATION OF
NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
IAEA comprehensive safegards
agreement mandatory?

Mandatory for non-nuclearweapon states parties.
(Art. III(1))

Mandatory for all states parties.
(Art. 3(1) and (2) and 4(3))

Not required and thus
voluntary for the five “nuclearweapon states”.

IAEA additional protocol
(or instrument of similar or higher
standard) mandatory?

Voluntary for all states
parties.

Mandatory for all nuclear-armed states
that join the TPNW.2 (Art. 4(2) and (3))
Mandatory for all former nuclear- armed
states that join the TPNW.3 (Art. 4(1))
Mandatory for all states parties that had
an IAEA additional protocol in force
upon the entry into force of the TPNW
(appx 70% of potential states parties).
(Art. 3(1))
Voluntary for the remaining states
parties.

Non-binding recommendation to
adopt IAEA additional protocol?

The 2010 NPT Review
Conference Action Plan
“encourages” all states
parties which have not yet
done so to conclude and
bring into force an IAEA
additional protocol
(Action 28).

A first or subsequent meeting of states
parties to the TPNW may consider
adopting a non-binding
recommendation similar to that
adopted in the NPT urging all states
parties to conclude and bring into force
an IAEA additional protocol.

1 This does not apply to states that disarmed before the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, notably South Africa. However, South Africa already has an
IAEA Additional Protocol in force.
2 The text of the TPNW does not make explicit reference to the IAEA Additional Protocol. It requires, however, that all current and former nuclear-armed
states that join the TPNW conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA sufficient to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declare
nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. In practice, this means at least an IAEA Additional Protocol as well as the
IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
3 See footnotes 1 and 2.
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7 Recommendations to the First Meeting of States Parties

Article 8 of the TPNW provides for regular meetings of states
parties, the first of which is to be held within one year of the
Treaty’s entry into force. Subsequent meetings will be
convened every two years unless the states parties agree
otherwise, with a review conference to be held after five years
and then every six years thereafter. Extraordinary meetings
of states parties will be convened if one third of the states
parties support a written request by any state party.

3. The First Meeting of States Parties should strongly
encourage each state party that has not yet done so to
conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol
with the IAEA.
4. The First Meeting of States Parties should establish
standing committees to address issues related to
victim assistance and environmental remediation,
including needs assessments, programmatic
responses, and international cooperation and
assistance.

The scope of work of the meetings is broad, with each
meeting of states parties effectively mandated to consider
any matters “pursuant to and consistent with the provisions
of” the TPNW, including its status and implementation. The
Ban Monitor has five recommendations for the First
Meeting of States Parties.

5. The First Meeting of States Parties may need to
address issues of compliance, such as with respect to
assisting or encouraging prohibited activities, and
should consider establishing a standing committee for
such matters.

1. The First Meeting of States Parties should elaborate
and adopt a Declaration of the States Parties and a
Plan of Action for promoting the full implementation
and universalisation of the TPNW and stigmatising
nuclear weapons. The role of civil society and
international organisations as partners should be
stressed throughout. All states parties are obligated to
promote adherence to the Treaty by other states under
its Article 12.
2. In accordance with Article 4, the First Meeting of States
Parties is explicitly obligated to set the deadlines for
the destruction of a state party’s nuclear explosive
devices and for the removal of a foreign state’s nuclear
weapons from any area under the jurisdiction or control
of a state party. It should consider setting a deadline
of ten years for the destruction of all nuclear weapons,
renewable upon request to the other states parties
where necessary. In ten years it may be feasible to
achieve elimination of even the largest nuclear-weapon
stockpiles (those of the United States and Russia).167
Such a deadline is also consistent with practice in the
disarmament treaties prohibiting anti-personnel mines
and cluster munitions. A far shorter deadline for
removal of foreign nuclear weapons (hosting
arrangements) – for example, no more than three years
– would seem appropriate.

167

M. Kütt and Z. Mian (2019) Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Destruction Under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Journal for
Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, at: bit.ly/2oh0fNd.
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8 State Profiles

The following state profiles contain summary data on
TPNW status and compliance for each of the world’s 197
states. It also comprises information on their participation
in the TPNW negotiations and voting related to the Treaty,
and information on related treaties and mechanisms.

on this categorization. Within each of the four categories,
the state profiles are presented in alphabetical order.
For the nuclear-armed states, an additional page is
included with data on the status of its nuclear forces, main
nuclear weapons delivery systems, and doctrine, policies
and practices. The main source for this information is
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris’ nuclear
notebooks, published by the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists.

The 197 states are categorised according to their basic
nuclear-weapon policy, with separate sections for the 135
TPNW supporters, the 22 other non-nuclear armed states,
the 31 nuclear-weapon-complicit states, and the 9 nucleararmed states. See Figure 2 in Chapter 2 for more information
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Afghanistan
Afghanistan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Afghanistan has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Afghanistan did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Afghanistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Did not vote

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Algeria has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 26 September 2019, at the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International
Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Algeria’s Foreign Minister Sabri Bouakdoum announced the intention of Algeria
to ratify the TPNW "as soon as possible". He also said: "We must work together to ramp up the entry-into-force of the TPNW."
(bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Algeria should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Algeria

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Andorra
Andorra participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Andorra has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Andorra voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Andorra should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (100%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Angola
Angola has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Angola participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Angola should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (27 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Antigua and Barbuda
Antigua and Barbuda has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Antigua and Barbuda participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana,
to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Antigua and Barbuda should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Austria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Austria has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in
Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Speaking at the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Alexander Schallenberg, Austria's Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and
Foreign Affairs, said about the TPNW: "With every additional signature and ratification, states send a very powerful signal that
having a say on nuclear weapons is not exclusive to states who possess them. The security of all our citizens is equally important
and equally at risk. We are of course under no illusion. We are under no illusion that the treaty will immediately reduce risk or
decimate nuclear weapons stockpiles, but it is and remains an essential step. Let us not lose heart." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Austria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Austria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (8 May 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (21%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Austria

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Azerbaijan has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Azerbaijan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Azerbaijan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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The Bahamas voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. The Bahamas has not
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Bahamas voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Bahamas should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (75%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

68

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Bahamas

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Bahrain
Bahrain voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Bahrain has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bahrain voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Bahrain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (100%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Bangladesh has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bangladesh' Minister for Foreign Affairs, A. K. Abdul Momen, deposited the government's instrument of ratification on the
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at
the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly the same day, Minister Momen said:
"The TPNW, once entered into force, can serve as an important international instrument for stigmatizing nuclear weapons and
sending an unequivocal message about the inhumane and indiscriminate impact of use of nuclear weapons. We encourage other
member states to join us as one of the first 50 ratifying states on the road towards the Treaty’s entry into force. We see success of
TPNW as a critical building block". (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Bangladesh should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Bangladesh should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Bangladesh

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Barbados
Barbados participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Barbados has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Barbados voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Barbados should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (75%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Belize voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Belize has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Belize voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. On 19-20 June 2019, Belize participated in a
regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Belize should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Belize

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Benin
Benin has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Benin participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Benin should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No (amended SQP in force)

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Bhutan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Bhutan has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bhutan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Bhutan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

74

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Bhutan

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Bolivia
Bolivia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bolivia ratified the TPNW on 6 August 2019, after which the "Bolivian Ambassador to the United Nations Sacha Llorenti told
reporters that he chose the date, which coincides with the 74th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima, so as not to
forget those who lost their lives in the attack." (bit.ly/2oUFvuB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Bolivia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Bolivia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (16 Apr 2018)

Ratified (6 Aug 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Botswana has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Botswana’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Unity Dow, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters
in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Botswana should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Botswana

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Brazil
Brazil was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Brazil was the first state to sign the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in
Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In September 2018, the previous president of Brazil submitted the TPNW to congress for approval, but there is no news about
the progress in this process. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Brazil stated that the "adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in 2017 represents an evolutionary leap for the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. While the TPNW
will not bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons on its own, it has significantly raised the moral barrier against these
weapons." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (30%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

0

IAEA AP in force

No

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Yes (LEU)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
Civilian plutonium stocks
Fissile material production
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Brunei
Brunei has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Brunei voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Brunei should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Burkina Faso has not
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Burkina Faso voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Burkina Faso participated in a regional
forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW.
(bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Burkina Faso should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (40%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Burundi voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Burundi has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Burundi voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Burundi participated in a regional workshop
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Burundi should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Burundi

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Cabo Verde
Cabo Verde has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cabo Verde voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Cabo Verde should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No (amended SQP in force)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Cambodia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Cambodia's Secretary of State, Ouch Borit, made the following statement: "Today
represents a timely opportunity for the global community to come together in its commitment to promote the universality of the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by joining the treaty and implementing its prohibition. Having signed the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Cambodia is a strong supporter of general and complete nuclear disarmament and we are
fully engaged in commitment to ratify and implement this treaty." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Cambodia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (9 Jan 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Cambodia

Cameroon
TPNW SUPPORTERS

Cameroon participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Cameroon has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cameroon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Cameroon participated in a regional workshop
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Cameroon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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The Central African Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with the all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not
yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Central African Republic participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in
Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Central African Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Central African Republic

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Chad
Chad voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Chad has not yet adhered to the
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Chad voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Chad should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

85

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Chile
Chile has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Chile voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Chile should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (14%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Colombia
Colombia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Colombia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Colombia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (3 Aug 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Comoros has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Comoros voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Comoros should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Comoros

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Congo
Congo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Congo voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Congo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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The Cook Islands has acceded to the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Cook Islands participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in
Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Cook Islands should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• The Cook Islands should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

N/A

Acceded (4 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

N/A

Party to the NPT

No

N/A (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

N/A

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Cook Islands

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Costa Rica
Costa Rica was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, and Costa
Rica’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, chaired the
negotiations in 2017 that resulted in the adoption of the TPNW. Costa Rica has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty..

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 26 September 2019 Costa Rica’s President, Carlos Alvarado Quesada, made the following statement about the TPNW in the
UN: "We have embarked on a path in seeking prohibition and elimination of these terrible weapons. We must fill the existing legal
vacuum and add a chapter to international law that should have been written many years ago." He also encouraged states who
have not yet done so to sign and speed up the ratification process, and added: "The treaty bolsters the political standard-setting,
humanitarian and legal imperatives of nuclear disarmament which are the prime objective of this organization." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Costa Rica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Costa Rica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (5 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (75%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Côte d’Ivoire has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the
Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Côte d’Ivoire participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019
to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m3doYI). At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Côte d’Ivoire said: "[O]ur country
is fully committed to nonproliferation and disarmament and intends to bolster its commitment as soon as possible by depositing
its instruments of ratification for the TPNW." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Côte d’Ivoire should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Côte d’Ivoire

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Cuba
Cuba has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cuba voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Cuba should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Cuba should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (30 Jan 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (43%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

93

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

Cyprus voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Cyprus has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cyprus voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Cyprus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Cyprus

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The DRC voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The DRC should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (29%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Djibouti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Djibouti has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Djibouti voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Djibouti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Djibouti

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Dominica
Dominica has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Dominica’s Minister for Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, Francine Baron, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters
in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Dominica should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet
ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Dominican Republic voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Dominican Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (7 Jun 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Ecuador
Ecuador has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Ecuador voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Ecuador should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Ecuador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (25 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Egypt voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Egypt has not yet adhered to the
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Egypt voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Egypt should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed, Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

No

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No (Signatory)
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Egypt

TPNW SUPPORTERS

El Salvador
El Salvador has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, El Salvador said: “´[B]earing in mind that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
are a clear threat to peace, El Salvador, which adheres strictly to Article VI of the NPT, has participated in the negotiation process
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and ratified it in its entirety on the 30th of January 2019. This is the first
international instrument that is legally binding prohibiting the use, threat of use, possession, development, acquisition of this type
of weapon of indiscriminate effect, the only weapons that not have been prohibited under other international legislation.”
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• El Salvador should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• El Salvador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (30 Jan 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Equatorial Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Equatorial Guinea
has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article
1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Equatorial Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Equatorial Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Equatorial Guinea

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Eritrea
Eritrea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Eritrea has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Eritrea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Eritrea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Eswatini
Eswatini participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Eswatini has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Eswatini voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Eswatini should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Ethiopia
Ethiopia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Ethiopia has not yet adhered
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Ethiopia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Ethiopia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Fiji has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, the Minister for Defense, Inia Seruiratu, indicated that Fiji is in the
process of ratifying the TPNW. He also said that the TPNW (and the CTBT) need to come into force, and that “Fiji urges all
member states to ratify these important treaties. The world does not need nuclear weapons.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Fiji should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Fiji

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Gabon
Gabon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Gabon has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Gabon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Gabon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Gambia
The Gambia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Gambia participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Gambia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW
• The Gambia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Ghana
Ghana has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Ghana's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Shirley
Ayorkor Botchwey, said that the contry's "internal mechanisms are well advanced towards ratifiication" of the TPNW. She also
said that Ghana believes that a world without nuclear weapons would be in our collective interest and that the only guarantee to
ensuring total elimination of such weapons is to completely prohibit them. (bit.ly/2obi545) Ghana participated in a regional forum
for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW.
(bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Ghana should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (18%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Grenada has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Grenada’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Labour, Peter David, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination
of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Grenada should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (100%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Grenada

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Guatemala
Guatemala has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In October 2019, the Congress in Guatemala was expected to soon approve ratification of the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Guatemala should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (60%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Guinea participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Guinea has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Guinea participated in a regional forum for
ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the Treaty. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

No

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Guinea

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Guinea-Bissau participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Guinea-Bissau should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Guyana has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Guyana and ICAN co-hosted a regional forum in Georgetown to promote adherence to the TPNW.
(bit.ly/2kRrE6R) Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Guyana's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karen
Cummings, said that the TPNW "aims to transform the regional norm of the Caribbean against the possession of nuclear weapons
into a global norm.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Guyana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Guyana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (20 Sep 2017)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Guyana

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Haiti
Haiti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Haiti has not yet adhered to the
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Haiti did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. On 19-20 June 2019, Haiti participated in a
regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Haiti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Did not vote

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No (Signatory)
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The Holy See has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Holy See has on multiple occasions expressed grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental effects
of the use of nuclear weapons. In November 2017, Pope Francis maintained that “the possession of nuclear weapons should be
firmly condemned." He also said that the existence of nuclear weapons "creates a false sense of security that holds international
relations hostage and stifles peaceful coexistence" (bit.ly/2kLlNA7). On 26 September 2019, Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro
Parolin, said in the UN that the Holy See “acknowledges with satisfaction the increasing number of states who have ratified the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and encourages those states who have already signed it to ratify it as soon as
possible. We believe that the treaty is an important step towards a nuclear-weapons-free world and complements the NPT.”
(bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Holy See should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• The Holy See should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (20 Sep 2017)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
N/A

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (22%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

N/A

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Holy See

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Honduras
Honduras has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Congress in Honduras approved ratification of the TPNW on 13 September 2019.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Honduras should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (75%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Indonesia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Indonesia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Indonesia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Indonesia

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Iran
Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Iran has not yet adhered to the
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Iran voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. According to Iran, the adoption of the TPNW was a
“step forward” in the direction of confronting “bullying policies” (bit.ly/2mjID1U). Iran has recently restarted uranium enrichment
(albeit not to a level sufficient for use in a nuclear explosive device) and has threatened to no longer comply with its obligations
under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The United States had previously withdrawn its support for the agreement
and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Iran should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed, Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

<0.01 t (0 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

No (provisional impl. under the JCPOA)

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Yes (LEU)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks
Fissile material production
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Iraq voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Iraq has not yet adhered to the
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Iraq voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate
and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Iraq said: “The
international community must work together in order to guarantee the universality of relevant agreements and in a manner that
would guarantee the final elimination of such lethal weapons and in a manner that bolsters international peace and security.
Therefore, Iraq voted in favor of the treaty to ban nuclear weapons which was adopted by the General Assembly in July 2017.”
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Iraq should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Iraq

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Ireland
Ireland was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Ireland has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but
has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The legislation to ratify the TPNW is currently before the Irish Parliament. On 26 September 2019, Ireland said in the UN
General Assembly: “While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of international disarmament and the
nonproliferation regime, it was always envisaged that a separate legal instrument would be designed to give particular effect to
Article VI’s disarmament provisions. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first multilateral legal instrument on
nuclear disarmament to be adopted in over 20 years, is the complementary instrument that the NPT anticipated and it conveys a
powerful vision of a world free from these weapons of mass destruction. Ireland is currently taking the necessary steps to ensure
that domestic legislation is enacted to allow Ireland to ratify the TPNW and we hope this will be completed before the end of this
year.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Ireland should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Jamaica has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Jamaica participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Jamaica should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (8 Dec 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Jamaica

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Jordan
Jordan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Jordan has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Jordan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Jordan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but renounced them and has since advocated for nuclear
disarmament. Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the TPNW. Its hosting of Russian missile tests at the Sary Shagan test site
means that it is not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition on assisting development of nuclear weapons.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Kazakhstan, which has suffered the consequences of Soviet nuclear testing, deposited its instrument of ratification of the
TPNW to the UN Secretariat on the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 30 August 2019. Those gathered at the ceremony
observed a one-minute silence in memory of and to honour the victims of nuclear tests. (bit.ly/2YzeB8R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Kazakhstan should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
• Kazakhstan should request that Russia as soon as the TPNW enters into force must cease the testing of nuclear-capable

missiles at Sary Shagan. It should submit a statement making it clear that it does not authorise the testing of nuclear-capable
missiles on its territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate that position to Russia.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (2 Mar 2018)

Ratified (29 Aug 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Semipalatinsk)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<10 t (~350 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Kazakhstan

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Kenya
Kenya voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Kenya has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Kenya voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Kenya participated in a regional workshop cohosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Kenya should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (20%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Kiribati has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

President Taneti Maamau deposited Kiribati’s instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Kiribati should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Kiribati should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Kiribati

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Kuwait
Kuwait voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Kuwait has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Kuwait voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Kuwait should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Lao PDR has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saleumxay Kommasith, deposited Lao PDR’s instrument of ratification on the International Day for
the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in
New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Lao PDR should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Lao PDR should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (21 Sep 2017)

Ratified (26 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Lebanon
Lebanon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Lebanon has not yet adhered
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Lebanon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to
Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019,
Lebanon stated: "We must transfer from a narrow security approach to a comprehensive humanitarian approach. [...] "Activating
the international instruments that exist must not distract us from looking for a new and complementary instrument. The adoption
of the TPNW in 2017 ([...] is an important step”. (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Lebanon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (40%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Lesotho has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Lesotho’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Relations, Lesego Makghoti, signed the TPNW on the International Day for
the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in
New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Lesotho should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (75%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Lesotho

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Liberia
Liberia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Liberia has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Liberia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Liberia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No (SQP in force)

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Libya
Libya has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Libya voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Libya should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Liechtenstein
Liechtenstein has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Preparatory work for Liechtenstein's ratification of the TPNW is ongoing. Speaking in the UN General Assembly on 26 September
2019, Liechtenstein said: “Along with many other states, Liechtenstein sees important potential in the TPNW to restore the original
balance enshrined in the NPT. [...] Most importantly, it draws a legal line against all attempts to justify the use of nuclear weapons.
The horrendous and indiscriminate suffering these weapons infallibly inflict on civilians leaves no room for such justification. In
a time of eroding international norms, the TPNW is a sole beacon of hope and a lesson for multilateralism in a world increasingly
suffering from unsustainable big power politics.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Liechtenstein should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (40%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Madagascar
Madagascar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Madagascar voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Madagascar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Malawi
Malawi has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Malawi voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Malawi should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Malaysia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Malaysia said that the TPNW "complements and strengthens the nuclear
disarmament architecture and we urge all states to have an open and focused approach towards this treaty" (bit.ly/2obwUU6).
Malaysia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Malaysia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (40%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Malaysia

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Maldives
The Maldives has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Maldives’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdulla Shahid, signed and deposited the country’s instrument of ratification for the
TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level
Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly on the same day,
Minister Shahid said that the Maldives ratified the TPNW because it strongly believes in “our shared commitment as a member
state to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and also because the well-being, prosperity and advancement of humanity is a
collective responsibility of all.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Maldives should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• The Maldives should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

Ratified (26 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote*

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

* After the vote on the TPNW on 7 July 2017, "the delegation of Maldives informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour."
(A/72/206, note 2).
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Malta voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Malta has not yet adhered to the
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Malta voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Malta should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Malta

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Mauritania
Mauritania voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mauritania has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mauritania voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Mauritania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Mauritius voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mauritius has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mauritius voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Mauritius participated in a regional workshop
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Mauritius should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (20%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Mauritius

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Mexico
Mexico was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Mexico has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in
Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 8 July 2017, the Mexican government published a statement in which it welcomed the TPNW and stated that the adoption
of the treaty was “in line with Mexico’s longstanding and well-known diplomatic tradition of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation”. At the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Mexico said that it invited all those that have not signed or
ratified the TPNW "to speed up their respective processes.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Mexico should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Mexico should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (16 Jan 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (38%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Mongolia
Mongolia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mongolia has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mongolia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to
Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26
September 2019, Mongolia said that its internal process towards ratifying the TPNW is underway. (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Mongolia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (unilateral)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Morocco
Morocco voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Morocco has not yet adhered
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Morocco voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Morocco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Mozambique voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mozambique has not
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mozambique voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Mozambique should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Mozambique

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Myanmar
Myanmar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Myanmar participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Myanmar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Namibia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Namibia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Namibia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (8 Dec 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (20%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Namibia

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Nepal
Nepal has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pradeep Kumar Gyawali said that Nepal has initiated its
process of ratification for the TPNW. He added: “We call upon all countries to sign and ratify it for its early entry into force.”
(bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Nepal should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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New Zealand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including
during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. New Zealand has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with
all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 5–7 December 2018, New Zealand hosted a regional workshop in Auckland, to promote adherence to the TPNW
(bit.ly/2mnZJfd). Together with Thailand and UNODA, Thailand also hosted a regional workshop on the TPNW in Bangkok on 31
August 2018 (bit.ly/2m2Sucd). In the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, New Zealand said that the TPNW significantly
strengthens the norm against any use of nuclear weapons. It also said: "As a member of the core group of supporters, New
Zealand will continue to work closely, including with our valued civil society partners, to advance the Treaty and give reality to its
object and purpose." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• New Zealand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• New Zealand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (31 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (83%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

New Zealand

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Nicaragua
Nicaragua has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Nicaragua voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Nicaragua should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Nicaragua should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (22 Sep 2017)

Ratified (19 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Niger participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Niger has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Niger voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Niger participated in a regional workshop cohosted
by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Niger should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

150

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Niger

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Nigeria
Nigeria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Nigeria has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1,
but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Nigeria participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja on 15–16 August 2019 to promote
adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m3doYI). At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International
Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Nigeria said that “Prohibiting and completely
eliminating nuclear weapons remains the reasonable guarantee against their possession or usage in order to ensure global peace.
[…] Nigeria will continue to engage other nations on the need for the treaty to be taken as an important global instrument for the
promotion of international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Nigeria should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Oman voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Oman has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Oman voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Oman should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Oman

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Palau
Palau has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Palau participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on
5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Palau should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Palau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (3 May 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Panama
Panama has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Panama voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Panama should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Panama should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (11 Apr 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (60%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Papua New Guinea
has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article
1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Papua New Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop
to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Papua New Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Paraguay has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Paraguay voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018, and in August 2018, the senate foreign affairs
committee made a positive recommendation for ratification (https://bit.ly/2McgJ1l). No progress has been reported since then,
however.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Paraguay should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Paraguay

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Peru
Peru has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, Peru said: “The only guarantee against the grave threat inherent
in nuclear weapons for mankind is the pressing need to achieve the prohibition and total elimination. [...] [W]e hope that all
countries will one day accede and particularly those with nuclear arsenals. This legally binding instrument will not detract from
the current disarmament and nonproliferation regime, on the contrary it will strengthen and complement it and will contribute to
implementation of Article VI of the NPT.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Peru should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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The Philippines has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, the Philippines made the following statement: “While we see the
importance of building trust and confidence, particularly among nuclear weapons states, we believe that we should proceed with
the pursuit of disarmament without delay to honor our commitments under the NPT. The Philippines is a signatory to the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a landmark agreement that fortifies the nuclear disarmament architecture. This treaty
represents the universalisation of the Philippines’ hope for the elimination of nuclear weapons in line with the specific provision
of our constitution and the treaty on the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapons-free zone. The treaty also fulfills the goals set out in the
NPT. It delegitimises once and for all the use of nuclear weapons.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Philippines should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (53%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Philippines

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Qatar
Qatar voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Qatar has not yet adhered to the
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Qatar voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Qatar should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Moldova voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Moldova has not yet adhered
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Moldova voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Moldova should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (40%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Republic of Moldova

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Rwanda
Rwanda did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Rwanda maintains policies
and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the
Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Rwanda voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Rwanda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Saint Kitts and Nevis has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mark Anthony Brantley, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Saint Kitts and Nevis should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Saint Kitts and Nevis

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Saint Lucia
Saint Lucia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Saint Lucia participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Saint Lucia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Saint Lucia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (27 Sep 2018)

Ratified (23 Jan 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (75%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article
1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in
Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2kRrE6R). Speaking in the UN on 26 September 2019, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines’ Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves encouraged states which have not yet signed and ratified the TPNW
“to do so in our collective pursuit to bring peace to every corner of the globe.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (8 Dec 2017)

Ratified (31 Jul 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Samoa
Samoa has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 26 September 2019, Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi said in the UN that his country had signed and rapidly
ratified the TPNW to underscore its commitment to the NPT goals. He also said that the Treaty's “success over time will depend on
the commitment of each and every UN member state. Each new signature and ratification of the treaty ban will strengthen global
norms against these weapons of terror and move us closer to a nuclear-weapon-free world. And the only guarantee humankind
has against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons is through the non-possession and total elimination of all nuclear
weapons.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Samoa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Samoa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (60%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

San Marino
San Marino has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

San Marino voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• San Marino should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• San Marino should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Sao Tome and Principe
Sao Tome and Principe has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet
ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sao Tome and Principe voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Sao Tome and Principe should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Saudi Arabia has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Saudi Arabia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Saudi Arabia wants to extract and
enrich uranium for its new nuclear energy programme, including construction of two nuclear reactors. It is already in talks with
companies from China, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the project, but is, so far, unwilling to agree to an
associated ban on enriching uranium and on reusing nuclear material. It has pledged to acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do
so.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Saudi Arabia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Saudi Arabia

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Senegal
Senegal voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Senegal has not yet adhered
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Senegal voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Senegal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Seychelles
Seychelles has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Seychelles voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Seychelles should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sierra Leone has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sierra Leone voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated in a regional forum for
ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Sierra Leone should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Solomon Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Solomon Islands has
not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of
the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Solomon Islands voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop to
promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Solomon Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Solomon Islands

TPNW SUPPORTERS

South Africa
South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s but decided in 1989 to give them up and has since advocated for
nuclear disarmament. It was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including
during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. South Africa has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the
prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 16–17 August 2018, South Africa and ICAN co-hosted a regional workshop in Pretoria, to promote adherence to the
TPNW (bit.ly/2kHK228). Speaking in the UN on 26 September 2019, South Africa said it was pleased to be among the first 25
member states of the TPNW. It urged all states that have not signed the TPNW to do so as soon as possible, and added: “South
Africa reaffirms our view that the TPNW is a bold and positive step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons as it
strengthens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." (bit.ly/2obi545

RECOMMENDATIONS

• South Africa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• South Africa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (25 Feb 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (30%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sri Lanka has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sri Lanka voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Sri Lanka should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

State of Palestine
Palestine has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Palestine signed the TPNW on 20 September 2017 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 22 March 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Palestine should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Palestine should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (22 Mar 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
N/A

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (60%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

N/A

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No (SQP approved)

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Sudan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sudan has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sudan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by
South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Sudan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Sudan

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Suriname
Suriname voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Suriname has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Suriname voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Suriname should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

177

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

Thailand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Thailand has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions
in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 31 August 2018, Thailand, together with New Zealand and UNODA, hosted a regional workshop in Bangkok, to promote
adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m2Sucd). On 26 September 2019, Thailand stated at the UN General Assembly that the TPNW
"truly reflects a global call to rid the world of these terrible weapons. It is now the time we turn the momentum into concrete
actions. Therefore, as a ratifying state to the treaty, Thailand calls on all states to sign and ratify the treaty at the earliest
opportunities.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Thailand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Thailand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (20 Sep 2017)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (46%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Thailand

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified
the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Timor-Leste participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018
to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Timor-Leste should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2018)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (100%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No (SQP signed)

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Togo
Togo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Togo participated in a regional forum hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the
TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Togo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Tonga
Tonga voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Tonga has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tonga did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop to
promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Tonga should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Did not vote

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Trinidad and Tobago has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Trinidad and Tobago’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and CARICOM, Dennis Moses, signed the TPNW and deposited the
government's instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September
2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session at the UN General
Assembly on the same day, he said: “We view this treaty as an option for immediate action on nuclear disarmament, which is
necessary in this challenging international security environment. We therefore encourage states that have not yet done so to sign
and ratify the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons.” He added that the TPNW is part of Trinidad and Tobago's efforts towards a
sustainable development agenda. (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Trinidad and Tobago should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Trinidag and Tobago should also ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

Ratified (26 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (75%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Trinidad and Tobago

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Tunisia
Tunisia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Tunisia has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tunisia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Tunisia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Turkmenistan did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Turkmenistan
maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign
and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Turkmenistan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Turkmenistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Semipalatinsk)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Turkmenistan

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Tuvalu
Tuvalu has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tuvalu participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on
5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Tuvalu should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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Uganda voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Uganda has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Uganda voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Uganda participated in a regional workshop cohosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Uganda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (29%)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Uganda

TPNW SUPPORTERS

United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. The
UAE has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in
Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The UAE voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The UAE should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (14%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Tanzania has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, Palamagamba J.A.M. Kabudi, signed the TPNW on the International
Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN
Headquarters in New York. Speaking about the TPNW in a plenary session of the UN General Assembly on the same day, the
Minister said: "The treaty is important, not only because it complements existing international instruments on nuclear weapons,
but also because it places those weapons on the same legal footing as other weapons of mass destruction. In order to make the
treaty enter into force, I encourage those countries that have not yet signed the treaty to do so as soon as practicable.”
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Tanzania should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

United Republic of Tanzania

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Uruguay
Uruguay has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Speaking about the TPNW at the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, Uruguay said: “[A]s in previous years, we
urge all states who have not yet done so to accede and ratify.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Uruguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Uruguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (25 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Vanuatu has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Vanuatu participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland,
on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Vanuatu should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Vanuatu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Vanuatu

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Venezuela
Venezuela has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Venezuela voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Venezuela should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Venezuela should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (20 Sep 2017)

Ratified (27 Mar 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (25%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Viet Nam has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Viet Nam participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to
promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m2Sucd).

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Viet Nam should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Viet Nam should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (22 Sep 2017)

Ratified (17 May 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Viet Nam

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Yemen
Yemen voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Yemen has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Yemen voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Yemen should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Zambia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Zambia’s Foreign Minister Joseph Malanji signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.
Zambia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote
adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m9WdFB).

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Zambia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

Yes (26 Sep 2019)

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (33%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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TPNW SUPPORTERS

Zambia

TPNW SUPPORTERS

Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Zimbabwe has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Zimbabwe voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Zimbabwe participated in a regional workshop
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Zimbabwe should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (20%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted yes

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

195

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES
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Argentina
Argentina voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Argentina has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Argentina abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Speaking about the TPNW in the UN
General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Argentina said that "The spirit underlying the treaty is shared by Argentina, for which
reason we voted for its adoption. Argentina is analyzing the impact of the treaty in other important spheres of the current regime
in regards to nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the cornerstone of which is the NPT.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Argentina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (40%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Tlatelolco)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

0

IAEA AP in force

No

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Yes (LEU)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
Civilian plutonium stocks
Fissile material production
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Bosnia and
Herzegovina maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can
therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bosnia and Herzegovina voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Signed

Adhered

No

No

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR -ARMED STATES

• Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Finland
Finland did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Finland maintains policies
and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the
Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

The Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Finnish Parliament gave a statement on the TPNW in June 2018. According to the
Committee, the TPNW “supports and complements” the NPT and CTBT. The TPNW “could lead to changed expectations, priorities
and views also in states outside of the treaty.” The Committee argued that Finland should “continue to analyse the contents of the
treaty and compare it to other central initiatives in the area.” The Committee did not offer a straightforward recommendation with
respect to adherence or not, but concluded that Finland should cooperate with Sweden and monitor the Swedish stance on the
TPNW (bit.ly/2mkxaz9). Finland abstained on the UN General Assembly's resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Finland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Georgia
Georgia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Georgia maintains policies
and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the
Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Georgia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Georgia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Kyrgyzstan has not
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Kyrgyzstan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the UN General Assembly’s High-Level
Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26
September 2019, Kyrgyzstan among other issues spoke about the importance of remediating areas impacted by uranium mining.
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Kyrgyzstan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Semipalatinsk)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Mali
Mali participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Mali has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mali abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Mali participated in a regional workshop co-hosted
by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Mali should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Marshall Islands
The Marshall Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet
signed or ratified it. The Marshall Islands’ hosting of US missile tests at Kwajalein Atoll means that it is not in compliance with
the TPNW’s prohibition on assisting illegal activities relating to nuclear weapons.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

The Marshall Islands abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. The Marshall Islands’ foreign
minister John Silk has said that his government cannot back the TPNW without US involvement, but has also communicated that
ongoing internal consultations have prompted the government to take more time for consideration before joining the Treaty (The
Marshall Islands Journal, vol. 49, no. 44 (2 November 2018)).

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Marshall Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
• The Marshall Islands should request that the United States cease the testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Kwajalein Atoll.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Micronesia
Micronesia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Micronesia maintains
policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify
the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Micronesia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Micronesia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No (SQP signed)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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Monaco
Monaco participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Monaco has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Monaco voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Monaco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (67%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Nauru
Nauru did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Nauru maintains policies and
practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty
without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Nauru should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Did not vote

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Nauru did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Nauru is expected to soon sign the TPNW. It
participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7
December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

Niue
Niue is not a member or observer of the UN and was therefore not entitled to participate in the TPNW negotiations. Niue has
not yet adhered to the Treaty, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of
the TPNW. Niue can therefore accede to the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Niue is party to the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), but has not signalled whether it intends to sign
and ratify the TPNW.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Niue should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms
N/A

Party to the NPT

No

N/A (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)
Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

N/A

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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North Macedonia
North Macedonia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. North
Macedonia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but it currently maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all
of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty and can therefore sign and ratify without making changes to existing practices
or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

• North Macedonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It

should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement,
and refrain from endorsing future NATO statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• North Macedonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty, and until it is in a
position to do so, it should - in line with its obligations under the NPT - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (50%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

North Macedonia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution in 2018. As of writing, North Macedonia was in the process
of joining NATO, and if it does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, it will be
deemed to be encouraging assistance with acts prohibited by the TPNW and not in compliance with Art 1(1)(e).

Serbia
Serbia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Serbia maintains policies and
practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty
without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Serbia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Serbia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Singapore
Singapore participated in the TPNW negotiations, but was the only state to abstain on the vote when the Treaty was adopted.
Singapore has not adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in
Article 1 of the Treaty and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Singapore should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (17%)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Bangkok)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Abstained

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Singapore is categorized by the Ban Monitor as "undecided" on the TPNW. In First Committee of the UN General Assembly in
2018, the representative of Singapore said his country is committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, the only guarantee
against their use. Singapore regretted that concerns it has about the TPNW were not taken into account when the instrument was
negotiated. "While there are multiple pathways towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, all parties must be involved in the process,"
he said, adding that Singapore will continue to work constructively toward that goal. (bit.ly/2nOeKYC)

Somalia
Somalia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Somalia has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Somalia did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Somalia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Signed, Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Did not vote

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No (Signatory)
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South Sudan
South Sudan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. South Sudan has not
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

South Sudan did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• South Sudan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

No

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

No (Pelindaba)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Did not vote

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

No

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

No

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No
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Sweden
Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but the government has
decided to not adhere to the Treaty for the time being. Sweden maintains policies and practices that are compliant with
all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing
practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Sweden abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution in 2018, before announcing in July 2019 that it would "refrain from
signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time." The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also indicated, however,
that Sweden might reassess its position following the NPT review conference in 2020, and that Sweden will participate in the first
meeting of states parties to the TPNW as an observer. There has been extensive debate in the Swedish Parliament and in the
media about the government's decision to not adhere to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kr6r3l)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Sweden should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (45%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Switzerland
Switzerland voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet adhered to
the Treaty. Switzerland maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW,
and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Switzerland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (14%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted yes

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

In June 2018, the Swiss Government published an interdepartmental working group (IDAG) report on the implications of accession
to the TPNW. “At the current stage”, the report concluded, “the reasons against an accession of Switzerland outweigh the potential
opportunities accompanying a signature and ratification of this treaty” (bit.ly/2nGIhQr). Both houses of the Swiss Parliament
subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify without delay (bit.ly/2kTeiqI). The Swiss Government plans to update
the IDAG report and review its decision by the end of 2020, and contends that this fulfills the mandate given by Parliament
(bit.ly/2ktmTQF). Parliament and NGOs disagree. Bern and Geneva have signed ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

Syrian Arab Republic
Syria participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Syria has not yet adhered to
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Syria did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Syria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (11%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

No

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Did not vote

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<0.001 t

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

No (Signatory)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Tajikistan
Tajikistan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Tajikistan has not yet
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tajikistan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Tajikistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Semipalatinsk)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Ukraine
Ukraine boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. Ukraine maintains policies and practices that
are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making
changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Ukraine abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Ukraine should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Uzbekistan has not
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Uzbekistan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Uzbekistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (No data)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Semipalatinsk)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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OTHER NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES
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Albania
Albania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Albania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Albania voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Albania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Albania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Armenia
Armenia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it.
It is deemed to be a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. It may sign
and ratify the TPNW, but will have to renounce Russian retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf in order to
become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Armenia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Armenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Armenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Yes (0%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Did not vote

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Australia
Australia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Australia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to
its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Australian government has opposed the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons since the beginning. It has argued that a key
problem with the TPNW is that it "seeks to delegitimise extended deterrence” (bit.ly/2mX63ek). In December 2018, the Labor Party
committed to “sign and ratify the Ban Treaty” after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an
effective verification and enforcement architecture (bit.ly/2mmfEdT). Melbourne and Sydney are among 20 cities in Australia that
have committed to ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Australia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce
the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from
endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Australia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so,
it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration
of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical
steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

Yes (Rarotonga)

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Belarus
Belarus did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state
and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Belarus may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Belarus abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Speaking at the UN General Assembly’s HighLevel Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Belarus
stated that "The NPT must remain a cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament regime. Trying to replace it with other
international agreements is counterproductive.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Belarus should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Belarus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Belgium
Belgium boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Belgium may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In September 2019, 152 Belgian mayors signed an open letter urging Belgium to join the TPNW (bit.ly/2kKlHc0). 22 cities
in Belgium have joined ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Belgium should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Belgium should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant
Not compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Bulgaria
Bulgaria boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Bulgaria may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the Bulgarian government said that "simply prohibiting" nuclear weapons will not bring about a world without nuclear
weapons. Nuclear disarmament "is only possible within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", the Bulgarian
government maintained. (bit.ly/2lXIRMf)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Bulgaria should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Bulgaria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Canada
Canada boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Canada may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, Canada’s Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland stated: “Over the past year, we have seen leaders from the global
disarmament community drive the negotiation and signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The popularity
of this initiative speaks to the desire of countries, activists and communities to accelerate the work toward disarmament. It also
reflects frustration and disappointment at the pace of global efforts so far. We believe that this is a legitimate criticism”
(bit.ly/2FFEoDD). Toronto and Vancouver are among five Canadian cities that have committed to ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Canada should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Canada should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<10 t (~350 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Croatia
Croatia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Croatia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Croatia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Croatia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Croatia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Czechia
Czechia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Czechia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, the Czech delegation to the UN General Assembly's First Committee stated that it was “not convinced” that the
TPNW “will help to enhance the security of any country or diminish nuclear arsenals. In contrary, we see risks that it is
posing to the nuclear disarmament.” (bit.ly/2nQocuy)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Czechia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Czechia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Denmark
Denmark boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Denmark may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to
its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

A ban on nuclear weapons would conflict with NATO commitments, said Denmark’s foreign minister in 2017. (bit.ly/2krOgux). In
2018, Denmark voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Denmark should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Denmark should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Estonia
Estonia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Estonia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Estonia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Estonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Estonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Germany
Germany boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Germany may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to
its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The German government has consistently opposed the idea of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Opposition parties Grüne and
Linke favour German adherence (bit. ly/2krGFfn), and support for TPNW keeps growing in the German Parliament. 166 federal
parliamentarians have signed the ICAN Parliamentary Appeal. A new cross-party working group on the TPNW (Parlamentskreis
Atomwaffenverbot) was established in September 2019 (bit.ly/2ojf2GU). Three federal states and almost 50 cities have signed
ICAN's Cities Appeal, including Berlin and Munich.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Germany should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Germany should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant
Not compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Yes (LEU)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
Civilian plutonium stocks
Fissile material production
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Greece
Greece boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Greece may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Greece voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Greece should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Greece should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Hungary
Hungary boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Hungary may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

According to the Hungarian government, the TPNW may "intentionally or unintentionally … lead to the erosion of the NPT regime."
(bit.ly/2kwHFz2)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Hungary should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Hungary should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

Yes

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Iceland
Iceland boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Iceland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Iceland is undertaking an inquiry into the TPNW. The Icelandic Foreign Ministry made an official submission to the inquiry in April
2018. The Ministry argued that the TPNW conflicted with NATO’s nuclear policy and that Iceland should not join the treaty.
(bit.ly/2m1uRRt)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Iceland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Iceland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Italy
Italy boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Italy may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In September 2017, the Italian parliament adopted a resolution committing the government to “pursue a nuclear weapon free
world” and “in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of
becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons” (bit.ly/2lY88FY). According to the government, the
NPT “provides the only realistic legal framework to attain a world without nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international
stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.” (bit.ly/2kKjldb)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Italy should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Italy should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do
so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common
aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states
parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant
Not compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Voted yes

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Japan
Japan boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Japan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the Japanese government stated that the “ban treaty concept has been unable to obtain understanding and
involvement of nuclear-weapon states”, and that it would therefore “be difficult for Japan to participate” (bit.ly/2kKsSAW).
In October 2018, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Taro Kono, asserted: “As for the promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition
ofNuclear Weapons, Japan has still not decided anything. However, Japan is not thinking of signing the TPNW, so our response
will be based on that (bit.ly/35hYv74)”. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and many more Japanese cities have signed ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Japan should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Japan s should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

<10 t (~350 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

47 t (~9,400 weapon equivalents)

Party to the CWC

Yes

Yes (LEU and Pu)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material production
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Latvia
Latvia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Latvia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Latvia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Latvia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Latvia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do
so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common
aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states
parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Lithuania
Lithuania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Lithuania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to
its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, the Lithuanian delegation to the UNGA First Committee declared that, "Given the current geopolitical context, we do not
agree that delegitimization of nuclear weapons is a realistic addition to the harmonization of the disarmament and security ends."
(bit.ly/2m4sUne)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Lithuania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Lithuania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

239

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019

Luxembourg
Luxembourg boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and
not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Luxembourg may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Luxembourg voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Luxembourg should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Luxembourg should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a
position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards
the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with
its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Montenegro
Montenegro boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and
not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Montenegro may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Montenegro voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Montenegro should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Montenegro should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Netherlands
The Netherlands was the only nuclear-weapon-complicit state to participate in the negotiations of the TPNW, but also the only
state that voted against the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017. The Netherlands has not adhered to the TPNW, and is not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty. The Netherlands may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have
to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In November 2018, the Dutch House of Representatives adopted a series of motions calling on the government to intensify its
advocacy for nuclear disarmament, including to champion the TPNW within NATO and investigate the compatibility of the TPNW
with existing Dutch legislation. The Dutch foreign and defence ministers responded that there are no fundamental obstacles within
the Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining. (bit.ly/2P730d7)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Netherlands should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It

should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement,
and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of nuclear weapons.
• The Netherlands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a
position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards
the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with
its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant
Not compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Yes (30%)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

Voted no

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Yes (LEU)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
Civilian plutonium stocks
Fissile material production
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Norway
Norway started the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a majority of states
negotiating and adopting the TPNW. But Norway boycotted the negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclearweapon-complicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW,
but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In February 2018, the Norwegian Parliament asked the Government to do an inquiry into the consequences of joining the TPNW.
In the resulting report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that because of weaknesses in the TPNW's nuclear disarmament
verification arrangements and the fact that Norway "cannot join the TPNW without coming into conflict with our membership
in NATO" the government deems that Norway should not join the TPNW (bit.ly/2pmTcTH). Norway’s capital Oslo and 15 other
Norwegian cities have endorsed ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Norway should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Norway should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to it. Until it is in a position to do so, it
should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings
of states parties as an observer, and work with its parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

<0.01 t (0 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Poland
Poland boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Poland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Poland voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Poland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Poland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Portugal
Portugal boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Portugal may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Portugal voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Portugal should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Portugal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No (Signatory)

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Republic of Korea
South Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and
not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. South Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In the words of the South Korean delegation to the NPT PrepCom in 2018, the TPNW, "crafted without the participation of nuclearweapon states cannot but bear intrinsic limitation." (bit.ly/2mqPAyq)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• South Korea should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• South Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a
position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards
the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with
its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Romania
Romania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Romania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to
its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

According to the Romanian delegation to the 2018 NPT PrepCom, “A viable road to nuclear disarmament in the current security
environment should concentrate first and foremost on improving the geopolitical conditions” (bit.ly/2mnh6N6).

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Romania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Romania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Slovakia
Slovakia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovakia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, Slovakia’s state secretary for foreign affairs declared that "we do not believe that the mere existence of a legally binding
international instrument banning nuclear weapons will attain the goal of zero. No shortcuts can lead us toward this direction. That
is the reason, why Slovakia is not in the position to support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (bit.ly/2mjLzvs).

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Slovakia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Slovakia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Slovenia
Slovenia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovenia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Slovenia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Slovenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Slovenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

No (Observer)

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Spain
Spain boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Spain may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Spanish government agreed in September 2018 to sign the TPNW. The agreement was made during negotiations on the
2019 budget, when left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from the government to sign the Treaty in exchange for
Podemos’ support for the 2019 budget. The government has not commented on whether or when it will implement this decision
(bit.ly/2koiOgA). The city of Granollers and five other Spanish cities have signed ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Spain should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Spain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do
so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common
aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states
parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW

Turkey
Turkey boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Turkey may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its
policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Turkey voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Turkey should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should

renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Turkey should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-COMPLICIT STATES

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant
Not compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

No

IAEA AP in force

Yes

Civilian plutonium stocks

No

Party to the CWC

Yes

Fissile material production

No

Party to the BWC

Yes
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China
China boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. China may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and
practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In a joint statement with France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2018, China said: "The TPNW will not be
binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law;
nor does it set any new standards or norms. We call on all countries that are considering supporting the TPNW to reflect seriously
on its implications for international peace and security.” (bit.ly/2mrUHhO) (bit.ly/2pyMY2S)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that

any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• China should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do
so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals
- welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its
meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

Yes

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed, Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Voluntary offer agreement)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

14 t (~933 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes (Modified)

Civilian plutonium stocks

0.04 t (~8 weapon equivalents)

Party to the CWC

Yes

Military plutonium stocks

2.9 t (~967 weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Nuclear arsenal*

Dongfeng 21A

Deployed

0

Stockpiled

290

TOTAL ACTIVE

290

Retired

0

TOTAL

290

Nuclear testing**
A Chinese DF-21A transporter errector vehicle on display at the Beijing
Military Museum, 2007 (Max Smith)

Number of nuclear explosive tests

45

Last explosive test

1996

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY
PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

DF-4

ICBM

Silo

5

10

3,300 kt

5,500+ km

82 t

28 m

2.25 m

DF-5 A/B

ICBM

Silo

20

40

200–5,000 kt

13,000 km

183 t

32.6 m

3.35 m

DF-21/26

M/IRBM

Road-mobile

108

114

200–300 kt

2,150–4,000 km

14.7 t

10.7 m

1.4 m

DF-31 (A/AG)

ICBM

Silo/Road-mobile

54

54

200–300 kt

7,200–11,200 km

42 t

13 m

2.25 m

JL-t2

SLBM

Submarine

48

48

200–300 kt

7,000–8,000 km

42 t

13 m

?

The Chinese nuclear weapons arsenal also includes strategic bombers and possibly cruise missiles.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
China maintains a so-called no-first-use policy, meaning that the Chinese government has declared that it will only use nuclear
weapons in response to a nuclear attack. China has long claimed to rely on a "minimum deterrent", but recent developments
suggest that China might be in the process of altering its policy. China has traditionally maintained that it will not use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and states in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Having ratified the relevant protocols to the
treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk, China has legally committed not to use nuclear weapons against
the members of the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African, and Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.
China has not ratified the equivalent protocol for the South-East Asian zone.
China is believed not to deploy nuclear warheads on missiles in normal circumstances, but some believe that China has already
fitted, or will soon fit, nuclear warheads to missiles on its nascent submarine force. There have also been reports that some
Chinese officials are advocating "increasing the readiness of China’s nuclear missiles".1 China routinely conducts nuclear readiness
drills. In January 2019, Chinese state media reported that Chinese forces had simulated the launch of a nuclear-armed ICBM
against "an imaginary enemy".2 In a bid to enhance its second-strike capability, China has positioned much of its land-based
strategic forces in hardened bunkers deep inside mountains. That said, China does not appear to have yet adopted a "launch on
warning" posture, retaining its traditional "ready the forces on warning" posture.3

1
2
3
*
**
***

Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuC0Yx.
Liu Xuanzun, "China’s Rocket Force conducts mock ICBM strike exercise", Global Times (22 January 2019), at: bit.ly/34dA0HY.
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "The Pentagon’s 2019 China Report", Federation of American Scientists (6 May 2019), at: fas.org/
category/china/.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

254

TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
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Since the 1990s, China’s approach to multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy has been one of caution. At the UN, China often
choses to abstain on controversial resolutions instead of picking a side, a stance that is probably informed by China’s shared
history and close relationships with the non-aligned world. In 2016, China was the only permanent member of the UN Security
Council to abstain on the vote in the General Assembly that mandated the 2017 negotiation of the TPNW; France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States all voted against.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
North Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. North Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes
to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the delegation of North Korea to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that the North Korean government
could not support the TPNW. North Korea “consistently supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the efforts for
denuclearization of the entire world. However as long as the U.S. who constantly threatens and blackmails the [Democratic
People's Republic of Korea] with nuclear weapons rejects the NBT [Nuclear Ban treaty] the DPRK is not in position to accede to
the treaty”.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• North Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do
so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons,
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring
The prohibition on testing

Not compliant
Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Did not vote

Party to the NPT

No (1985-2003)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

No (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Abstained

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

Yes (not implemented)

Fissile material
0 t (~0 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

-

Party to the CWC

No

Military plutonium stocks

0.04 t (~13 weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Hwasong-15

Nuclear arsenal*
Deployed

0

Stockpiled

20–30

TOTAL ACTIVE

20–30

Retired

0

TOTAL

20–30

Nuclear testing**
North Korea’s new road mobile Hwasong-15 (HS-15) intercontinental
ballistic missile (unknown)

Number of nuclear explosive tests

6

Last explosive test

2017

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

Hwasong 14

ICBM

Road-mobile (TEL)

?

?

?

6,700–10,400 km

33.8 t

19.5 m

1.7 m

Hwasong 15

ICBM

Road-mobile (TEL)

?

?

?

8,500–13,000 km

~71–21 t

~22.5 m

~2.4 m

Taepodong 2

ICBM

Launch pad

?

?

?

12,000 km

~80 t

~30 m

2.0–2.2 m

Most of the North Korean nuclear weapons delivery system is under development. In addition to the list above, it includes IRBMs (Hwasong
10/12), MRBMs (Hwasong 6/7) and possibly an SLBM (Bukkeukseong).

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

North Korean officials have occasionally made statements that have been interpreted to go in the direction of a no-first-use policy.
For example, in May 2016, the North Korean news agency quoted Kim Jong-un, the supreme leader of North Korea, as having
averred that North Korea will not use a nuclear weapon unless North Korea’s sovereignty is "encroached upon by any aggressive
hostile forces with nukes".1 Other statements have suggested that North Korea might be willing to use nuclear weapons preemptively. In March 2016, for example, in reaction to the commencement of a US–South Korean military exercise, North Korea
threatened a "pre-emptive nuclear strike of justice" and to turn Washington and Seoul into "flames and ashes".2 Most analysts
believe that the North Korean regime will use nuclear weapons to protect itself against any perceived threat to its survival.
In August 2017, US President Donald Trump contended that North Korea "best not make any more threats to the United States",
adding that "they [North Korea] will be met with fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen
before."3 Many feared war was imminent. Instead, Trump and Kim met for a high-level summit in Singapore on 12 June 2018.
North Korea committed to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". The US administration represented
this as a significant diplomatic victory. In reality, the summit declaration added little if anything to North Korea’s standing policy.
North Korea has executed a number of nuclear and missile tests in recent years, attracting widespread criticism from other
governments. Over the course of 2018 and 2019, North Korea has conducted at least 9 ballistic missile tests, some of them
involving multiple missiles (i.e. multiple missiles launched on a single day). North Korea has not carried out any nuclear or longrange ballistic missile tests since 2017, focusing instead on developing its short-range missiles. North Korea’s nuclear-weapon
programme should be considered as a nuclear weapon and missile development programme rather than a programme to
"modernise" existing forces. Unlike other nuclear-armed states that have used bomber aircraft as their initial delivery means, North
Korea has so far concentrated its efforts on the development of ballistic missiles (short, medium, and long-range).

*
**
***

BBC, "North Korea ‘will not use nuclear weapons’ unless threatened" (8 May 2016), at: bbc.in/32fIvjY.
The Guardian (AP), "North Korea threatens to reduce US and South Korea to ‘Flames and Ash’" (7 March 2016), at: bit.ly/2ZomwKp.
Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, "Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.", New York Times (8 August
2017), at: nyti.ms/2HtIO2s. .
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.
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1
2
3

France
France boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. France may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and
practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In July 2018, an information mission set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs commission concluded that France should
“mitigate its criticism of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the countries that have contributed to its
adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global
governance” (bit.ly/2krrvX). Paris and a dozen other French cities have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that

any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• France should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear
arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons,
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

No

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Voluntary offer agreement)

Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks

30.6 t (~2,040 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes (Modified)

Civilian plutonium stocks

65.4 t (~13,080 weapon equivalents

Party to the CWC

Yes

Military plutonium stocks

6 t (~2,000 weapon equivalents

Party to the BWC

Yes
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Mirage 2000N

Nuclear arsenal*
Deployed

280

Stockpiled

20

TOTAL ACTIVE

300

Retired

0

TOTAL

300

Nuclear testing**
The Mirage 2000N, designed to carry a 300 kt nuclear armed air-to-surface
cruise missile (photo: Jerry Gunner)

Number of nuclear explosive tests

210

Last explosive test

1996

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

M51 (1/2)

SLBM

Submarine

32

?

100–150 kt

6,000 km

52 t

12 m

2.3 m

ASMP (A)

Cruise
Missile

Strategic bomber /
fighter plane

?

?

300 kt

300–500 km

860 kg

5.38 m

0.38 m

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

In a 2013 White Paper on defence and national security, the French government asserted that use of nuclear weapons by
France "would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defence." The White Paper further postulates
that nuclear deterrence protects the country from "any State-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin
and in whatever form. It rules out any threat of blackmail that might paralyse its freedom of decision and action."1
France does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, but the French nuclear arsenal has been claimed to
contribute to general NATO deterrence since 1974. Like the United Kingdom, France maintains a "continuous at sea
deterrent" mission, whereby at least one of the country’s four ballistic missile submarines will always be on patrol. When
at sea, the submarines carry 16 SLBMs with six nuclear warheads on each missile. As other nuclear-armed states, France
routinely prepares for the use of nuclear weapons. In February 2019, the French Air Force conducted an 11-hour nuclear
exercise, practicing "to sneak a nuclear-capable cruise missile through simulated enemy air defences."2
France has issued non-binding assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party
to the NPT (provided that the aggressor is not allied to a nuclear-armed state). In ratifying the relevant protocols to the
treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, France has committed not to use nuclear weapons against
the members of the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African or Central Asian NWFZ treaties.
France was long antipathetic towards the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Taking a firm stance against
the concept of nuclear non-proliferation in the late 1950s (when France was still a non-nuclear state), France did not
accede to the NPT until 1992. Today, official French policy states that "France has not given up on the goal of disarmament,
including nuclear disarmament." At the 2018 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee, France claimed to remain
"committed to the objective of a world without nuclear weapons", but qualified its statement by adding "when conditions
allow". France has actively sought to discredit disarmament initiatives such as the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW,
lobbying other states not to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Government of France, "French White Paper: Defence and National Security" (2013), pp. 67, 73.
Sebastian Sprenger, "French Air Force rehearses a long-range nuclear strike", Defense News (5 February 2019), at: bit.ly/30JFNCJ.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "French nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr. See
also Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.
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**
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India
India boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. India may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and
practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that "the "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons, negotiated outside the CD, does not create any obligations for India." (bit.ly/2kTNEhi)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that

any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• India should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to
do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear
weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards
disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

No

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

No (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Item-specific agreement)

Fissile material
4 t (~267 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes (Modified)

Civilian plutonium stocks

0.4 t (~80 weapon equivalents)

Party to the CWC

Yes

Military plutonium stocks

7.07 t (~2,357 weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Nuclear arsenal*

Agni 2

Deployed

0

Stockpiled

130–140

TOTAL ACTIVE

130–140

Retired

0

TOTAL

130–140

Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests

An Agni-2 intermediate range ballistic missile on a road-mobile launcher
(TEL), New Delhi, 2004 (Photo: Antônio Milena)

3

Last explosive test

1998

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

Prithvi 2

SRBM

Road-mobile (TEL)

24

24

12 kt

350 km

4,600 kg

8.56 m

1.1 m

Agni 1

SRBM

Rail/Road-mobile (TEL)

20

20

40 kt

700–900 km

12 t

15 m

1.0 m

Agni 2

MRBM

Rail/Road-mobile (TEL)

8

8

40 kt

2,000–3,500 km

16 t

21 m

1.3 m

Agni 3

IRBM

Rail/Road-mobile (TEL)

8

8

40 kt

3,500–5,000 km

50 t

17 m

2.0 m

Dhanush

SRBM

Ship

2

4

12 kt

400 km

4,500 kg

8.53 m

0.9 m

India also has nuclear-capable fighter planes, and is reported to develop SLBM capability.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
India has traditionally maintained a no-first-use policy. According to the Indian government, India will only contemplate the use of
nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack,1 and India’s force structure is based on the principle of a
"credible minimum deterrent" designed to provide an "adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail." It has therefore usually
been assumed that any use of nuclear weapons by India would be retaliatory rather than pre-emptive, and that it will be focused
on "counter-value targets" (i.e. the adversary’s cities) rather than "counter-force targets" (the adversary’s nuclear forces). However,
according to certain commentators, India may now be in the process of altering its doctrine. India might attempt a counter-force
strike against Pakistan should it believe the latter to be contemplating a nuclear attack against India.2 According to one set of
observers, "India is developing a suite of capabilities and increasingly making statements about preemption and counterforce."3
India has not offered legally binding security assurances to any state. The protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-free zone
treaties containing such assurances for zone members are not open for Indian accession. India has not signed or ratified the NPT,
CTBT, or TPNW, but has on numerous occasions stated that it supports global nuclear disarmament.

1
2
3
4
5
*
**
***

Arms Control Association, "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India" (January 2018), at: bit.ly/2UdLBlo.
Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India’s nuclear strategy: A shift to counterforce?", Observer Research Foundation (30 March 2017). at: bit.ly/32dAw6W.
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, "India’s Counterforce Temptations", International Security 43, no. 3 (2019), p. 7.
Statement by India to the UN General Assembly First Committee (9 October 2017), at: bit.ly/32beUrz.
International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Fissile material stocks" (January 2017), at: http://fissilematerials.org/.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.
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While successive Indian governments have claimed to favour nuclear disarmament also after 1998 – the Indian delegation to
the UN General Assembly First Committee in 2017 asserted that "India remains committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons free
world"4 – India has gradually expanded its nuclear capabilities. India formally supports the commencement of negotiations on
a fissile material cut-off treaty, but has been reluctant to discuss existing stocks of such material, preferring a treaty that would
only ban future production. In contrast to Pakistan, which possesses a much smaller stock of fissile material and has opposed
negotiations on a treaty that only prohibits future production, India retains enough fissile material to produce thousands of new
nuclear warheads.5 The Indian government did not participate in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in 2017.

Israel
Israel boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Israel may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and
practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Israel opposes the TPNW. In 2017, the Israeli delegation to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that "Israel wishes to
emphasize its view that the treaty does not create, contribute to the development of, or indicate the existence of customary law
related to the subject or the content of the Treaty." (bit.ly/2lXKnhp)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that

any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• Israel should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to
do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear
weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards
disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

No

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed, Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Item-specific agreement)

Fissile material
0.3 t (~20 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

-

Party to the CWC

No (Signatory)

Military plutonium stocks

0.9 t (~300 weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

No

Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Jericho 3

Nuclear arsenal*
Deployed

0

Stockpiled

80

TOTAL ACTIVE

80

Retired

0

TOTAL

80

Nuclear testing**
The launch of a Jericho 3 missile (photo: unknown)

Number of nuclear explosive tests

?

Last explosive test

?

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

Jericho 2

MRBM

Silo/rail/TEL

25

?

?

1,500–1,800 km

22 t

15 m

1.35 m

Jericho 3

IRBM

Silo/rail/TEL

25

?

?

4,000+ km

29 t

15.5-16 m

1.56 m

Israel is also believed to have SLCM capability, and that the country maintains 30 nuclear gravity bombs to be delivered by aircraft.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
Israel is believed to have acquired nuclear weapons in 1967, and to have slowly expanded its stockpile ever since. Although Israel
has never confirmed the existence of a nuclear arsenal, experts estimate that it reached a level of around 80 nuclear warheads for
delivery by aircraft, ground-based missiles and, possibly, sea-launched cruise missiles by 2004 and that this number has remained
stable since that date. Kristensen and Norris estimate that Israel stores its nuclear warheads at five locations across the country.1
Israel is not confirmed to have conducted any nuclear tests. However, Israel is believed to have received access to early French
testing data, and is believed by some to have conducted a nuclear test near the Prince Edward Islands off Antarctica in 1979
(the so-called Vela incident), possibly in cooperation with South Africa. There is no reliable public estimate of Israel’s spending on
nuclear weapons.
Maintaining a policy of nuclear "opacity", Israel has never made its nuclear doctrine public. Instead, Israeli officials have insisted
that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. Writing in 2017, Kristensen maintained that Israel’s
nuclear warheads were not on alert in normal circumstances, increasing the amount of time needed to launch a nuclear strike.2
Israel has not officially admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not offered legally binding security assurances to
any state. The protocols to the various NWFZ treaties are not open for Israeli accession.
Israel officially "supports a vision of the Middle East free from war and hostility, and from weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery."3 However, Israel has resisted calls to negotiate a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East, claiming its security interests are not being sufficiently accommodated. Israel reportedly "values the NPT and recognizes
its contribution to the non-proliferation regime",4 but has not acceded to the agreement. Israel has not ratified the CTBT, but
contributes to the CTBT verification scheme by supplying data from its national seismic stations to the International Data Centre.

2
3
4
*
**
***

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5
(2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.
Hans M. Kristensen, "Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons", AIP Conference Proceedings 1898 (2017), p. 1.
Statement of Israel to the UNGA First Committee (13 October 2016), at: bit.ly/348sGx5.
Statement of Israel to the UNGA First Committee (13 October 2017), at: bit.ly/30JcsIL.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.
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1

Pakistan
Pakistan boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Pakistan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to
its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

An official spokesperson of the Pakistani government stated in August 2017 that Pakistan "cannot become a party" to the TPNW.
"Pakistan does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations enshrined in this Treaty." (bit.ly/2msHhlP)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that

any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• Pakistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear
weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards
disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

Compliant

TPNW process

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

Abstained

Party to the NPT

No

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

No (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Item-specific agreement)

Fissile material
3.4 t (~227 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

No

Civilian plutonium stocks

-

Party to the CWC

Yes

Military plutonium stocks

0.28 t (~93 weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Highly enriched uranium stocks
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HATF 3, 4 & 5

Nuclear arsenal*
Deployed

0

Stockpiled

140–150

TOTAL ACTIVE

140–150

Retired

0

TOTAL

140–150

Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests

Pakistani nuclear-capable missiles on display in Karachi, 2008 (photo:
unknown)

2

Last explosive test

1998

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

Ghaznavi (Hatf 3)

SRBM

Road-mobile

~16

~16

5-12 kt

290 km

700 kg

8.5 m

0.8 m

Ghauri (Hatf 5)

MRBM

Road-mobile

~24

~24

5-12 kt

1,250–1,500 km

700 kg

15.9 m

1.35 m

Shaheen 2 (Hatf 6)

MRBM

Road-mobile

~12

~12

5-12 kt

1,500–2,000 km

700 kg

17.2 m

1.4 m

Babur (Hatf 7)

GLCM

Ground launched

~12

~12

5-12 kt

350-700 km

~500 kg

6.2 m

0.52 m

Nasr (Hatf 9)

SRBM

Road-mobile

~24

~24

low kt

60 km

1,200 kg

6m

0.4 m

Pakistan is also believed to be able to deliver nuclear weapons by aircraft (F-16 / Mirage III), and there are indications that the country is developing weapons for use on ships or submarines.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
The government of Pakistan has pledged "no first use against non-nuclear weapons states", but "Pakistan’s policy on first use
against states that possess nuclear weapons, particularly India, remains vague."1 Pakistan has traditionally kept its nuclear
warheads "de-mated", meaning that the fissile cores are stored separately from the rest of the warheads. This practice
increases the time required to employ the weapons, likely reducing the risk of nuclear strikes following miscalculation or
accidents. In recent years, a number of commentators have expressed concern about Pakistan’s development of tactical
nuclear weapons, which they fear will lower the nuclear threshold.2
Pakistan has not offered legally binding security assurances to any state. The protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-freezone treaties containing such assurances are not open for Pakistani accession. Since 1990, however, Pakistan has advocated
the negotiation of a global treaty containing negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states.
Pakistan frequently conducts nuclear drills and tests of nuclear-capable missiles. Over the course of 2018 and the first nine
months of 2019, Pakistan carried out at least seven nuclear missile tests, including of intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(Hatf-5 and Shaheen II), short-range ballistic missiles (Nasr), and a sea-launched cruise missile that likely had nuclear capacity.
Pakistan has long claimed to favour global nuclear disarmament, even after its acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1990s. In
practice, however, Pakistan has expanded its nuclear capabilities and blocked the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile
Material (Cut-off) Treaty. Pakistan did not participate in the negotiation of the 2017 TPNW.

*
**
***

Arms Control Association, "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan" (April 2017), at: bit.ly/2NFE3H8.
Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 5 (2018),
at: bit.ly/30K9B1Z.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.
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1
2

Russian Federation
Russia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Russia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and
practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Russia is opposed the TPNW. In a 2017 statement to the UNGA First Committee, the Russian government said it "cannot assess
this Treaty the TPNW positively." (bit.ly/2kwgHrg)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that

any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• Russia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear
arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons,
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Compliant

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

TPNW process

Compliant
Not compliant
Compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Voluntary offer agreement)

Fissile material
679 t (~45,267 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes (Modified)

Civilian plutonium stocks

59 t (~11,800 weapon equivalents)

Party to the CWC

Yes

Military plutonium stocks

128 t (~42,667 weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Highly enriched uranium stocks
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SS-18 M6 SATAN

Nuclear arsenal*
Deployed

1,600

Stockpiled

2,730

TOTAL ACTIVE

4,330

Retired

2,170

TOTAL

6,500

Nuclear testing**
The R-36 missile (NATO reporting name: SS-18 Satan) is the largest of
all the ICBMs, here pictured at the Museum of Strategic Rocket Forces,
Ukraine (Photo: Clay Gilliland)

Number of nuclear explosive tests

715

Last explosive test

1990

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY
PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

SS-18 M6 Satan

ICBM

Silo

46

460

500/800 kt

11,000 km

211.1 t

34.3 m

3m

SS-19 M3 Stiletto

ICBM

Silo

20

120

400 kt

10,000 km

105.6 t

27 m

2.5 m

SS-25 Sickle

ICBM

Mobile

90

90

800 kt

11,000 km

45 t

23 m

1.8 m

SS-27 Mod 1/2

ICBM

Silo/Mobile

160

522

100–800 kt

10,500–11,000 km

47.2 t

22.7 m

1.86 m

SS-N-18 M1 Stingray

SLBM

Submarine

16

48

200 kt

6,500 km

35.3 t

14.6 m

1.8 m

SS-N-23 M1

SLBM

Submarine

96

384

500 kt

11,000 km

47 t

21.9 m

1.9 m

SS-N-32

SLBM

Submarine

48

288

100–150 kt

8,300 km

36.8 t

12.1 m

2.0 m

AS-15A/23B

ALCM

Bomber

68

786

200–250 kt

6,500–13,200 km

1,210 kg

6.04 m

0.514 m

The Russian nuclear weapons arsenal also includes a number of nonstrategic and defensive weapon systems, including short-range ballistic
missiles. The range listed for the ALCMs is the range of the delivery platform (Tupolev bombers).

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
Measured by the sheer number of nuclear warheads in its possession, Russia retains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
According to the current Russian doctrine, Russia reserves "the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear
and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the
Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy".1 Russia possesses
a larger arsenal of "tactical" or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons than other nuclear-armed states, suggesting that Russia retains
a comparatively greater role for the battlefield use of nuclear weapons (as opposed to "strategic" use against cities or nuclear
assets) than other nuclear-armed states.
The Russian Federation has ratified the protocols containing negative security assurances for members of the Latin American and
Caribbean, South Pacific, African, and Central Asian NWFZs. Russia has thereby committed not to use nuclear weapons against
members of these zones. Russia/the Soviet Union has offered a number of non-binding security assurances over the years, but
Russia does not have a no-first-use policy.

1

*
**
***

Russian Embassy to the United Kingdom, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (2014), at: https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: https://fas.org/issues/
nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Russian nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 2 (2019), at: bit.ly/2L5l8U8. See
also Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/
default/files/SIPRIYB18c06.pdf.
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Russian officials often assert that Russia is committed to the creation of a world without nuclear weapons. In practice, however,
Russia has snubbed offers of multilateral arms control negotiations, including proposals to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, and
sought to discredit diplomatic efforts such as the humanitarian initiative for nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Russia has
reportedly approached the United States to discuss the extension of the New START agreement, but has apparently not found a
willing interlocutor.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United Kingdom may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the UK government said that the UK “does not intend to sign, ratify or become party to" the TPNW. It further stated that
“The unpredictable international security environment we face today demands the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent for the
foreseeable future” (bit.ly/2mp3twV ). The cities of Edinburgh and Manchester have joined ICAN’s Cities Appeal. In July 2018, the
governing body of the Church of England, the Synod, adopted a motion calling on the UK government to “respond positively” to the
TPNW and bring about nuclear disarmament. (bit.ly/2ms2psg)

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The United Kingdom should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international

security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to
verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• The United Kingdom should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position
to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings
of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Compliant

Art 1(1)(e)

Compliant
Not compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

Yes (Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Voluntary offer agreement)

Fissile material
21.2 t (~1,413 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes (Modified)

Civilian plutonium stocks

110.3 t (~22,060 weapon equivalents)

Party to the CWC

Yes

Military plutonium stocks

3.2 t (~1,067 weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Highly enriched uranium stocks
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Vanguard Class submarine

Nuclear arsenal*
Deployed

120

Stockpiled

95

TOTAL ACTIVE

215

Retired

0

TOTAL

215

Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests

Royal Navy Vanguard Class submarine HMS Vigilant returning to HMNB
Clyde after her extended deployment (CPOA(Phot) Thomas McDonald/MOD)

45

Last explosive test

1991

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY
PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

UGM-133A Trident II D5

SLBM

Submarines

?

215

100 kt

7,400+ km

59 t

13.58 m

2.11 m

The United Kingdom draws its missiles from the "commingled US/UK pool of missiles". These Trident II missiles are serviced and maintained to
precisely the same standards as those of the United States (bit.ly/2p6GM20).

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
The United Kingdom espouses a first-use posture and a so-called continuous-at-sea deterrence (CASD) policy, meaning that
at least one nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine will always be on patrol. The UK government claims that its nuclear
arsenal offers a credible and independent minimum deterrent,1 but critics have questioned not only whether UK nuclear use
is credible, but also whether the UK nuclear arsenal is really independent from the United States, and whether UK nuclear
weapons are actually deterring anyone from doing something they want to do. The British nuclear-weapon programme
has traditionally been justified by UK government officials as a deterrent against Soviet/Russian aggression. And as the UK
nuclear force is by all accounts not large enough to threaten the nuclear forces or infrastructure ("counterforce targets") of
Russia, any deterrence relies on an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons against Russian population centres ("countervalue" targets). From the late 1960s onwards, British nuclear doctrine and procurement have ostensibly been centred on the
so-called Moscow criterion, that is, the ability to demolish the Russian capital and its inhabitants.2
Successive British governments have framed the United Kingdom as a "responsible nuclear-weapon state" and expressed
support for the goal of nuclear disarmament. At the 2018 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee in Geneva, the
UK delegation stated that "[w]e firmly believe a consensus, step-by-step approach to multilateral disarmament is the best
way of making progress towards our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons."3 However, as discussed above,
British policy makers often make quite different statements to their domestic audiences, representing disarmament as
irresponsible, effeminate, or humiliating. For example, in a 2015 op-ed, then UK Foreign Secretary (now Prime Minister),
Boris Johnson, likened nuclear disarmament to castration.4

1
2
3
4
5

*
**
***

UK Ministry of Defence, "The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent" (19 February 2018), at: bit.ly/2Zq4LKL.
John Baylis, "British Nuclear Doctrine", Contemporary British History 19, no. 1 (2005).
Statement by the United Kingdom to the 2018 NPT PrepCom (26 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2zw86bW.
Boris Johnson, "If we want to be taken seriously, we have to defend ourselves", The Telegraph (16 February 2015), at: bit.ly/30K9sLZ.
International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Fissile material stocks" (January 2017), at: http://fissilematerials.org/.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.
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The United Kingdom formally supports the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty, but has been
reluctant to discuss existing stocks of such material, preferring a treaty that would only ban future production. The United
Kingdom retains enough fissile material to produce thousands of new nuclear warheads.5 And despite being a party to
the NPT, which commits the United Kingdom to pursue negotiations "in good faith" on nuclear disarmament, the United
Kingdom has never participated in any nuclear disarmament negotiations.

United States of America
The United States boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United States may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In a 2017 statement about the TPNW, the United states declared that it “will not support the treaty”. Nuclear disarmament “will
require a transformation of the international security environment.” (bit.ly/2kwlcCa) In August 2018, the California Senate approved
resolutions urging the United States to embrace the TPNW and restrict the US president’s unchecked authority to launch a first
nuclear strike. The states of Oregon and New Jersey have also approved legislation supporting the TPNW. Washington D.C., Los
Angeles, and seven other U.S. cities have committed to ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security,

and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to reduce and
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• The United States should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a
position to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear
arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons,
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed

Adhered

No

No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a)

The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring

Not compliant

The prohibition on testing

Compliant

The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(b)

The prohibition on transferring

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(c)

The prohibition on receiving transfer or control

Art 1(1)(d)

The prohibition on using

Art 1(1)(e)

Compliant
Compliant

The prohibition on threatening to use

Not compliant

The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities

Not compliant

The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities

Not compliant

At 1(1)(f)

The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities

Not compliant

Art 1(1)(g)

The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

TPNW process

Compliant

Related treaties and mechanisms

Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)

Voted no

Party to the NPT

Yes

Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)

No (N/A)

Party to a NWFZ

No

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Vote on adoption of treaty text

N/A

Ratified the CTBT

No (Signed, Annex 2 state)

Vote on UNGA resolution 2018

Voted no

Party to the PTBT

Yes

Member of the CD

Yes

IAEA CSA in force

No (Voluntary offer agreement)

Fissile material
574.5 t (~38,300 weapon equivalents)

IAEA AP in force

Yes (Modified)

Civilian plutonium stocks

8 t (~1,600 weapon equivalents)

Party to the CWC

Yes

Military plutonium stocks

79.8 t (~26,600weapon equivalents)

Party to the BWC

Yes

Highly enriched uranium stocks
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AGM-86B

Nuclear arsenal*
Deployed

1,750

Stockpiled

2,050

TOTAL ACTIVE

3,800

Retired

2,385

TOTAL

6,185

Nuclear testing**
AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile dropped from a B-52H Stratofortress,
Utah, 2014 (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Roidan Carlson)

Number of nuclear explosive tests

1,030

Last explosive test

1992

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME

TYPE

DELIVERY PLATFORM

NO.

WARHEADS
(AVAILABLE)

YIELD PER
WARHEAD

RANGE

WEIGHT

LENGTH

DIAMETER

LGM-30G Minuteman III

ICBM

Silo

400

800

300kt–335kt

13,000 km

34.4 t

18.2 m

1.85 m

UGM-133A Trident II D5

SLBM

Submarines

240

1,920

100kt–475kt

7,400+ km

59 t

13.58 m

2.11 m

AGM-86B

Cruise
missile

Strategic bombers

44

528

5-150 kt

2,500/16,000 km

1,450 kg

6.32 m

0.62 m

Gravity
bombs

Strategic bombers/
fighter planes

16

282

0.3-340 kt

11,000 km

320 kg

3.56 m

0.33 m

B61/B83

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

The United States maintains a first use policy and significant "counter-force" capabilities. According to the Trump
administration’s "Nuclear Posture Review" of February 2018, the United States will "only consider the employment of nuclear
weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of the United States, its allies, and partners."1 The United
States has long maintained that it will not use nuclear weapons "against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the
NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations." However, this assurance is not legally binding and it
is not clear how the United States defines "in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations". The United States
has only offered legally binding assurances not to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Washington has refused to ratify the protocols containing such assurances for members of the South Pacific, South-East
Asian, African, and Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zones.

1
2

*
**
***

US Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review" (February 2018), p. 21.
Hans M. Kristensen, "Pentagon Slams Door On Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Transparency", Federation of American Scientists (17 April 2019),
at: bit.ly/2PnjHoA.
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen , "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.
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In 2018, the United States abandoned its longstanding policy of seeking disarmament through a "step-by-step" approach
and launched instead an initiative to "create the conditions for nuclear disarmament" (later renamed "creating the
environment for nuclear disarmament" (CEND)). According to the US government, the security environment is currently not
auspicious for nuclear reductions or implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Consequently, the international community
should focus not on further disarmament steps, but rather on creating an environment in which the United States,
Russia, and other nuclear-armed major powers would feel secure enough to reduce and eliminate their weapons of mass
destruction. For the US government, necessary changes include, inter alia, the verified unilateral disarmament of DPR
Korea, universal application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols in non-nuclear-weapon states, a
guarantee that Iran "is never again able to position itself dangerously close to nuclear weaponization", and an improvement
in "transparency about nuclear policies, plans, and doctrines". In 2019, the United States decided not to disclose the current
number of nuclear weapons in the Defense Department’s nuclear weapons stockpile, walking back close to a decade of US
nuclear transparency policy.2

Text of the Treaty

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Treaty,
Determined to contribute to the realization of the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences that would result from any use of nuclear
weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to
completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the
only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never
used again under any circumstances,
Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence
of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon
detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and
emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all
humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to
prevent any use of nuclear weapons,
Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of
nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed,
transcend national borders, pose grave implications for
human survival, the environment, socioeconomic
development, the global economy, food security and the
health of current and future generations, and have a
disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as
a result of ionizing radiation,
Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear
disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining
a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is a global public good
of the highest order, serving both national and collective
security interests,
Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm
caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons
(hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of
nuclear weapons,
Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclearweapon activities on indigenous peoples,
Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply
with applicable international law, including international
humanitarian law and international human rights law,
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Basing themselves on the principles and rules of
international humanitarian law, in particular the principle
that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of
distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks,
the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the
prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules
for the protection of the natural environment,
Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of
international humanitarian law,
Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also
be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates
of public conscience,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, States must refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations, and that the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security are to be
promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the
world’s human and economic resources,
Recalling also the first resolution of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January
1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the
elimination of nuclear weapons,
Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament,
the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and
security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste
of economic and human resources on programmes for
the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear
weapons,
Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear
weapons constitutes an important contribution towards
the achievement and maintenance of a world free of
nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and
transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and
determined to act towards that end,
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Determined to act with a view to achieving effective
progress towards general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control,
Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in
good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control,
Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role
to play in promoting international peace and security,
Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a
core element of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime,
Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the
internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the
States of the region concerned enhances global and
regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the
objective of nuclear disarmament,
Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be
interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States
Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation
of both women and men is an essential factor for the
promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and
security, and committed to supporting and strengthening
the effective participation of women in nuclear
disarmament,
Recognizing also the importance of peace and
disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising
awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear
weapons for current and future generations, and
committed to the dissemination of the principles and
norms of this Treaty,
Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering
of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for
the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing
the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations,
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
other international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha,
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Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
Prohibitions

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any
circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire,
possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage
in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone
to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in
its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
Article 2
Declarations

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this
Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration
in which it shall:
(a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled
nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and
eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including
the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclearweapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force
of this Treaty for that State Party;
(b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns,
possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices;
(c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are
any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or
control that are owned, possessed or controlled by
another State.
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2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
transmit all such declarations received to the States
Parties.
Article 3
Safeguards

1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2,
does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in
force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without
prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may
adopt in the future.
2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2,
does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into
force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement
shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force
of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall
enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry
into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State
Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without
prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may
adopt in the future.
Article 4
Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed
or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme,
including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all
nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into
force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the
competent international authority designated pursuant to
paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the
irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme.
The competent international authority shall report to the
States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of
the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from
peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of
undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party
as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall
commence within 180 days from the entry into force of
this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter
into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force
of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall
thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards
obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant
instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that
owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other
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nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them
from operational status, and destroy them as soon as
possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by
the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a
legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and
irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclearweapon programme, including the elimination or
irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related
facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the
entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall
submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent
international authority designated by the States Parties.
The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent
international authority, which shall submit it to the
subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference,
whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its
rules of procedure.
3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall
conclude a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of
undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a
whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence
no later than the date upon which implementation of the
plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after
the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall
thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the
entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has
fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party
that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction
or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by
another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such
weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline
to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties.
Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive
devices, that State Party shall submit to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations a declaration that it has
fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall
submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each
review conference on the progress made towards the
implementation of its obligations under this Article, until
such time as they are fulfilled.
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6. The States Parties shall designate a competent
international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify
the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons
programmes, including the elimination or irreversible
conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in
accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In
the event that such a designation has not been made prior
to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to
which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations shall convene an
extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any
decisions that may be required.
Article 5
National implementation

1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures
to implement its obligations under this Treaty.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide
technical, material and financial assistance to States
Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to
further the implementation of this Treaty.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide
assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia,
through the United Nations system, international, regional
or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental
organizations or institutions, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.

2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal,
administrative and other measures, including the
imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty
undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction
or control.

6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it
may have under international law, a State Party that has
used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear
explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide
adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the
purpose of victim assistance and environmental
remediation.

Article 6
Victim assistance and environmental remediation

Article 8
Meeting of States Parties

1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under
its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of
nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable
international humanitarian and human rights law,
adequately provide age-and gender-sensitive assistance,
without discrimination, including medical care,
rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide
for their social and economic inclusion.

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to
consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect
of any matter with regard to the application or
implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its
relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear
disarmament, including:

2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its
jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities
related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and
appropriate measures towards the environmental
remediation of areas so contaminated.

(b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible
elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including
additional protocols to this Treaty;

3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall
be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any
other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one
year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings
of States Parties shall be convened by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless
otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of
States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first
session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of
the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally
binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading
towards their total elimination, shall apply.

Article 7
International cooperation and assistance

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States
Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State
Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance,
where feasible, from other States Parties.
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3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be
convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, at the written request of any
State Party provided that this request is supported by at
least one third of the States Parties.
4. After a period of five years following the entry into force
of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene a conference to review the operation of the
Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the
Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
convene further review conferences at intervals of six
years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed
by the States Parties.
5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant
entities of the United Nations system, other relevant
international organizations or institutions, regional
organizations, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental
organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of
States Parties and the review conferences as observers.
Article 9
Costs

1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review
conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States
Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not
party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment
adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations in the circulation of declarations under
Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments
under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of
assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The cost related to the implementation of verification
measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs
related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclearweapon programmes, including the elimination or
conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should
be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the
States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they
support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal
shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties
or review conference, whichever comes first.
2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may
agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a
positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States
Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted
amendment to all States Parties.
3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State
Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or
acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the
deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance
by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption.
Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party
90 days following the deposit of its instrument of
ratification or acceptance of the amendment.
Article 11
Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States
Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this
Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with
a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or
by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice in
accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the
settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good
offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start
the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending
a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with
the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of
the United Nations.
Article 12
Universality

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this
Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the
Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States
to the Treaty.
Article 13
Signature

Article 10
Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any
State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The
text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views
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September 2017.
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Article 14
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for
accession.
Article 15
Entry into force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90
days after the date on which that State has deposited its
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after
the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by
the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month
period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed
conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the
obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols
until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.
Article 18
Relationship with other agreements

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice
obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to
existing international agreements, to which they are party,
where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.
Article 19
Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby
designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 16
Reservations

Article 20
Authentic texts

The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to
reservations.

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic.

Article 17
Duration and withdrawal

DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand
and seventeen.

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALCM
ANZUS
ASCM
BWC
CSTO
CTBT
CWC
DR Congo
GLCM
IAEA
ICAN
ICBM
INF
INFCIRC
IRBM
Lao PDR
LEU
MIRV
NATO
NPA
NPT
NWCS
NWFZ
Pu
SNOWCAT
SLBM
SLCM
SRBM
SSBN
START
TPNW
UAE
UK
UN
UNODA
US
WMD

Air-launched cruise missile
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (Treaty).
Anti-ship cruise missile
Biological Weapons Convention
Collective Security Treaty Organization
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Chemical Weapons Convention
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ground-launched cruise missile
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Intercontinental ballistic missile
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Information Circular
Intermediate-range ballistic missile
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Low enriched uranium
Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Norwegian People’s Aid
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear-weapon-complicit states
Nuclear-weapon-free zone
Plutonium
Support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics
Submarine-launched ballistic missile
Submarine-launched cruise missile
Short-range ballistic missile
Submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
United States
Weapons of mass destruction
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